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Abstract 
 In this thesis I argue that the affective component of emotional experience plays an 
essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I call this the notion 
of affect as a disclosure of value.  
The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part I critically asses three 
contemporary accounts which, I argue, are motivated either implicitly or explicitly by the 
notion of affect as a disclosure of value. I argue that all three accounts fail due to the 
theoretical assumptions they inherit from the respective underlying theories of perceptual 
experience they rely on to theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in emotiona l 
experience. Nevertheless, out of the critical assessment I extract three criteria that an 
account of affect as a disclosure of value ought to satisfy and I clarify the theoretical 
positions that we ought to avoid.  
In the second part of the thesis I build on these three criteria to provide an account 
of affect as a disclosure of value. I argue that at the core of this account is the constitut ive 
thesis that the formation of rationally intelligible motivational states towards an object is 
constitutive of the disclosure of value. I then argue that a defence of the constitutive thesis 
commits us to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value of the sort defended 
by David Wiggins and John McDowell. Finally, I rely on the work of John Campbell to 
clarify both the sort of evaluative knowledge at stake and the role of affect in its acquisit ion.  
I argue that the sort of knowledge at stake is the sort that grounds our evaluative concepts 
and affect provides us with the epistemic access to the evaluative concepts’ semantic value.
   1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Aim 
A lot of interest in contemporary philosophical research on emotions has 
concentrated on their experiential dimension. The experiential dimension of an emotion 
refers to that aspect of an emotion that is occurrent, episodic and has phenomenal character.  
To get a preliminary grip on what the experiential dimension of an emotion is, it is useful 
to distinguish it from the dispositional dimension of an emotion. To illustrate. A mother’s 
love for her child need not be occurrent, or felt, by the mother in every moment of her life. 
Yet this does not mean that when the mother is not feeling her love for her child or thinking 
about it, she does not love her child. Rather, all things equal, the mother loves her child 
throughout her waking life and she is disposed to feel, or experience, her love only when 
certain conditions obtain, for instance when she is in the presence of her child or when her 
child is the topic of conversation. The target of this thesis are emotions as experienced and 
not emotional dispositions.   
There are two features of emotional experience that have received particular 
attention in recent studies on the subject. The first feature is the sort of evaluation that is 
involved in having an emotional experience. For instance, when I experience fear at an 
ongoing robbery, I evaluate the ongoing robbery as dangerous or fearsome. When I 
experience indignation at the latest governmental cuts to higher education, I evaluate the 
governmental cuts as unjust. And when I feel joy at the birth of a new born, I evaluate the 
birth as a joyful event. The second feature of emotional experience that has attracted 
attention in recent accounts is their phenomenology. The phenomenology, or phenomena l 
character, of an experience is that aspect of the experience that is often referred to as the 
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“what it is likeness” of having that experience from a first person point of view. Emotiona l 
experiences have a salient phenomenal character that is usually characterised as affective. 
Although the notion of affect is general and its nature is subject of heated debates within a 
variety of disciplines, by “affect” philosophers generally refer to that feeling-component 
of an emotional experience that we often express as “moving” or “touching” us. For 
instance, in feeling sad at my friend’s death, the affective component of the experience of 
sadness is what we might metaphorically express when saying “It hurts that my friend 
died”. And in feeling exhilarated at the news that I won a prestigious prize, the affective 
component of the experience of exhilaration is what we might metaphorically refer to as 
the feeling of “elevation” at the news.  
While it might be less controversial to agree that emotional experience involves an 
affective component, it might be more controversial to agree that emotional experience 
involves some sort of world-directed evaluation. Although in this thesis I do not expend 
energies in providing arguments to the effect that emotional experience involves 
evaluation, it will prove fruitful to provide two observations that support this claim and 
two further clarifications of the subject matter of this thesis in order to avoid init ial potential 
objections. The two observations in support of the claim that emotional experiences involve 
evaluations are the following. First, as Deonna and Teroni (2012, 40) observe, a good 
indication that emotions are intimately related with evaluation is to look at our everyday 
language. Very often, there is a corresponding relation between a type of emotion and an 
evaluative predicate. For instance, sadness, happiness, fear, shame, admiration and 
contempt have the corresponding evaluative predicates “sad,” “happy,” “fearsome,” 
“shameful,” “admirable,” and “contemptible.” This first observation ties in neatly with the 
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second one. Michelle Montague, whose account of emotional experience we will look at 
in detail in the first chapter of this thesis, convincingly observes that having an emotiona l 
experience normally involves attributing an evaluative predicate to something. For 
instance, in feeling fear, I normally attribute the evaluative predicate of “dangerous” or 
“fearsome” to something, say the ongoing robbery. To put the same thought the other way 
round, it seems to make little sense to feel fear towards an ongoing robbery yet not see any 
reason why one should attribute the predicate “dangerous” or “fearsome” to the event.1 In 
the rest of this thesis, then, along with many other theorists of emotion, I assume that 
emotional experiences involve evaluations. 
The two further clarifications of the subject matter of this thesis are the following. 
First, I am not arguing that all experiences that we normally denote with an emotional tag 
and that have a clear affective dimension are world-directed evaluations. For instance, 
panic attacks are experienced as having a strong affective component and are usually 
denoted as extreme forms of anxiety. Yet these forms of anxiety are not, at least at first 
sight, directed towards the world. The first clarification, then, is that in this thesis I focus 
strictly on emotional episodes that are clearly evaluatively related to worldly objects. By 
this I do not mean to include solely particulars occupying a spatio-temporal position in the 
actual world and which are present but also objects and states of affairs that are imagined, 
objects and states of affairs that belong to the past, future or conceivable states of affairs 
and objects, and so on. The second clarification stems from the fact that many experiences 
with an affective tone do not seem to be evaluations of particular objects in the world. For 
instance, subjects feeling depressed normally do not feel depressed at a particular object or 
                                                 
1 Here I bracket cases of phobia where the subject fears an object yet is aware that there is no 
reason to attribute danger to the object. 
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state of affairs in the world. The same seems to be the case with melancholia. In these 
cases, subjects report the world in general to be “coloured” by their state of mind. Here, it 
is important to distinguish between emotional experiences and moods. Although to a 
certain extent this is merely a matter of terminology, in this thesis emotional experiences 
refer to experiences with an affective dimension that are evaluatively directed to particular 
objects or state of affairs while moods do not have particular objects or state of affairs 
towards which they are directed. As the examples listed at the beginning of this 
introduction suggest, I am interested in experiential episodes of, say, fear that are directed 
towards a particular state of affairs, say, an ongoing robbery or a past traumatic event or a 
future possible breakup from my beloved partner. Phenomena that fall under the category 
of moods as characterised here will not be part of my investigations in this thesis.   
The target of this thesis, then, are emotional experiences understood as occurrent, 
phenomenally conscious episodes of emotions with an affective character that are 
evaluatively directed towards particular objects or states of affairs. Now, what 
distinguishes a prominent number of contemporary philosophical theorists of emotiona l 
experience -understood in the way that we have specified so far- is their belief that in 
theorising the evaluative nature of emotional experience we should not conceive their 
affective character as a mere contingent and extrinsic component. On the contrary, 
according to these theories, the affective component of emotional experience should be 
seen as playing an essential role in the way that we evaluatively relate to the world. But 
why should we think so? The motivation behind this belief is the phenomenologica l 
observation that in the absence of the affective component of emotional experience we 
miss something about the evaluative import of an object or state of affairs, something about 
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the evaluative import that we can gain solely in virtue of having an affective response to 
the object. But what are we missing about the value of an object in the absence of an 
affective response to an object or state of affairs? The thought is that what we are missing 
is a distinctive sort of evaluative knowledge about the object or state of affairs, a sort of 
knowledge that can be acquired solely in virtue of our experience having an affective 
component. It is this intuition that would motivate many to claim that if, hypothetica l ly, 
you have never felt amusement at something, then no matter how much you have been told 
about amusing things, you don’t really know what an amusing thing is. And if you have 
never felt admiration, then no matter how much you have been told about admirable people, 
you don’t really know what an admirable person is.  
Although the claim that in the absence of emotional affect we are unable to acquire 
a distinctive sort of evaluative knowledge about an object or state of affairs might resonate 
with many, including myself, it might not resonate with others. For what sort of knowledge 
is at stake here? And what exactly is the role that affect plays in the acquisition of such 
knowledge? Are we claiming that if a subject is unable to feel, say, fear, then she is unable 
to grasp the concept of “danger”? If not, then why should we think that affect plays an 
essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm? What would we be missing in case 
we were to stop feeling emotions and become stone-cold, hyper-rational human beings? 
The aim of this thesis is to answer these questions. More specifically, the aim of this thesis 
is to argue that affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I 
call this the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. 
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2. The Structure 
 There are two central questions that need to be answered in order to provide an 
account of affect as a disclosure of value, that is, in order to provide a defence of the claim 
that affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. First, what 
sort of evaluative knowledge is at play? Second, what exactly is the essential role of affect 
in the acquisition of such knowledge? Both these questions are answered in steps 
throughout the various chapters of the thesis finding their culmination in the final chapter. 
In this section I want to review the overall argument of this thesis by giving a brief 
summary of the steps of the argument.  
 The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of the thesis is composed of three 
chapters. In Chapter 1 I critically assess Michelle Montague’s argument to the effect that 
the affective phenomenal character of emotional experience is inextricably linked to its 
evaluative component. Strictly speaking, Montague’s aim is not to argue for affect as a 
disclosure of value even though, as we shall see, that is the motivation behind her account. 
I argue that Montague’s account falls short of securing the inextricability between affect 
and evaluation in emotional experience and therefore does not provide us with a viable 
account from which to argue that affect provides us with a distinctive sort of evaluative 
knowledge. I argue that Montague’s argument falls short of its promise due to the 
theoretical constraints imposed by the theory of perceptual experience she relies on to 
theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience. More 
specifically, I argue that since her arguments to the effect that phenomenology and 
intentionality are inextricably linked are unsuccessful, her account falls back into a position 
that suffers from the same problems as qualia theories of the phenomenal character of 
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experience do, namely one’s that do not allow us to show how the phenomenal character 
of experience, in this case affect, discloses not only features of the experience but also of 
the object of experience. 
 In Chapter 2 I critically assess Peter Goldie’s account of “feelings towards.” Here 
I argue that Goldie relies on an intentionalist, or representationalist, model of experience 
to make the case that affect and evaluation are inextricably linked. I argue that Goldie’s 
arguments are inconclusive as to whether affect and evaluation are inextricably linked. 
Moreover, I argue that due to his commitments to an intentionalist model of experience, 
what Goldie’s arguments can achieve at most is a necessary relation between affect and 
evaluation in emotional experience but not the claim that the presence of affect discloses a 
feature of the object of experience, namely its value, rather than just a feature of experience. 
I argue that the lesson to be drawn from the first two chapters is that if we want to secure 
the claim that affect is the disclosure of value, then at the very least the theoretical 
commitments of our account need to allow for the notion that in having a phenomena lly 
conscious experience we disclose not only features of the experience but also of the object 
of experience. 
 In Chapter 3 I critically assess a final account of the relation between affect and 
evaluation underpinned by a specific theory of experience, namely Mark Johnston’s. The 
theory that underlies Johnston’s account is so-called Naïve Realism, or Relationism. I 
argue that although this theory of experience avoids the issues with the previous two 
theories looked at in Chapters 1 and 2, ultimately also in this case, when applied to affect 
and value, the account provided fails to secure its aim due to the theoretical commitments 
imported from the underlying theory of experience. Nevertheless, there is an important 
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difference between Johnston’s account and Montague’s and Goldie’s. While in the case of 
Montague and Goldie the aim is strictly to argue for the inextricability between affect and 
evaluation in emotional experience, by way of which one can then attempt to argue for the 
notion that affect is the disclosure of value, in the case of Johnston the aim is directly to 
argue for the latter. Moreover, with Johnston we start appreciating the importance of 
motivational states in the relation between affect and value. Indeed, as we shall see, the 
introduction of the question of the role of motivational states in the theorising of affect and 
value becomes of central importance in the arguments put forward in the second part of the 
thesis to the effect that affect is the disclosure of value.  
In the final section of the third chapter I extract three criteria from the critical 
assessment in Chapters 1-3 that an account of affect as a disclosure of value needs to 
satisfy: 
1. An account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to show that the affective 
character of experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge of the object. In other words, it needs to be able to show why 
in the absence of affect one cannot gain insight into what the evaluative property of 
an object is.  
2.  An account of affect as a disclosure of value needs to be able to accommodate the 
phenomenological fact that affect renders readily intelligible one’s evaluat ive 
beliefs and motivational sates. That is, it needs to accommodate the authority of 
affect. 
3. An account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to accommodate the 
disanalogy with the sort of disclosure at play in visual experience. That is, it mus t 
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be able to show that the sort of disclosure at play in affective experience is one 
where the evaluative import of the object of experience is disclosed in virtue of 
properties of the experience that are introspectively dissociable from the features 
of the object of experience. 
In the second part of the thesis I build on these three criteria to provide an account 
of affect as a disclosure of value. In Chapter 4 I begin by arguing that the first two criteria 
need to be satisfied jointly which essentially comes down to Johnston’s insight that in order 
to understand in what sense affective experience is a disclosure of value we need to make 
sense of the phenomenological observation that affect renders readily and rationally 
intelligible not only the formation of our evaluative judgements but also of our motivationa l 
states. I then argue that to make sense of this phenomenological observation we should 
commit to the following constitutive thesis: the formation of our motivational states 
towards an object is constitutive of the disclosure of value. The key challenge in defending 
this constitutive thesis is the apparent tension between the idea that the sort of evaluative 
knowledge that we acquire in having an affective experience is objective, that is, it is 
knowledge of objects –hence the notion of affect as a disclosure of value- and the idea that 
the formation of motivational states of the subject is a constitutive part of such evaluative 
knowledge. How can the formation of motivational states of the subject be a constitut ive 
part of knowledge of objects? I then rely on the work of John McDowell to argue that in 
order to dissolve this apparent tension we need to commit to a response-dependent notion 
of the objectivity of value. Importantly, I introduce in a preliminary fashion a distinct ion 
between two sorts of evaluative knowledge: theoretical knowledge of value, that is, 
propositional knowledge of value acquired by testimony and in the absence of affective 
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experience, and knowledge of value, that is, the sort of evaluative knowledge that can be 
acquired solely by affective experience. It is the latter sort of evaluative knowledge that is 
at stake in the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. This distinction is refined in detail 
in the final chapter of the thesis. 
Although committing to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value 
allows us to show in a preliminary fashion that we can solve the challenge, we need to 
provide the details of this notion of objectivity that show how the challenge is solved, that 
is, that shows in what way the formation of our affective-cum-motivational responses is a 
constitutive part of what it means for the object to have value. I do so in Chapter 5. Here, 
I rely on the work of David Wiggins to provide a detailed account of the sort of objectivity 
that characterises value and the way in which our affective-cum-motivational responses are 
inextricably related to it. We also learn why affect is essential in the generation of 
evaluation concepts. I then show how this account of the objectivity of value dissolves the 
apparent tension that lies within the constitutive thesis and therefore provides a defence of 
the idea that affect is the disclosure of value. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I clarify the sort of knowledge that can be acquired exclusive ly 
in virtue of an affective experience and the essential importance of affect in the navigat ion 
of the evaluative realm. I do so by specifying in detail the distinction I drew in chapter 4 
between knowledge of value and theoretical knowledge of value. In order to do so, I rely 
on the work of John Campbell, from whom I borrowed the terminology of “the explanatory 
role of experience” and “knowledge of.” Crucially, knowledge of value is knowledge of 
the semantic value of the relevant evaluative concept. It is only by acquiring knowledge of 
value that we are able to gain an independent source of justification and intelligibility in 
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the deployment of evaluative concepts and in the formation of motivational states. The sort 
of knowledge at stake, then, is not the sort constituted by beliefs that necessitate higher 
order reflective faculties to be justified. Rather, it’s the sort that grounds our concepts of 
the features of objects, in the case of affect, evaluative features. The crux of the argument,  
then, is that in the absence of affective experience, and therefore of knowledge of value, 
we are unable to form rationally intelligible motivational states in the deployment of our 
evaluative concepts. I end the chapter by drawing out the full implicatio ns of this finding 
by devising various thought experiments. I argue that the implications indicate that affect 
plays an essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm. 
3. Phenomenology, Emotion, and Perception  
 I want to end this introduction by briefly clarifying two points regarding my 
approach to the theme of this thesis. First, the subtitle of my thesis states that my approach 
is phenomenological. We often find a distinction drawn between the phenomenologica l 
approach referring to the strictures followed within the Phenomenological tradition 
inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and counting the likes of Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the phenomenological approach 
referring to a general interest in the phenomenal character of experience as studied within 
the Analytic tradition. There are undoubtedly some differences between the two traditions, 
but an equal number of differences can be found within the two traditions, and this is so 
because these differences are due to the creativity of individual philosophers and not to a 
supposed allegiance to either tradition. Although my thesis works with philosophers in the 
Analytic tradition, the thoughts in this work are owed just as much to the study I have 
pursued on key figures in the Phenomenological tradition, especially Husserl, Scheler, 
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Heidegger, and, in primis, Sartre. I believe that ultimately the subject matter of 
philosophers on either side is the lived experiential dimension of a psychologica l 
phenomenon and the motivation to investigate this aspect of psychological phenomena is 
the belief that if we are to give an accurate account of such phenomena, we cannot ignore 
the way that we experience them from a first person perspective. Indeed, our compass in 
theorising these complex psychological phenomena should be the way that they are 
experienced. It is in this spirit that my approach is phenomenological. 
The second point in need of clarification is the following. One of the debates that 
has received most attention in the philosophical theory of the relation between emotion and 
value is the debate on whether emotional experience is a sort of perceptual experience of 
value.2 In this thesis, I discuss in detail the analogies that some authors, namely Montague 
and Johnston, have drawn between perceptual experiences of colour and emotiona l 
experience of value, the disanalogies that have been drawn between two, for instance by 
John McDowell, and I rely on John Campbell’s argument to the effect that sensory 
awareness plays an essential role in grounding our concepts of the observable qualities of 
objects to formulate the final argument of this thesis, namely that affect plays an essential 
role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. Indeed, the overall argument of the first 
part of my thesis, namely that all three accounts of the relation between affect and value 
that I survey fail in their aim, is based on tracing their shortcomings to the theoretical 
commitments they import from the theories of the phenomenal character of perceptual 
                                                 
2 For a defence of the claim that emotional experience is a sort of perceptual experience of value, 
see de Sousa (1987); Tappolet (2000, 2011, 2012); Johnston (2001); Zagzebski (2003); Roberts 
(2003); Doering (2003, 2007); Prinz (2004); Deonna (2006); Goldie (2007); Poellner (2007, 
2016); Cowan (2016). For an argument against this claim, see Salmela (2011); Whiting (2012); 
Deonna and Teroni (2012, ch.6); Brady (2013). 
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experience they rely on. It is in part inevitable that in theorising the relation between the 
affective character and evaluation of emotional experience one relies on theories of the 
phenomenal character of perceptual experience since the phenomenal character of 
experience and its role in grounding knowledge of our surroundings is primarily theorised 
through the study of perceptual experience, in particular visual experience. 
Nevertheless, in no way do I take a stand on the question of whether emotiona l 
experience is a sort of perceptual experience of value. At best, I remain neutral on this 
question. At worst, I believe that the question, formulated as such, is not conducive to a 
constructive investigation of the phenomenon in question. I believe that what motivates 
many to ask this question, and attempt to answer it positively, is precisely the wish to 
capture the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. That is because, ultimately, one of the 
underlying motivations is to show that, just like in the case of perceptual experience the 
phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in acquiring knowledge of, say, 
colours, in emotional experience the affective character plays an essential role in acquiring 
evaluative knowledge. I believe that in order to capture this phenomenon, one should not 
ask whether emotional experiences are sorts of perceptual experiences. Rather, one should 
pay close attention to the analogies and disanalogies between the two sorts of experiences 
and carefully draw out the appropriate conclusions while respecting the individuality of 
each. It is with this approach that I build the argument in defence of the notion of affect as 
a disclosure of value.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Emotion, Value, and Resemblance 
Introduction 
In her papers “The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion” (2009) 
and “Evaluative Phenomenology” (2014), Michelle Montague defends the view that the 
phenomenology and intentionality of emotional experience are inextricably intertwined 
(see also Montague 2016, ch.9).3 Towards the end of her “Evaluative Phenomenology, ” 
there is a passage that expresses Montague’s underlying thought about the phenomenon 
she seeks to capture through a defence of the inextricability thesis. It is worth quoting at 
length since it encapsulates the key motivating intuition about emotional experience and 
value shared with the other authors we will discuss in the following chapters, namely 
Goldie and Johnston, and which constitutes the focus of this thesis: 
So, although one may be able to know intellectually (in some sense) that the death 
of a friend is of disvalue, and indeed that such a death is sad without feeling an 
emotion, one can experience the disvalue of the friend’s death in this distinctive 
way only if one has an emotional experience. Data in Star Trek , who does not have 
any emotions, may be capable of saying what is of value and disvalue, and in turn 
                                                 
3 Montague’s defence of the inextricability thesis is part of her more demanding project of 
showing that the intentionality and phenomenology of emotional experiences are sui generis. In 
this paper I leave aside Montague’s further task of showing that if the inextricability thesis is 
secured, then we are at least in part on the way of showing that the intentionality and 
phenomenology of emotional experiences are not reducible to other forms of intentionality and 
phenomenology.  
It also has to be noted that Montague focuses solely on the experiential dimension of 
emotions. So whenever she writes “emotions”, one should read “emotional experience”. 
Furthermore, it is helpful to clarify from the start that Montague is interested solely in 
experiences that are conscious and have intentionality. That is, experiences of which the subject is 
aware and have a phenomenal character and that are directed towards an intentional object 
distinct from itself. 
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saying what is sad and what is happy, but he cannot experience sadness or 
happiness and thus he cannot experience value or disvalue (in the special way I am 
indicating). A stronger claim about Data, which I do not have the space to pursue 
in this chapter, is that although he can say what is of value and disvalue, and know 
what is of value and disvalue, he cannot really know value and disvalue. It may be 
similar to someone who is blind from birth who can say this is red, when told that 
it is a ripe tomato, and indeed know that it is red, but not know what red is. 
(Montague 2014, 47)  
Montague distinguishes between two claims. First, unless one is able to experience 
emotions, one cannot experience value. I believe that the way we should interpret this claim 
is as entailing the belief that the presence of affect in emotional experience indicates the 
disclosure not merely of features of experience but also of the objects of experience, 
namely its value. The interpretation gains plausibility when we look at the second, stronger 
claim that the first one is meant to be a prelude to. The second claim is that the affective 
component of emotional experience provides us with a distinctive sort of knowledge about 
value that cannot be acquired in the absence of affect. According to Montague, her 
argument to the effect that the affective phenomenology and evaluative intentionality of 
emotional experience are inextricably linked is meant to secure the first claim, not the 
second. At the same time, it is not farfetched to suggest that it is the second claim that truly 
motivates Montague’s argument to the effect that phenomenology and intentionality in 
emotional experience are inextricably intertwined. More to the point, Montague seems to 
suggest, correctly, that the second claim cannot be secured without securing the first claim, 
that is, the claim that affect provides us with a distinctive sort of evaluative knowledge 
cannot be secured without securing the claim that the presence of affect discloses not only 
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features of experience but also of the object of experience. Since arguing for the 
inextricability between affect and evaluation in emotional experience is meant to secure 
the latter claim, then unless Montague can argue for the inextricability claim, her account 
cannot be the basis for arguing that affect provides us with a distinctive sort of evaluative 
knowledge.  
Since the aim of this thesis is to secure the second claim, namely that affective 
experience plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge, in this chapter 
I ask whether Montague’s argument to the effect that affect and evaluation are inextricab ly 
intertwined is fit to provide us with the starting material to argue for that thesis. In what 
follows I argue that Montague’s account falls short of securing the inextricability between 
phenomenology and intentionality in emotional experience and therefore does not provide 
us with a viable account from which to argue that affect provides us with a distinctive sort 
of evaluative knowledge. I argue that Montague’s argument falls short of its promise due 
to the theoretical constraints imposed by the theory of perceptual experience she relies on 
to theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience.  More 
specifically, I argue that since her arguments to the effect that phenomenology and 
intentionality are inextricably linked are unsuccessful, her account falls back into a position 
that suffers from the same problems as qualia theories of the phenomenal character of 
experience do, namely one’s that do not allow us to show how the presence of affe ct 
discloses not only features of the experience but also of the object of experience. Moreover, 
I argue that in tracing the theoretical constraints that impede Montague’s account to achieve 
its goal, we learn the sort of theoretical assumptions about experience that we ought to 
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avoid if we want to construct an argument in support of the notion of affect as a disclosure 
of value. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. In Section 1 I reconstruct Montague’s 
argument in detail and uncover the argument’s theoretical constraints imported from the 
theory of perceptual experience used to theorise the relation between affect and value in 
emotional experience. In Section 2 I show how these theoretical constraints impede 
Montague’s argument to achieve its aim. I end by clarifying the theoretical constraint we 
ought to avoid in the pursuit of our goal. 
Section 1 
 Montague’s account begins with the claim that the phenomenological character of 
emotional experience ‘contributes essentially’ to its intentionality (Montague 2009, 184). 
Montague uses a sophisticated terminology in order to build her argument. I will introduce 
the technical terms only when needed since I think that the gist of her argument can be 
made sense of without unnecessary terminological complications. Let me begin to specify 
Montague’s argument by looking at how she uses the notions of “phenomenology” and 
“intentionality” in the context of emotional experience. Montague puts the thought that the 
intentionality of emotional experience is evaluative in kind in terms of emotiona l 
experience representing an evaluative property: emotional experiences ‘essentia lly 
represent objects and states of affairs in an evaluative way…That is, emotions essentially 
represent objects and states of affairs as having evaluative properties…Emotions, 
according to the present view, are essentially evaluative representations’ (Montague 2014, 
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33).4 For instance, in feeling sad at the death of a friend, I represent my friend’s death as 
sad. Montague puts the thought that the phenomenology of emotional experience is 
affective in terms of “colouring”: ‘the particular affect or feeling associated with an 
emotion is discernible by the (affective) coloring that the intentional attitude verb 
indicates’ (Montague 2009, 174). Furthermore, Montague points out that affect has 
valence, a point that will become significant in her argument. The valence of affect refers 
to the characteristic of affect as either positive or negative. While the feeling of sadness is 
generally thought of as negative, the feeling of joy is generally thought of as positive. A 
more precise formulation of Montague’s argument for the inextricability thesis, then, is the 
following: the affective phenomenology of an emotional experience plays an essential role 
in the representation of an object, event or situation as having an evaluative property. For 
instance, the affective character of the experience of sadness plays an essential role in 
representing my friend’s death as sad.  
In order to specify further Montague’s view, we need to introduce her notion of 
“awareness-of-awareness” (I will also refer to this notion as “self-awareness”). According 
to Montague, during a conscious, intentional experience the subject having the experience 
is aware of an object distinct from the experience. Montague then claims that during a 
conscious experience, the subject is also aware of having the experience. This is the 
awareness-of-awareness, or self-awareness, component of a conscious experience. The 
awareness-of-awareness relation is understood as an intentional relation: it is an awareness 
of. According to Montague, in being aware of having an experience, the subject is aware 
                                                 
4 Montague is careful in noting that claiming that emotions represent objects as having evaluative 
properties does not commit her to any sort of moral realism. The claim is strictly at the level of 
the subject’s experience and does not commit her to any metaphysical view. 
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of the phenomenological character of the conscious experience. Importantly, Montague 
claims that during an experience, the subject is aware of the phenomenological properties 
of the experience as properties of the experience: ‘phenomenological properties 
themselves present, phenomenologically, as what they are –properties of experience’ 
(Montague 2014, 38). In being aware of the properties of the experience, the subject having 
the experience is aware of the sort of experience he is having precisely because he is aware 
of its properties. Since Montague conceives conscious experience as representing an object 
distinct from itself, the subject having the experience is intentionally related towards two 
objects: the object distinct from the experience and experience itself. Following Montague, 
I will refer to the object distinct from the experience as the primary object of experience 
(Montague 2009, 184). (Montague refers to experience as an object of the experience itself 
as the secondary object of experience. I think it is clearer if I do not use this term and stick 
solely with the notion of the primary object of experience to distinguish the two objects of 
an experience). Since conscious experience represents the primary object of experience as 
having a property (or properties), the subject having the experience is aware of two sets of 
properties: the properties of the primary object (as experienced) and the properties of the 
experience itself.  
Montague applies this general framework of the intentionality of conscious 
experience to both visual and emotional experience. The introduction and analogy between 
visual and emotional experience will become important in understanding further 
Montague’s view. Let me begin with visual experience. In having a visual experience of a 
red ball, the subject having the experience is aware of (intentionally directed towards) both 
the primary object, that is, the red ball, and the experience itself. The subject is aware of 
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the experience as a visual experience, which according to Montague, means that he is aware 
of the phenomenological properties of the visual experience. In being aware of the 
phenomenological properties of the experience he is aware that he is having a visual 
experience. What are the properties of visual experience? According to Montague, these 
are colour-phenomenology, shape-phenomenology, and so on (Montague 2014, 40). In this 
specific example, the subject is aware of the ‘reddish phenomenology’ of the experience 
as a property of the experience (as well as the ‘roundish phenomenology’; I stick to colour 
phenomenology for simplicity purposes) (ibid.: 44). Although Montague is not clear on 
this point, this does not seem to commit her to the implausible claim that experience itself 
is “reddish.” Rather, I am assuming that according to Montague the phenomenal properties 
of experience responsible for its, say, “reddish phenomenology”, are intrinsic properties of 
experience which, if they fail to have an inextricable relation to the intentional structure of 
experience, are somewhat reminiscent of qualia.5 The subject is then also aware of the 
properties of the ball, namely, among others, its redness. The subject having the visual 
experience is therefore aware of two sets of properties: the “reddish” phenomenal property 
of the experience and the “redness” of the ball.  
                                                 
5 As we shall see, in the case of emotional experience Montague’s understanding of the properties 
of experience will become more complicated and, indeed, confusing. See footnote 5. 
I am aware that Montague herself does not subscribe to the qualia view of the phenomenal 
character of experience. Rather, she subscribes to what has been recently termed the “phenomenal 
intentionality research project”. Phenomenal intentionalists promise to be able to show that the 
phenomenal and the intentional are inextricably linked without falling back into a form of qualia 
theory or more traditional forms of intentionalism. Consistently with this, and as we shall 
presently see, I argue that Montague’s account, and in particular her arguments, fail in this regard 
and therefore her positon relapses into a position that is vulnerable to the same problems as qualia 
theories of experience. See also my footnote 11 in Chapter 2. For the “phenomenal intentionality 
research project”, see Kriegel (2013). For a more specific elaboration of the view, see Farkas 
(2013). For early versions of phenomenal intentionalism, see Horgan and Tienson (2002) and 
Loar (2003). The notion of qualia has itself been widely debated. For a useful account of the 
history of the term, see Crane (2000a). 
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In the case of emotional experience, for instance in feeling sad, the subject having 
the experience is aware of the phenomenological properties of his experience of sadness 
and in being so aware he is aware that what he is experiencing is sadness. The 
phenomenological properties of an emotional experience are its affective and valenced 
qualities. During an experience of sadness, the subject having the experience is aware of 
the affective character of the experience and of its negative valence. Insofar as the subject 
experiencing sadness is also evaluating the primary object of experience as sad, he is aware 
of two sets of properties: the negatively valenced affective properties of the experience of 
sadness and the evaluative property of, say, his friend’s death, namely its sadness. 
How does the above support Montague’s claim to the effect that affect and 
evaluation in emotional experience are inextricably linked? As I presented Montague’s 
account above, she wants to argue that the subject’s awareness of the phenomenologica l 
properties of the emotional experience plays an essential role in the representation of the 
primary object having the evaluative property it is experienced as having. If my 
understanding is correct, then it seems to me that Montague adopts the following strategy 
(Montague 2009, 184-188; Montague 2014, 43-48): 
[a] Part of accounting for the way the primary object is represented in experience is to 
account for the property attribution we make in relation to that object.  
[b] The subject’s awareness of the phenomenological properties of the experience 
contributes essentially to the property attributions we make.  
[c] Therefore, the awareness of the phenomenological properties of the experience 
contributes essentially to the representation of the primary object of experience.6  
                                                 
6 Although the plausibility of Montague’s strategy hinges equally on the plausibility of claims [a] 
and [b], and indeed on whether [c] follows, Montague spends argumentative energies in securing 
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In the case of the visual experience of the red ball, the subject’s awareness of the senso ry 
phenomenology of the visual experience is an essential component of the subject 
attributing the property ‘red’ to the ball. Since accounting for the subject’s property 
attribution is part of accounting for the subject’s representation of the primary object of the 
experience, then the subject’s awareness of the phenomenological, “reddish” property of 
the visual experience is part of accounting for the representation of the ball as red. For 
Montague, unless the subject is aware of the colour phenomenology of the visual 
experience, she would not attribute the colour property to the primary object.  
In the case of emotional experience, for instance sadness, Montague’s rationale is 
analogous. The awareness the subject has of the affective character of the experience is an 
essential component of the subject attributing the evaluative property ‘sad’ to a friend’s 
death. Since accounting for the property attribution the subject makes is part of accounting 
for the representation of the primary object of experience, then the awareness of the 
phenomenological properties of the experience of sadness is accounting for the 
representation of the friend’s death as sad. Unless the subject is aware of the 
                                                 
[b] while [a] and whether [c] follows are taken more lightly and they are not given much defence. 
At this stage, I do not want to critically assess the plausibility of [a] or whether [c] follows since I 
am interested in getting at the bottom of Montague’s view. At the same time, it has to be noted 
that there seems to be an important difference between experiencing an object as having a 
property, or in Montague’s words, “experientially representing” (Montague 2009, 187) an object 
as having a property, and attributing a property to an object. More seems to be needed for the 
latter. I take it that this is the reason why Montague says that accounting for property attribution 
is “part of” accounting for the representation of the object. What Montague seems to me to be 
saying is, when experiencing an object, if we attribute a property to that object, it is due to the 
way that we experience it i.e. the way the object is represented in the experience. If that is the 
case, then, accounting for property attribution is in part accounting for the way that an object is 
represented in the experience. I think that Montague’s point has enough intuitive plausibility to 
withstand any sort of initial skepticism that would block her account at this stage. At the same 
time, as we shall see below, any issues that arise from the resulting account of property attribution 
should be treated as a signal of issues in the way representation has been accounted for. 
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phenomenological, affective properties of the experience of sadness, he would not attribute 
the evaluative property ‘sad’ to the friend’s death.  
The inextricability thesis is then defended by arguing that unless the subject is 
aware of the phenomenology of the experience, she would not represent the primary object 
as having the properties it is experienced as having. The crux of the argument hinges on 
the putatively inextricable relation between self-awareness and representation that 
Montague argues for via the notion of property attribution. In order to see the full argument, 
though, we need to dig deeper. We said that according to Montague the subject’s awareness 
of the phenomenological properties of the experience plays an essential role in the 
representation of the primary object as having the properties it is experienced as having. In 
the case of visual experience, the claim is that the subject’s awareness of the colour -
phenomenological properties of the experience is essential to the representation of the 
primary object as having the colour property it is experienced as having. The subject 
attributes the colour property ‘red’ to the ball in virtue of her awareness of the 
phenomenological ‘reddish’ property of the experience. In the case of emotiona l 
experience, the claim is that the subject’s awareness of the phenomenological, affective 
properties of the experience is essential to the representation of the primary object as 
having the evaluative properties it is experienced as having. The subject attributes the 
evaluative property ‘sad’ to the friend’s death in virtue of his awareness of the affective 
character (phenomenological properties) of the experience of sadness.  
But how exactly do we move from the awareness of the phenomenological property 
of the experience to the attribution of a property to the primary object of experience? How 
exactly should we conceive the move from self-awareness to representation? What 
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Montague has to explain is the move from the subject’s awareness of the properties of the 
experience to her attribution of a property to the primary object of experience.  
This is precisely what Montague does. Montague tries to explain the link between 
self-awareness and representation by explaining how the awareness of the properties of 
experience leads to the representation of the properties that the primary object of 
experience is experienced as having. Montague argues that the subject, in being aware of 
both the properties of experience and the properties of the primary object of experience, 
finds a resemblance between the two. As we have seen above, according to Montague, 
during the visual experience of a red ball the subject is aware both of the phenomena l 
properties of the experience as properties of the experience, namely its “reddish” 
phenomenology, and of the property ‘red’ attributed to the ball. Montague then asks what 
the relationship between these two must be in order for the subject to attribute the property 
‘red’ to the ball in virtue of the “reddish” phenomenology of the visual experience. 
Montague, of course, settles for resemblance: the “reddish” phenomenology of experience 
resembles the ‘red’ property attributed to the ball. Montague writes:  
An aspect of the phenomenal redness [i.e. “reddish” phenomenology] resembles 
an aspect of the redness attributed to the ball. We feel the experience of 
phenomenal redness gets it exactly right about, completely conveys the intrinsic 
qualitative character of, the objective property. This is what our belief in the 
resemblance consists in…Resemblance is part of explaining how the 
phenomenological property experienced as a property of experience gets linked to 
the property attributed to the object- a property experienced as an objective, mind-
independent property. (Montague 2014, 45).  
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In the specific case of emotional experience, the properties of the experience the subject is 
aware of are its affective and valenced properties. The experience of sadness has the 
phenomenological properties of negative affect while the experience of joy has the 
phenomenological properties of positive affect. Montague then claims that we normally 
associate positive affect and negative affect with the positive value and negative value, or 
disvalue, of objects, respectively. Because of this association, Montague dubs the positive 
or negative affect of an emotional experience its “evaluative phenomenology” (hence the 
title of the second paper). More specifically, Montague claims that ‘The positive or 
negative evaluative phenomenology (the positive or negative affect) of an emotion 
represents the positive or negative quality of the object or state of affairs 
represented…negative and positive evaluative phenomenology represents disvalue and 
value’ (Montague 2014, 46-47). Montague, then, argues that the reason why we attribute a 
value or disvalue to the primary object is due to the resemblance that the property of the 
primary object has to the property of the experience, that is, positive or negative affect. 
Representation is understood in terms of resemblance. Montague then proceeds to give the 
following account of evaluative property attribution in emotional experience:  
The basic idea is that in experiencing the negative affect (the negative evaluative 
phenomenology) that is part of experiencing sadness, the negative affect is itself 
experienced as something of disvalue. This disvalue experienced in the experience 
of negative affect resembles the disvalue that is attributed to the state of affairs of 
the friend’s death. It is then partly in virtue of this resemblance relation that the 
negative affect experienced as a property of experience represents the disvalue 
attributed to the friend’s death. More strongly put, [] we feel the experience of feeling 
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the disvalue of negative affect gets it exactly right about, completely conveys the 
character of, the purported objective property of disvalue. (Ibid. 47-48)   
Notice that Montague has added an element to her account. Now, the resemblance is not 
anymore strictly between the valenced affective character of the experience and the 
(dis)value attributed to the primary object. Rather, it is between the (dis)value associated 
with the valenced affective character and the (dis)value attributed to the primary object. 
Montague’s account is the claim that ultimately the subject attributes a disvalue to his 
friend’s death because of a resemblance it has with the disvalue of the negative affect of 
the experience of sadness the subject is having.7  
 Let me tie all of the above together. Montague argues that the affective 
phenomenology and evaluative intentionality of emotional experience are inextricab ly 
intertwined. Her argument revolves around the idea that during an experience, the subject 
is aware not only of the object distinct from the experience i.e. the primary object, but he 
is also aware of having the experience. That is, the subject is self-aware while experiencing 
an object distinct from the experience. Due to the subject’s self-awareness, he is aware both 
of the primary object of the emotional experience as having the evaluative properties that 
                                                 
7 In footnote 5 I said that once we switch to emotional experience, the nature of the intrinsic 
phenomenological properties of experience becomes more complicated. This is so because while 
in the case of visual experience the relation of resemblance is between the “reddish” phenomenal 
property and the property “red” of the primary object of experience, the resemblance relation in 
emotional experience is between the value associated with the affective-valenced phenomenal 
property of experience and the property of the primary object of experience. Therefore, while in 
the case of visual experience I stated that (due to Montague’s unsuccessful arguments) the 
intrinsic property is reminiscent of qualia, that is, non-intentional properties of experience 
responsible for the experiential phenomenal quality, in the case of emotional experience the 
affective phenomenal property of experience is associated with a value (which in turn resembles 
the evaluative property of the primary object of experience). So it seems as the affective property 
of the emotional experience does bare a further relation to something else, namely the associated 
value. Does this mean that it is somehow intentional? I am not sure. I take up this issue again 
towards the end of this section. 
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it is experienced as having and he is aware of the phenomenal, affective properties of the 
emotional experience itself. The primary object is represented as having evaluative 
properties in virtue of a resemblance between the positive or negative value associated with 
the positive or negative valence of the affective component of the emotional experience 
and the value or disvalue experienced as a property of the primary object. Since the subject 
of experience would not represent the primary object in an evaluative way unless he were 
aware of the phenomenal character of the experience, then the affective phenomenology of 
emotional experience plays an essential role in its evaluative intentionality. This shows, 
according to Montague, that the intentionality and phenomenology of emotiona l 
experience are inextricably intertwined.  
Section 2 
 In what follows I aim to show that, in fact, Montague’s account fails on two counts. 
First, I argue that the resulting account of evaluative property attribution in emotiona l 
experience is implausible and that this implausibility has important reverberations for her 
account of the relation between affect and value. Second, and more importantly, I argue 
that Montague’s commitment to her underlying theory of experience does not allow her to 
argue for the inextricable link between phenomenology and intentional ity in emotiona l 
experience that she seeks to defend.  
A key notion in the argument above as I have presented it is property attribution. 
As we have seen, Montague argues that the subject’s awareness of the phenomenologica l 
properties of the experience plays an essential role in his attribution of properties to the 
primary object of experience and since property attribution is indicative of the way the 
primary object is represented in the experience, then the subject’s awareness of the 
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phenomenal character of the experience plays an essential role in the way that the primary 
object is represented in the experience. Montague’s account of evaluative property 
attribution in emotional experience states that we attribute an evaluative property to the 
primary object of emotional experience because of a resemblance between the disvalue or 
value associated with the negative or positive affect of the experience and the disvalue or 
value that the primary object is experienced as having. In the experience of sadness at the 
death of a friend, the subject attributes the property “sad” to the friend’s death due to a 
resemblance between the disvalue associated with the negative affective feel of the 
experience and the disvalue the friend’s death is experienced as having. Much here hinges 
on what we mean by the disvalue of the negative affect of the experience of sadness. 
Although Montague does not say, one plausible understanding of “the disvalue of the 
negative affect of sadness” is the fact that it feels bad, or it “hurts”, to feel sadness. We 
associate disvalue with the experience of sadness because it is, for want of a better word, 
uncomfortable to have that experience. If so, then Montague’s account entails that we 
attribute the property of sadness to the friend’s death because it hurts to feel sadness. And 
here is the problem: it doesn’t seem right to say that I attribute sadness to the event of my 
friend’s death due to the disvalue associated with the negative affect of my feeling of 
sadness, that is, because it hurts to feel sadness. I don’t attribute sadness to my friend’s 
death because the feeling of sadness hurts me. Rather, I attribute sadness to my friend’s 
death because I know that I will never speak to a beloved person again or because I know 
that her daughter will not no longer be able to play with her mother. There is a sense in 
which Montague’s resulting account of evaluative property attribution is “egoistic”: my 
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friend’s death is sad because it hurts me to feel sadness rather than because of factors that 
are outside of me. 
This problem is indicative of an issue with Montague’s account of representation 
in emotional experience. If we follow Montague and agree that accounting for property 
attribution is part of accounting for representation, and that representation is to be 
understood in terms of resemblance, then we end up with the following picture: I represent 
my friend’s death as sad because of a resemblance between the sadness of my friend’s 
death (evaluative property of the primary object) and the fact that it hurts to feel sadness 
(evaluative property associated with the phenomenological property of emotiona l 
experience). But what kind of resemblance is there between the disvalue of an experience 
of sadness and the disvalue of a friend’s death? What aspects of the disvalue of the negative 
affective character of sadness resemble the relevant aspects of the disvalue attributed to the 
friend’s death?8 Again, the event of my friend’s death is not represented as sad, and 
therefore as a disvalue, due to the feeling of sadness but rather due to the factors mentioned 
above, such as a daughter losing her mother. It seems to me, then, that we don’t attribute 
disvalue to a friend’s death insofar as the event resembles the disvalue inherent in the 
negative affective quality of our experience of sadness. Indeed, we intuitively feel that 
someone attributing sadness to his friend’s death due to it hurting him to feel sadness got 
things terribly wrong. The issue here is that the representation of a friend’s death is not to 
be accounted for in terms of a resemblance between the disvalue of the phenomenologica l 
                                                 
8 I speak of the aspects of properties of experience resembling aspects of the evaluative properties 
the subject attributes to the primary object since Montague does so when discussing visual 
experience. See next two paragraphs.   
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properties of sadness and the evaluative property the friend’s death is experienced as 
having.  
Let me analyse further the problem in order to get at its source. The issue I just 
mentioned arises because the (dis)value of the valenced affective character of an emotiona l 
experience does not resemble in any obvious way the (dis)value the subject normally 
attributes to the primary object. But why did Montague postulate the subject’s awareness 
not only of the valenced affective character but also of the (dis)value associated with it? 
Why not postulate solely the awareness of the valenced affective character? The answer 
here seems to me to be that, again, there is no obvious way in which the valenced affective 
character of an emotional experience resembles the evaluative property normally attributed 
to the primary object. And since Montague postulates resemblance as doing the 
representational work, then by losing resemblance, Montague would lose representation. 
Insofar as this argument is in support of the inextricability thesis, if the phenomenology of 
an emotional experience does not play an essential role in the representation of an 
evaluative property, then the inextricable link between phenomenology and intentiona lity 
is severed. Montague’s problem is that the phenomenological properties of an emotiona l 
experience do not seem to resemble the sort of evaluative properties that we normally 
attribute to the primary objects of emotional experiences.  
In fact, even if we concede the notion of resemblance a place in the theory of 
experience proposed by Montague, her account is unable to secure the sort of inextricability 
between phenomenology and intentionality sought after. According to Montague’s account 
of experience, what determines the phenomenal character of an experience are intrins ic 
phenomenological properties of the experience. For instance, during the visual experience 
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of a red ball, among other things, the subject is aware of the “reddish” phenomena l 
properties of the experience. And during the experience of sadness, the subject is aware of, 
among other things, the negatively valenced affective properties of the experience. Insofar 
as Montague is unable to secure the inextricability of phenomenology and intentionality,  
the phenomenal properties of these respective experiences are non-intentional, intrins ic 
features of experience, in many ways resembling qualia. They then partake in the 
intentionality of the respective experiences through resembling the properties that the 
primary object of experience is experienced as having. The “reddish” phenomenal property 
of visual experience partakes in its world-directed intentionality through its resemblance 
with the red colour of the ball. And the negatively valenced affective property of the 
experience of sadness partakes in the experience’s world-directed intentionality through its 
resemblance with the evaluative property of “sadness” that the primary object is 
experienced as having. But why should we think that, under the aegis of Montague’s theory 
of experience, experiencing a phenomenal, intrinsic property of experience should disclose 
a property of the object of experience? What the experience of a new sort of affect would 
give us is the disclosure of a new property of experience, namely the intrinsic property of 
experience constituting its phenomenal character, and at most the knowledge that the 
relevant object of experience causes the experience to have that phenomena l character. But 
it does not disclose the evaluative property of the object.  
Let me draw an analogy. Take the case of accidentally cutting yourself with a piece 
of paper. The resulting experience has an acute phenomenal character. But does the 
phenomenal character of the experience disclose anything about the piece of paper apart 
from one of its potential causal effects? Suppose that my brother, who has never suffered 
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a paper cut, is sitting next to me when I cut myself and can therefore see that the piece of 
paper has the potential of cutting the epidermic layer. By undergoing the painful 
experience, have I learnt something new about the piece of paper that my brother cannot 
know? The answer seems to be no. What has been disclosed to me that hasn’t been 
disclosed to my brother is the phenomenal character of the experience but since this is 
merely the causal effect of the paper sliding on my finger, the phenomenal character of the 
experience has not disclosed anything about the nature of the piece of paper that my brother 
cannot appreciate from his comfortable point of view. Indeed, the properties of the 
experience of the cut in no way resemble the properties of the paper. It seems that an 
analogous case applies to Montague’s account. Insofar as the phenomena l character of the 
emotional experience is determined by intrinsic properties of experience and partakes in 
the intentionality of experience merely in virtue of resembling the evaluative properties of 
the object represented by the experience, Montague is unable to show that something about 
the evaluative property as a property of the object has been disclosed to the subject of 
experience that could not have been disclosed in the absence of affect. For all that has been 
said, the only thing that cannot be disclosed to Data is the intrinsic, phenomenologica l 
property of the emotional experience. That is, Data will never be able to feel an emotion. 
But nothing has been said to show that Data is therefore unable to “access” the same 
evaluative information as a human being.   
In conclusion, the above seems to call into question whether Montague’s account 
is able to secure any form of the inextricability thesis at all. If the relation between the 
intrinsic property of experience constituting its phenomenal character and the property of 
the object of experience is one of mere causation, that is, the phenomenal character of the 
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experience discloses the fact that the object of experience has that sort of effect, then the 
relation is one of mere contingent association. Crucially, once we reject the claim that the 
two sets of properties are related by resemblance, causation seems to be the only plausib le 
relation one can draw between the two. In the specific case of emotional experience, the 
inextricability between affective phenomenology and evaluative intentionality seems to be 
even more severed. Recall that according to Montague during an emotional experience 
there is a resemblance not between the valenced affective properties of the experience and 
the properties that the primary object is experienced as having but rather between the latter 
and the value or disvalue associated with the valenced affective property of the experience. 
But why should we think that here the associative relation is a necessary one? Unless we 
are given good reason to think that it is a necessary one, then in the specific case of 
emotional experience we have two reasons to be suspicious of the inextricability of 
phenomenology and intentionality. Therefore, in order to argue for the notion of affect as 
a disclosure of value, we have to avoid theoretical constraints from theories of experience 
that do not allow for the claim that the phenomenal character of experience discloses not 
merely an intrinsic feature of the experience but also a feature of the object of experience. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Emotion, Value, and Representation 
Introduction 
I began the previous chapter by suggesting that Montague’s claim to the effect that 
the affective phenomenology and evaluative intentionality of emotional experience are 
inextricably intertwined is motivated by the phenomenological intuition that in the absence 
of an affective experience we lack a distinctive sort of epistemic access to the evaluative 
features of an object. I called this the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. I then argued 
that Montague’s argument fails to secure the inextricability between phenomenology and 
intentionality due to the theoretical constraints imposed on her account by the theory of 
perceptual experience Montague relied on to theorise affect and value in emotiona l 
experience.  
In this chapter I make a similar claim against Peter Goldie’s argument in support 
of the inextricability between the affective character and evaluative intentionality of 
emotional experience. First, I believe that also in Goldie’s case it is the phenomenologica l 
intuition that affect is the disclosure of value that motivates his account of emotiona l 
experience. Furthermore, Goldie also relies on a specific theory of experience, so-called 
“intentionalism” or “representationalism,” from which it inherits certain theoretical 
constraints that impede him in securing his goal. Finally, also in Goldie’s case, tracing 
these theoretical constraints allows us to make progress towards building an argument to 
the effect that affect is the disclosure of value by identifying the theoretical constraints 
about experience that we should avoid.  
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The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section one I clarify Goldie’s version 
of the claim that affect and evaluation in emotional experience are inextricably linked by 
tracing the theoretical commitments his account imports from adopting an intentiona list 
model of experience. In Section 2 I reconstruct Goldie’s arguments in support of the claim 
that affect and evaluation are inextricably linked in emotional experience. I also argue that 
Goldie, just like Montague, wants to show that affect discloses not only a feature of 
experience but also of the object of experience. In Section 3 I argue that Goldie’s arguments 
in support of the inextricability claim based on the analogy with Jackson’s Mary are 
ultimately unsuccessful. Finally, in Section 4 I rely on arguments from the literature on 
sensory experience to argue that, due to the underlying intentionalist model of experience, 
Goldie’s account of the inextricability between affect and evaluation can at most show the 
inextricability between phenomenal and intentional properties of experience but not that 
affect discloses evaluative features of the object of experience. In the light of this, I argue 
that Goldie’s account of the relation between affect and value cannot provide us with the 
material to argue for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.  
Section 1 
Peter Goldie advocates the inextricability between affect and evaluation in 
emotional experience through his characterization of emotional experience as “feelings 
towards”. Goldie’s notion of “feeling towards” is meant to capture the thought that our 
emotional experiences are not cold-blooded evaluations of an object or situation 
contingently coated with an affective phenomenal character, a claim committed to by what 
he terms “add-on” views of emotional experience. Rather, in Goldie’s words: 
[E]motional feelings are inextricably intertwined with the world-directed aspect of 
emotion, so that an adequate account of an emotion’s intentionality, of its 
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directedness towards the world outside one’s body, will at the same time capture 
an important aspect of its phenomenology. Intentionality and phenomenology are 
inextricably linked. (Goldie 2002, 242) 
Goldie formulates the inextricability of phenomenology and intentionality in emotiona l 
experience by employing theoretical tools borrowed from the intentionalist account of 
perceptual experience. To be sure, this does not mean that Goldie makes an analogy 
between emotional and perceptual experience.9 Rather, it means that he relies on a model 
of perceptual experience, the intentionalist model, when theorising the relation between the 
affective phenomenal character and evaluative intentionality of emotional experience. It is 
true that Goldie does not subscribe to any particular intentionalist view of perceptual 
experience and he never formulates the inextricability thesis in any detailed intentiona list 
manner. Indeed, at times he seems to rely on the intentionalist model as if it were a neutral 
model of experience (Goldie 2002, 241). Still, the intentionalist framework within which 
Goldie formulates his version of the inextricability thesis does have important theoretical 
consequences when attempting to show that affect plays an essential role in the sort of 
evaluation characteristic of emotional experience. Insofar as he formulates the 
inextricability thesis in these terms, he has to accept the theoretical consequences. Since I 
want to argue that Goldie’s reliance on the intentionalist model of experience plays a 
central role in Goldie’s unsuccessful attempt at arguing for the inextricability between 
affect and evaluation in emotional experience, I will begin this section with a few specific 
remarks regarding the intentionalist model. This will allow me to show what Goldie’s 
claims actually amount to.  
                                                 
9 In fact, Goldie does commit to the claim that emotional experience is a sort of perceptual 
experience in his later 2007 paper. He does not do so in the texts I shall consider here.  
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 According to the intentionalist model, perceptual experience is a kind of mental 
representation. Perceptual experience represents the world being a certain way. For 
instance, when I see a brown chair in front of me, my visual experience represents a brown 
chair in front of me. The intentionalist model makes use of the notion that perceptual 
experience has intentional, or representational, content in order to cash out the thought that 
the object of perceptual experience, say a chair, is represented as being a certain way to the 
subject of experience, say as brown. Representational content, then, is one of the features 
of the structure of the intentionality of perceptual experience in virtue of which perceptual 
experience represents the world being a certain way to the subject of experience. According 
to the intentionalist, the representational content of perceptual experience has veridica lity 
conditions: the representational content can be correct or incorrect. In case the perceptual 
experience is veridical, the properties represented by the content of the experience are the 
properties of the object of experience out there in the world. In case the experience is 
illusory or hallucinatory, the properties represented by the content of experience are not 
the properties of the object out there in the world. Nevertheless, the perceptual experience 
is still intentional insofar as it still has content, albeit one that misrepresents the world. 
According to the intentionalist, then, both veridical and illusory or hallucina tory 
experiences have something in common, namely representational content. This is how the 
intentionalist model explains the phenomenological indistinguishability between a 
veridical and illusory or hallucinatory experience. Importantly, intentionalists argue that in 
employing the notion of representational content there is no commitment to the claim that 
perceptual experience entails a veil of appearance or intermediary mental object between 
the subject and the object. Before we consider the intentionalist’s explanation of what 
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determines the phenomenal character of experience, it must be mentioned that that there is 
a second feature of the structure of perceptual experience that intentionalists take to 
determine its representational character: this is the intentional attitude that is taken towards 
the representational content. It is standardly accepted by proponents of the intentiona l 
model that the intentional attitude of perceptual experience is sui generis and not reducible 
to other forms of intentional attitude, such as believing. The intentional attitude of a 
perceptual experience is just that, an attitude of sensibly perceiving. The intentional attitude 
and representational content, then, are the two features that according to the intentiona list 
constitute the structure of intentionality. 
            So how does the intentionalist model understand the relation between the 
phenomenal character of experience and its intentionality? Since the intentionalist model 
is usually taken to be the standard model for theorising perceptual experience, it has 
engendered a variety of different answers to this question. Still, there seem to be two broad 
ways in which this question can be answered within the intentionalist model and which 
will allow us to understand further both Goldie’s claims and their flaws. The first way the 
intentionalist can understand the relation between the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience and its intentionality is by drawing an intimate connection between the  
phenomenal character and the experience’s representational properties. According to this 
sort of intentionalist, the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is determined 
by the representational properties of the experience. The representational properties of the 
experience are the properties the experience has due to its representational content and the 
intentional attitude taken towards it. Although different forms of this sort of intentiona list 
theory disagree on whether the phenomenal character is determined wholly by the 
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representational content or whether the intentional attitude also has a role to play, they 
agree that ultimately the phenomenology of perceptual experience is determined by the 
representational properties of the experience.10 So in the case of visually experiencing a 
brown chair, what it is like to perceptually experience a brown chair is determined by the 
content of the experience representing the chair, among other things, as brown (plus, for 
some intentionalists, the attitude of sensibly perceiving). 
There is a second option that the intentionalist can also opt for that will become 
important in evaluating one of Goldie’s key claims. The intentionalist can account for the 
phenomenal character of experience by arguing that it is determined also by qualia, that is, 
non-intentional, or non-representational, intrinsic properties of experience. In this case, 
what it is like to visually experience a brown chair is determined by an intrinsic, non-
intentional feature of experience associated with “brown-ness.” Of course, if one opts for 
this strategy then one has to provide an account of the relation between qualia and the 
representational structure of perceptual experience.11  
Notice that in both intentionalist options it is a property of experience that 
determines its phenomenal character: in the first case the representational properties of 
experience and in the second the intrinsic properties of experience, namely qualia. 
Importantly, though, while the first way of explaining the phenomenal character of 
experience is committed to the inextricability between phenomenology and intentionality, 
                                                 
10 For the view that the phenomenal character of experience is determined solely by the 
representational content, see Tye (1992); while for the view that the intentional attitude has also a 
determining role to play in the phenomenal character, see Crane (2003) and Crane (2009). 
11 Notice that while this option is not the one originally opted for by Montague, it is the position 
that I argued she falls back into due to her unsuccessful arguments to the effect that 
phenomenology and intentionality are inextricably linked.  
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the second is not.12 This is so because while in the first case it is the representationa l 
properties of the experience, that is, the properties it has due to its intentional structure, that 
determines the properties of its phenomenal character, in the second case the phenomena l 
character is determined by qualia which potentially have no necessary relation with the 
intentional structure of the experience. In other words, while in the first case it follows that 
if we alter the representational properties of the experience then necessarily we alter its 
phenomenal character, and vice versa, in the second case it is at the very least conceivable 
that we can alter the phenomenal character (qualia) of the experience without altering its 
representational properties. Opting for the latter strategy is therefore potentially 
problematic for an account in defence of the inextricability thesis.  
 In order to understand what Goldie’s inextricability thesis amounts to, and the 
argument he puts forward in its support, it is important to be clear as just how the 
intentionalist model of perceptual experience translates to the case of emotiona l 
experience. For the moment I will set aside the qualia option and consider it later on. If it 
is agreed that the intentionality of emotional experience is evaluative in kind, then by 
adopting an intentionalist model of experience we are confronted with three possibilit ies 
for understanding in what way its intentionality is evaluative. One possible option is to 
                                                 
12 In fact, there is a third position as well within the intentionalist framework, namely 
“Phenomenal Intentionalism.” As we have seen in footnote 5, phenomenal intentionalists 
distinguish themselves from more traditional forms of intentionalism by aiming to characterise 
the intentional in terms of the phenomenal rather than vice versa. For a reply to the argument I 
will develop below to the effect that intentionalism is unable to show that the phenomenal 
character of experience plays an essential role in the acquisition of knowledge, see Cassam’s 
contribution in Campbell and Cassam (2013). Cassam also subscribes to a similar view as 
phenomenal intentionalism. Since, as I argued in the previous chapter, it is not clear that a 
phenomenal intentionalist take on emotional experience is able to avoid the problems that qualia 
theories have, it is not clear that a phenomenal intentionalist reply to the argument below is a 
viable option.  
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theorise the evaluative component of the intentionality of emotional experience solely at 
the level of the attitude. In this case an emotional experience is thought of as possessing an 
evaluative attitude towards an evaluatively neutral content. If by “evaluative content” we 
understand that the object towards which the emotional experience is directed is 
represented by the emotional experience as possessing evaluative properties, then 
according to this first option the object is not represented as possessing evaluative 
properties. Rather, one takes an evaluative attitude towards non-evaluative properties of an 
object or situation. Such a view is instantiated by Deonna and Teroni (2012, 2014, 2015). 
To illustrate with an oversimplified example. In the case of someone fearing an 
approaching lion, according to this first option the subject’s experience of fear is a case of 
taking an evaluative attitude of “fearing” – where “fearing” is possibly construed as 
“evaluating something as dangerous”- towards, say, the sharp claws of the lion and its bare 
teeth which constitute its evaluatively neutral representational content.  
By contrast, a second possible way of theorising the evaluative intentionality of 
emotional experience utilizing the intentionalist model is to theorise the evaluative 
component as being solely at the level of content. In this case emotional experience is 
thought of as possessing an evaluative content and an evaluatively neutral intentiona l 
attitude. Under one possible reading, this view is instantiated by Sabine Doering’s (2003, 
2007) characterization of emotions as “affective perceptions of value”. The content of 
emotional experience is evaluative in kind and the intentional attitude taken towards it is 
one of perceiving, therefore not entailing an evaluative component. The representationa l 
content of the subject’s experience of fear, according to this second option, represents the 
lion as possessing an evaluative property, say danger, towards which the subject takes the 
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evaluatively neutral attitude of perceiving. In this case, then, the subject has a perceptual 
experience of danger.  
Finally, a third possible option is that the evaluative component is found both at the 
level of attitude and of content. In this final case, the subject takes an evaluative attitude 
towards an object that is represented as having evaluative properties. For instance, the 
emotional experience of fear can be construed as taking an evaluative attitude of fearing 
towards the danger that the lion is represented as possessing.  
If, then, we want to argue employing an intentionalist model of experience that the 
affective phenomenology of emotional experience is inextricably linked to its evaluative 
intentionality, we can express the inextricability thesis in three possible ways. Either we 
claim that the relevant representational properties of emotional experience determining its 
affective character are found at the level of attitude, or at the level of content, or both. 
According to the first option, the inextricability between the affective and evaluative 
components of emotional experience is located at the level of attitude such that a change 
in the affective character of the emotional experience should yield a necessary change in 
the evaluative attitude taken by the subject towards the representational content of the 
experience. And vice versa. For instance, if the subject ceases to feel fear due to the 
realization that the approaching lion is enclosed in a glass cage, then the change in the 
affective dimension of the experience necessarily entails that the subject has changed her 
evaluative attitude towards the evaluatively neutral properties that the object of experience 
is represented as having, that is, the lion’s sharp claws and bare teeth. There is no necessary 
change in the properties that the lion is represented as having. According to the second 
option, the inextricability between affect and value is captured in terms of content such that 
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a change in the evaluative properties the object is represented as having by the content of 
experience should yield a necessary change in the experience’s affective character. And 
vice versa. If the subject stops feeling fear, then according to this second option, the subject 
still has the same intentional attitude of perceiving, but the evaluative properties the object 
is represented as having have changed: the lion is not anymore represented as dangerous 
by the content of experience (while the intentional attitude is the same one, that is, one of 
perceiving). According to the third option, the inextricability between affect and value is 
theorised at both the level of attitude and content such that a change in affective character 
should yield a change in both attitude and content. And vice versa. Once the subject ceases 
to feel fear, then the change in affect not only yields a necessary change in the evaluative 
attitude taken towards the properties that the lion is represented as having, but also a change 
in those very properties.13 The lion is not represented as instantiating the evaluative 
property of danger any longer.  
Notice that only options two and three are committed to the claim that the presence 
of affect yields a change in the sort of properties that the object is represented as having. 
By contrast, according to the first option, the presence of affect yields a change solely in 
the sort of attitude one takes towards the properties of the object and not a change in the 
way the latter are represented. Depending on the presence or absence of feelings, one takes 
different attitudes towards the same evaluatively neutral properties the object is represented 
as having. 
                                                 
13 These examples are oversimplified for illustrative purposes. To be sure, if a person suddenly 
realizes that the lion is trapped in a glass cage and that he is safe from the lion, then although the 
affective component of, say, fear might dissipate or change into relief, the subject might still 
adopt an evaluative attitude towards the lion’s danger simply insofar as he is aware that the lion is 
in fact a dangerous animal.  
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Now, Goldie’s account seems to instantiate the third view since he claims that the 
presence of feelings radically changes the nature of the evaluative intentionality of an 
emotional experience both at the level of attitude and at the level of content: 
The difference between thinking of X as Y without feeling and thinking of X as Y 
with feeling will not just comprise a different attitude towards the same content –
a thinking which earlier was without feeling and now is with feeling. The 
difference lies also in the content[.] (Goldie 2000, 60) 
[T]he phenomenology is neither specifically an aspect of the attitude nor of the 
content: phenomenology infuses both attitude and content. (Goldie 2002, 242)  
Goldie is adamant that the presence of affect yields a change also at the level of content 
and not just at the level of attitude. Goldie’s metaphor that phenomenology “infuses” both 
attitude and content seems to want to convey the thought that we cannot simply detach the 
intentional attitude from the representational content of an emotional experience without 
distorting its phenomenology. In other words, Goldie claims that we distort emotiona l 
experience if we paint a picture where the presence of affect does not yield a change in the 
way evaluative features of the object are represented. If it were possible to detach the 
evaluative attitude from the representational content and locate the inextricability between 
the affective and evaluative components of emotional experience solely at the level of 
attitude without distorting its phenomenology, then the presence of affect would not 
indicate a disclosure at the level of representational content. And this is something Goldie 
is at pains to deny.  
Section 2 
 In order to argue for his claim, Goldie provides us with the case of Irene, a person 
who, by slipping on ice, fears its danger for the first time (cf. Michael Stocker 1983). 
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According to Goldie, while before slipping on ice Irene had only a cool grasp of the danger 
of ice, now she apprehends its danger in a new, affective manner. What the case of Irene is 
meant to do is to tease out the intuition that once Irene fears the danger of ice, something 
new has been disclosed to her about danger that not only was not disclosed to her before 
feeling fear but could not have been disclosed to her in the absence of the affective 
component of the emotional experience.  
To clarify and beef up his case, Goldie draws two analogies between the case of 
Irene and hypothetical cases in perceptual experience. In the first analogy, Goldie (2000, 
60) considers ‘a colour-blind person who can reliably pick out red things because he has a 
constant companion who points out to him all and only things of that colour.’ Goldie’s 
thought is that the colour-blind person expresses the content of his thought when signaled 
correctly by his companion as “The object is red” even though he is never presented with 
the colour red but rather relies on accurate and trustworthy testament. If the colour-blind 
person were to be miraculously cured, then although the content of his thoughts would be 
expressed using the same words, he would have actually gained new knowledge about the 
colour red insofar as he would then be presented with it. According to Goldie, the case of 
Irene is analogous. Once Irene slips on ice and feels fear towards its danger, she has gained 
new knowledge about the danger of ice. Something new has been disclosed to her about 
danger. 
 The second analogy drawn by Goldie (2002, 243-6) is with the notorious thought 
experiment devised by Frank Jackson as an epistemic argument against physicalism. The 
protagonist of Jackson’s thought experiment is Mary, a colour scientist who has lived in a 
black and white environment for the whole of her life. The thought experiment hinges on 
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the claim that if one day Mary were confronted with a red object, she would acquire a new 
bit of knowledge regarding the colour red that she did not, and could not have, possessed 
before the encounter: namely, what it is like to phenomenally experience the colour red. 
What is important here is not what conclusions Jackson’s epistemic argument is able to 
achieve against physicalism. Rather, what is important is the intuitive grip that the thought 
experiment is able to have in support of the claim that Mary gains a new bit of knowledge 
regarding the colour red once she consciously experiences a red object. Something new is 
disclosed to Mary. There is a fact about being presented visually with a colour that cannot 
be captured by any other manner of representing the same colour, for instance by means of 
acquiring the knowledge of wavelengths defining the physics of the colour red. In an 
analogous way, Goldie wants to argue that after Irene slips on ice and develops a fear of 
ice, the dangerousness of the ice is presented to her in fear in a fundamentally different 
way from how it was represented in her “intellectual” thought that ice is dangerous. In the 
technical terms of the intentionalist model of experience, the evaluative property 
“dangerous” is represented in a fundamentally different way in the content of the 
experience of fear from how it is represented in the content of an “intellectual” evaluative 
thought. Just as with Mary, something new is disclosed to Irene. 
But what is disclosed about danger to Irene that could not have been disclosed in 
the absence of affect? Somewhat surprisingly, we are not told by Goldie so that we are left 
wondering whether the disclosed item is a feature of the experience that the subject 
undergoes or of the object of experience. Goldie argues that the difference that the presence 
of affect makes is manifested in Irene’s ‘way of thinking’ about the danger of ice (Goldie 
2002, 243). More specifically, Irene acquires a new phenomenal concept of danger which 
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gives her ‘new powers and potentialities of thought, imagination and feeling…[which] 
reverberate through the rest of her mental economy’ (Goldie 2002, 245, Goldie’s 
emphasis). For instance, Irene is now able to form ‘“feeling- laden desires’ rather than mere 
‘pro-forma’ desires’ (ibid.) to avoid the danger of ice. Furthermore, Irene is now able to 
recall the feeling of fear and feel empathy towards others feeling fear of danger. Unless 
Irene felt fear towards the danger of ice, she would not be able to have these new mental 
powers which are indicative of the putative fact that something new has been disclosed to 
her. In intentionalist terms, we can say that with the advent of affect danger is represented 
in a different way by the content of Irene’s emotional experience, a way that allows Irene 
to gain new mental abilities regarding the concept of danger. If so, according to Goldie, 
then there is an inextricable link between the affective character of the emotiona l 
experience and the representation of the properties of the object of experience, between 
phenomenology and intentionality. 
Section 3 
At this point, we have to ask two questions. First, is the above argument able to 
show that the presence of affect necessarily changes the way that the evaluative property 
of the object of experience is represented in the content of the emotional experience? 
Second, when coated in intentionalist terms, what is the most that the above argument can 
hope to achieve? In this section I answer the first question and I leave the task of answering 
the second question to the next section. 
The first question is in fact difficult to answer. Some authors have argued that 
Goldie is unable to show that there is any difference at the level of content in the presence 
of affect. For instance, Michael Brady claims that the difference between an evaluation 
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bereft of feeling and one “imbued” with feeling is simply that, a difference of evaluating 
an object without feeling in the first case and evaluating it with feeling in the second case. 
There is no difference in the way that the evaluative properties of the object constitut ing 
the content of the emotional experience are represented: 
Suppose we assume that thinking of something as dangerous is thinking of it as 
meriting fear… [C]ompare the content of feeling fear towards some object…and 
the content of non-emotionally thinking of the object as dangerous…The content 
in the first case is that the object merits a state with this affective or feeling element; 
the content in the second case is that the object merits a state with the affective or 
feeling element that has just dissipated. But I find it hard to understand how the 
first represents a “completely new” way of thinking about danger, when contrasted 
with the second. And I find it hard to understand, therefore, how the evaluative 
content of emotional experience in the first case differs from the evaluative content 
of the non-emotional experience in the second. All that has happened is that one’s 
relation to the relevant affect has changed: in the first case the feeling is presently 
experienced, in the second the feeling is remembered. How can this mark a genuine 
difference in what is disclosed about the evaluative realm beyond one’s body? 
(Brady 2013, 67-68) 
Brady then concludes by stating that the claim ‘about the necessity of affective presentation 
of evaluative information appears undermined: the same information can be presented non-
emotionally’ (ibid., p.68-9). Earlier Brady writes: ‘it is difficult to see how this difference 
between the experiences constitutes a difference in representational evaluative content. It 
is difficult to see, in other words, how the presence of the relevant feeling or affect conveys 
different evaluative information about the dangerousness of the object’ (ibid., 68). At the 
start of his discussion, Brady writes that ‘[t]he issue [i.e. whether affect is an essential 
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component of the evaluative intentionality of emotional experience], as I understand it, 
turns on the question of whether it is the feeling or affective element in emotiona l 
experience that plays the representational role; of whether, that is, our feelings are the way 
in which evaluative information is presented or disclosed to us’ (ibid., 52). What Brady 
means by the “representational role” of affect, I take it, refers to what I have repeatedly 
mentioned above, namely that according to the intentionalist model a change in 
phenomenal character yields a change in the properties represented by the content of 
experience. 
 Brady is not alone in complaining that affect does not seem to make any 
representational difference. Although Damien Whiting does not argue against Goldie’s 
argument directly, his objections are even more explicitly coated in intentionalist terms . 
He rejects the idea that ‘when we undergo emotion we represent evaluative properties to 
ourselves by means of feeling’ and this is because ‘although emotions comprise feelings, 
these feelings do not manifest phenomenally a representational character or content’ 
(Whiting 2012, 96-97; first emphasis mine). In fact, Whiting’s objection is more specific 
insofar as by “affect” or “emotional feelings” he understands the awareness of bodily or 
physiological changes that take place within us when undergoing an emotional experience. 
So Whiting writes that ‘the representation of there being a dangerous (or fearsome) object 
in front of me is no part of the experience of the unpleasant edgy sensation that pervades 
my guts and limbs when I am frightened’ (ibid.). Later on, Whiting rebuts the objection 
that his notion of emotional feelings is too narrow. ‘I reject the claim that I am considering 
the wrong (sorts of) feelings when I argue that emotional feelings do not have the sought -
after representational or intentional properties. And this is because the only feelings that 
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are phenomenally manifest in the emotions are the feelings I have been describing in this 
paper’ (ibid., 100-101). Notice that Whiting’s dogmatic belief that the only emotiona l 
feelings there are are the awareness of physiological changes is a belief that is subject of 
intense debate and controversy. Indeed, Goldie himself, and other authors that Whiting 
argues against, such as Doering (2003, 2007), explicitly state that the feelings they have in 
mind are not bodily feelings. Therefore Whiting’s objection as he formulates it ends up 
having a very narrow target. As far as I know, the only account that agrees that the only 
sort of emotional feelings are bodily feelings, and that explicitly uses the notion of 
representation in theorising the relation between the affective and evaluative component of 
emotional experience, is Prinz (2004). Whiting, then, either needs to provide us with a 
reason to believe that indeed the only kind of feelings involved in emotional experience 
are of the sort he claims, or, strictly speaking, his objections are relevant solely to Prinz’s 
account. At the same time, Whiting’s objection is important because even if we are more 
liberal in our understanding of emotional feelings, his argument is essentially the same as 
Brady’s, namely that it is difficult, or at least not straightforward, to understand what kind 
of representational work emotional feelings perform in relation to value.  
 Now, I think that it is difficult to adjudicate whether Goldie’s argument is effec tive 
in showing that the presence of affect changes the evaluative content of an emotiona l 
experience. On the one hand, there is room for being skeptical about whether the way Brady 
sets up the issue is the one Goldie had in mind. Consider again Brady’s objection. In his 
set up, the person having the thoughts that the ice is dangerous has presumably already 
experienced danger in the past and in particular the danger of ice. The contrast is then 
between the subject recollecting the feeling of fear while entertaining the thought that the 
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ice is dangerous and the subject entertaining the thought that the ice is dangerous without 
recollecting the feeling of fear. As I suggested above, there seems to be something right 
about the claim that the way danger is represented by the content of these two thoughts is 
not different. But perhaps this is not the sort of set up Goldie wanted to convey when trying 
to contrast the two evaluative contents before and after the onset of emotional experience. 
We can discern the difference between Goldie’s set up of the Mary analogy case and 
Brady’s set up of the contrast by looking closer at the analogy with Jackson’s thought 
experiment. In the latter, Mary has never phenomenally experienced the colour red (in fact, 
no colour except for white and black). She has no idea what it is like to experience the 
colour red. Therefore, when we move to Goldie’s thought experiment we shouldn’t set it 
up as if Irene has already experienced fear at the danger of ice and is now merely 
recollecting the feeling of fear while thinking about the danger of ice. In fact, this i.e. 
Brady’s, way of setting up the contrast seems to already imply that the affective and 
evaluative components of an emotional experience are detachable, an implication the truth 
of which is precisely at the heart of the matter. Rather, we should think of Irene as having 
no idea what it is like to feel fear at a danger in general and having merely an “intellectua l” 
grasp of fear and danger in the same way that Mary, before leaving the black and white 
room, had only an “intellectual” grasp of the colour red i.e. through the acquisition of 
knowledge of the wavelengths defining the physics of the colour red. The relevant contrast 
then is between the evaluative content of a thought the content of which does not and cannot 
be constituted by a phenomenal concept, in this case the phenomenal concept of danger, 
due to being entertained before having ever experienced fear at a danger, and the evaluative 
content of a thought after having slipped on ice and felt fear, and therefore being constituted 
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by the phenomenal concept of danger acquired through the experience of fear; and not 
between the evaluative content of two thoughts entertained after one has experienced fear 
at a danger. Insofar as Brady sets up the wrong sort of contrast, his challenge seems to miss 
the mark and therefore lose its force. 
 On the other hand, Goldie himself concedes that it is difficult to show that the 
presence of affect changes the way evaluative properties are represented by the content of 
experience. Indeed, before offering the analogy with Mary, Goldie writes that ‘there is no 
requirement to give a substantial characterization of what is the difference in content 
between thinking of something with feeling, and thinking of it without feeling. It might 
even be that no words are sufficient to capture this difference’ (Goldie 2000, 61; cf. Goldie 
2002). In fact, Goldie not only faces the issue that it is difficult to adjudicate the difference 
in evaluation before and after the onset of an emotional experience, but his characteriza t ion 
of the difference as being one of the “way of thinking” about the evaluative property of the 
object of experience introduces a further worry as to whether Goldie is able to secure the  
inextricability thesis at all.14 Recall the intentionalist’s “qualia option” above. According 
to this option, the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by an intrins ic, 
non-intentional property of experience. This property partakes of the intentionality of the 
experience by mere contingent association. That is, the intrinsic property of the experience 
is associated to the object of experience as cause and effect: the object causes the 
experience with that sort of intrinsic, phenomenal property. But there is no necessary, 
inextricable relation between the way that the object is represented in the experience and 
                                                 
14 Notice that Brady’s objection does not concern the inextricability thesis per se but rather the 
specific version Goldie puts forward. For all that has been said, Brady might opt for a version of 
the inextricability thesis as given by the “felt evaluative attitude” theory of Deonna and Teroni. 
See above. 
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the experience’s phenomenal character. This is essentially the argument we put against 
Montague in the previous chapter. Now, Irene’s acquisition of a completely new “way of 
thinking” about the danger of ice due to her acquisition of the phenomenal concept of the 
danger of ice is compatible with the “qualia option” scenario. According to the “qualia 
option,” when Irene experiences fear towards the danger of the ice, what is disclosed to her 
is something new about the experience, namely its phenomenal character, that is, an 
intrinsic, non-intentional feature of the experience of fear. This intrinsic feature of the 
experience is then associated with the object of experience as cause and effect. Irene then 
learns something new about ice, namely that it causes that sort of affective phenomena l 
character due to its danger. This is sufficient for Irene to acquire a new phenomenal concept 
that in turn allows her to think about ice in a completely new way by forming all sorts of 
mental connections such as the ones mentioned by Goldie above. In other words, acquiring 
a completely new way of thinking about the danger of ice does not necessitate, and 
therefore does not show, that there is any sort of inextricable relation between 
phenomenology and intentionality.  
Section 4 
 The answer to the second question -that is, when coated in intentionalist terms, what 
is the most that Goldie’s Mary type of argument can hope to achieve?- is more interesting.15 
Once Goldie frames his version of the inextricability thesis in intentionalist terms, what his 
claim actually amounts to is that if we remove or alter the affective character of an 
emotional experience, then we necessarily also alter the representation of the evaluative 
                                                 
15 For an analogous argument within debates on sensory awareness against representationalism 
employed in the next two paragraphs, see Campbell’s contribution in Campbell and Cassam 
(2014), esp. ch.2. See also Campbell (2002) and Campbell (2011). For a useful discussion of 
Campbell’s argument, see Soteriou (2016), 93-111. More on Campbell in chapter 6. 
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properties the object is experienced as having (in addition to the evaluative attitude the 
subject takes towards the content). If successfully argued for, this claim shows that there 
is an inextricable relation between the affective phenomenology of emotional experience 
and its evaluative intentionality, but it does not show that affect is the disclosure of an 
evaluative property of the object of experience. This is so because, once framed in 
intentionalist terms, the putative inextricable link one investigates is the one between two 
features of experience: the experience’s phenomenal character and representationa l 
properties. Nothing so far has been said about whether a property of the object of 
experience has been disclosed.  
 To be sure, an intentionalist might reply that in case the emotional experience is 
veridical, the representational properties of the experience are correct, and therefore it is 
the case that a property of the object of experience has been disclosed. If Irene’s fear of the 
danger of ice is correct, then the representational properties of her experience of fear are 
accurate, and therefore her acquisition of the phenomenal concept of danger occurs through 
the disclosure of a property of the object of experience. But this reply would miss the mark. 
For, analogously to the case of the qualia option discussed above, one might ask whether 
the acquisition of a new way of thinking about, say, the danger of ice, is due to the 
disclosure of a property of the object or due to the acquisition of a new mode of presentation 
of the object. In the case of Mary, if asked whether she acquires a new phenomenal concept 
of redness due to the experience disclosing redness itself or rather due to the acquaintance 
with a new mode of presentation of redness, the intentionalist is inclined to answer the 
latter. And the same goes for the case of Irene. Irene acquires a new phenomenal concept 
of danger due to becoming acquainted with a new mode of presentation of danger. But this 
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does not allow the intentionalist to claim that therefore a feature of the object itself has 
been disclosed to Irene. Therefore, even a successful attempt at showing that alteration at 
the level of affective phenomenology yields necessarily an alteration at the level of 
representational, evaluative content would fall short of showing that affect is the disclosure 
of evaluative features of the object of experience. If so, then Goldie’s arguments can at 
most achieve a form of the inextricability claim that show the inextricable relation between 
the phenomenal (affective) and intentional (representational) properties of emotiona l 
experience and not the claim that affect is the disclosure of evaluative qualities of objects 
of experience. This issue is found in Goldie’s analogy with the case of Mary. While setting 
up the issue by means of the analogy with Jackson’s thought experiment might help Goldie 
in showing that there is an inextricable link between the affective character of emotiona l 
experience and its evaluative intentionality, it does not settle the question whether what is 
disclosed is a feature of experience or of the object of experience. Once coated in 
intentionalist terms, then, the most that the analogy with Mary can show is that the presence 
of the relevant phenomenal character is inextricably linked with the representationa l 
properties of the emotional experience. 
 In conclusion, there are three claims that we can draw from the above. First, Goldie 
seems to want to argue for the claim that the presence of affect indicates the disclosure of 
an evaluative property of the object of experience. Second, once coated in intentiona list 
terms, Goldie’s claim can at most aspire to show that there is an inextricable relation 
between the phenomenal character of the experience i.e. affect, and the way that the 
evaluative property of the object is represented by the content of the experience. That is, 
that there is an inextricable relation between two properties of experience, not between a 
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property of experience i.e. its phenomenal character, and the evaluative property of the 
object of experience. Third, the argument Goldie provides us with is inconclusive at best 
and is compatible with a view of experience that denies there is an inextricable relation 
between phenomenology and intentionality at worst. 
 So where does this leave us? It is crucial to emphasise that all of the above 
arguments, both for and against the notion that affect is a sort of disclosure of value, are 
framed by using the intentionalist model of experience as if it were the only option on the 
table. Both Brady and Whiting conclude from the claim that it is difficult to conceive a 
way in which affect plays a representational role in the content of experience that affect is 
not a genuine disclosure of value. But they miss the more fundamental point that by relying 
on the intentionalist model of experience, nothing has been said about whether affect is the 
disclosure of a property of the object of experience. Their arguments, insofar as they are 
challenges to the claim that affect plays a representational role, are challenges solely to 
Goldie’s specific version of the claim that affect and evaluation are inextricably linked that 
results from being wedded to an intentionalist model of experience. They are not challenges 
to the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. For his part, Goldie also uses the 
intentionalist model as if it were the only game in town. But this is not the case.16 This 
opens the possibility of cashing out the notion that affect is the disclosure of value by 
employing different theories of experience, theories that are committed to the idea that the 
phenomenal character of experience is determined in part by the objective features of the 
                                                 
16For important challenges to intentionalist accounts of sense experience from the point of view 
of so-called relationism, or naïve realism, see Martin (2002), Travis (2004), Campbell (2011) and 
Campbell’s contribution in Campbell and Cassam (2014). More on what a relationist view of 
affect and value looks like, and its inherent problems, in chapter 3. For a clear overview of what 
the debate between representationalists and relationists comes down to, see Soteriou (2013), ch.2. 
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object of experience. It is legitimate to ask, then, whether perhaps we can theorise the role 
played by affect in the evaluative intentionality of emotional experience in some other 
terms that would avoid the problems raised above. In other words, whether Goldie’s 
motivating intuition could be reframed, and perhaps vindicated, by employing a different 
underlying theory of experience.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Emotion, Value, and Authority 
Introduction 
 In the previous two chapters I argued that neither Montague nor Goldie are able to 
provide us with an account of the relation between affect and evaluation in emotiona l 
experience that is capable of providing us with the theoretical material to build an argument 
towards the notion that affect is the disclosure of value which, in both cases, I suggested is 
the motivation behind their accounts. Moreover, I traced the shortcomings of both accounts 
to the theoretical constraints imposed by the respective underlying theories of experience. 
In so doing, we learnt what assumptions about experience we need to avoid in order to 
argue for the claim that affect is the disclosure of value. In particular, we learnt that if we 
are to argue that affect is the disclosure of value, then at the very least the theoretical 
commitments of our account need to allow for the notion that in having a phenomena lly 
conscious experience we disclose not only features of the experience but also of the object 
of experience. 
   In this chapter I look at a final account of the relation between affect and 
evaluation underpinned by a specific theory of experience, namely Mark Johnston’s. The 
theory that underlies Johnston’s account is so-called Naïve Realism, or Relationism. I 
argue that although this theory of experience avoids the issues with the previous two 
theories we looked at in Chapters 1 and 2, ultimately also in this case, when applied to 
affect and value, the account provided fails to secure its aim due to the theoretical 
commitments imported from the underlying theory of experience. Nevertheless, there is an 
important difference between Johnston’s account and the previous two we have looked at. 
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While in the case of Montague and Goldie the aim is strictly to argue for the inextricability 
between phenomenology and intentionality in emotional experience, by way of which one 
can then attempt to argue for the notion that affect is the disclosure of value, in the case of 
Johnston the aim is directly to argue for the latter. Two things follow from this. First, with 
Johnston, we are not only dealing with arguments to the effect that affective 
phenomenology and evaluative intentionality in emotional experience are inextricab ly 
linked. Rather, we are dealing directly with the question of whether affect plays an essential 
role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge, that is, knowledge of the object of 
experience. Second, since Johnston deals head on with the claim that affect is the disclosure 
of value, his account provides us not only with “negative” lessons, that is, with lessons 
about what assumptions we should avoid in constructing an argument to the effect that 
affect is the disclosure of value, but also with “positive” lessons, that is, with lessons about 
what assumptions regarding the relation between affect and value we should adopt. Most 
importantly, with Johnston we start appreciating the importance of motivational states in 
the relation between affect and value. Indeed, as we shall see, the introduction of the 
question of the role of motivational states in the theorization of affect and value will 
become of central importance in the arguments put forward in the second part of the thesis 
to the effect that affect is the disclosure of value. So although I argue that Johnston’s 
account ultimately fails in its aim, I also argue that his account provides us with invaluab le 
insights in the building of our account of affect as a disclosure of value.  
 This chapter is divided in three sections. In Section 1 I reconstruct Johnston’s 
argument to the effect that affect is the disclosure of value and clarify the underlying 
theoretical differences between his account and Montague’s and Goldie’s. In Section 2 I 
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discuss two problems encountered by Johnston’s account. First, I argue that Johnston’s 
commitment to a Naïve Realist conception of experience, when applied to affect and value, 
leads him to adopt an incoherent position that ultimately risks being vulnerable to the same 
charge as the one put forward against the representationalist account of Goldie. The second 
problem, also fruit of Johnston’s commitment to a Naïve Realist conception of experience, 
introduces the notion of the transparency of experience. I argue that Johnston’s account is 
unable to accommodate the phenomenological observation that affective experience is not 
transparent. Respecting the “opaqueness” of affective experience will become a key 
criterion in the building of our account of affect as a disclosure of value. Finally, Section 
3 concludes the first part of the thesis by outlining three criteria that an account of affect 
as a disclosure of value ought to satisfy. These are taken from the lessons learnt from the 
previous and present chapters. The second part of the thesis will build on the attempt to 
satisfy these three criteria.   
Section 1 
In “The Authority of Affect”, Mark Johnston argues for the thesis that ‘[s]ensing 
the utterly specific ways in which a situation, animal or person is appealing or repellent  
requires an appropriate affective engagement with the situation, animal or person. Absence 
of appropriate affect makes us aspect-blind’ (Johnston 2001, 181). Johnston specifies that 
‘the kind of affect in which [he is] interested includes both a pre-judgmental orientation 
towards the world, and occurrent ‘crystallizations’ of this orientation, understood as pre-
predicative or pre-judgmental disclosures of sensuous values’ (ibid., 182). In turn, by 
“sensuous values” Johnston means ‘the utterly determinate versions of such determinab les 
as the beautiful, the charming, the erotic [], the banal, the sublime, the horrific and plain 
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old appealing and the repellent’ (ibid.). Once “sensuous values” are introduced, Johnston 
restates his thesis thus:  
Within each determinable range, the determinate values in question would be 
inaccessible to beings without an appropriate sensibility. So these values might be 
called the inherently sensuous values. Thought and judgement directed at these 
determinate values could not be generated simply by the understanding. Something 
akin to sensing and sense-based imagination is required to make them available as 
topics for thought and judgement. While reason can include in its accounting 
judgements directed at such values, it cannot deliver the judgements themselves. 
Just as we need to sense cherry red to make a goodish range of judgments as to its 
nature, we need to encounter the determinate sensuous values in order to have them 
either as the topics or as the things predicated in our most basic evaluative 
judgements…If one has never been moved or affected by the determinate ways in 
which things are beautiful or charming or banal or sublime or horrific or appealing, 
then one is ignorant of the relevant determinate values. (ibid., 182-183)  
 Johnston writes that the sort of psychological phenomena he is after are not 
emotional experiences ‘which typically arise after one is drawn to or repelled by 
something’ (ibid., 182, fn.1). Johnston understands emotional experience as psychologica l 
occurrences grounded on the affective apprehension of value. Although, as we have seen, 
Goldie and Montague speak of emotional experiences in their respective accounts of the 
relation between affect and value, I believe that in the passage quoted above there is enough 
evidence to show that Johnston targets the same phenomenological intuition motivating the 
accounts of Goldie and Montague, namely that affect is the disclosure of value. This is so 
because, just like Goldie and Montague, Johnston emphasises in various ways that without 
an affective dimension to one’s experience, one does not gain access to the evaluative 
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features of one’s surroundings. In the absence of affect, we are ‘aspect-blind’, we are 
unable to form informative judgements regarding value. Reason and the understanding 
alone cannot provide us with insight into values. These are all themes that we have seen to 
be at the root of Goldie’s and Montague’s accounts.  
 The core of Johnston’s argument in support of his thesis relies on the claim that the 
affective component of the sort of experience under investigation, if appropriate, has a 
normative authority over the evaluative judgments and relevant actions motivated by the 
experience. From a first person perspective, there is no felt need to justify one’s evaluative 
judgments and relevant actions when these are motivated by affect: affect can make these 
readily intelligible (ibid., 187). Johnston then argues that it is in virtue of being a disclosure 
of value that affect has this sort of authority: 
[I]t is because affect can be the disclosure of the appeal of other things and other 
people that it can have authority in the matter of what we should desire and do. By 
‘the authority of affect’ I mean not to refer to its sheer effectiveness as a source of 
desire or action, but rather to the fact that the presence of the affect can make the 
desire or action especially intelligible to the agent himself. It can make the desire 
or act seem apt or fitting in a way that silences any demand for justification. 
(Johnston 2001, 189) 
Furthermore, Johnston argues that ‘[a]ffect has authority, when it does, by being a 
refinement of sensing and correct imagining, a more skilled way of doing these things’ 
(ibid., 205). According to Johnston, both affect and sense experience share the same sort 
of disclosure as a feature of their phenomenal character and this is manifested in the way 
both sorts of experiences have authority over the relevant beliefs and desires. Immedia te ly 
following the previous passage, Johnston writes: 
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In this way affect is akin to perceptual experience considered generally. Perceptual 
experience makes certain immediate perceptual beliefs about the perceived scene 
seem apt or fitting in a way that silences any demand for justification for those 
beliefs…Perceptual experience discloses how things stand in the environment and 
so confers a ready intelligibility on immediate perceptual beliefs. In the same way 
affective disclosure of sensuous goods makes desire readily intelligible from the 
inside. (Ibid., 189-190; cf. Martin 2002, 389-390) 
Here “sensing” must be understood broadly and not as referring solely to one particular 
sense modality. The thought, then, is that affect is a “refinement” of sensing in that it shares 
an essential feature of its phenomenal character, namely the disclosure of properties of 
objects which in turn bestows it with normative authority over beliefs and desires.  
 Just like Goldie and Montague, Johnston relies on a specific theory of sense 
experience to theorise the relation between affect and value. Where Johnston radically 
departs from both Goldie and Montague is in the sort of theory of sense experience that he 
relies on. Elaborating on their differences will prove crucial in gaining further clarity about 
Johnston’s account.  
According to my argument in Chapter 1, since Montague’s arguments to the effect 
that phenomenology and intentionality are inextricably linked are unsuccessful, she falls 
back into a position that is vulnerable to the same problems as a qualia theory according to 
which the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is constituted by intrinsic, non-
intentional, non-representational properties of experience. As we have seen, Montague 
argues that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is inextricably linked to its 
intentionality by way of a strict resemblance between the intrinsic properties of experience 
and the properties that the object of experience is experienced as possessing. In the case of 
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emotional experience, the story is slightly more complicated since the resemblance 
postulated is one between the evaluative property that the object of experience is 
experienced as having and the value associated with the valenced character of the affective 
properties of the experience. As for Goldie, I argued that he commits to some form of the 
intentionalist model of experience. According to this model, perceptual experience is a 
mental representation of the world. The structure of this mental representation, or of the 
intentionality of experience, is explicated in terms of the notion of intentional attitudes 
directed at a representational content with veridicality conditions. The content of 
experience is the way in which the experience represents the world to be. In the case of a 
genuine perceptual experience the veridicality conditions of the content of experience are 
satisfied and the experience correctly represents the way the world is while in the case of 
a perceptual illusion or hallucination the veridicality conditions of the content of the 
experience are not satisfied and therefore the experience misrepresents the way the world 
is. Crucially for our purposes, according to the intentionalist model imputed to Goldie, the 
phenomenal character of experience is captured (wholly or in part) by the representationa l 
content, that is, it is constituted by the properties the experience has in virtue of which it 
represents the world as being thus and so.  
Both Montague and Goldie, then, adopt theories of experience that theorise its 
phenomenal character as constituted by properties of experience. In the case of Montague, 
it is intrinsic, non-representational properties of experience that constitute its 
phenomenology. In the case of Goldie, it is the experience’s representational properties 
that do so i.e. (wholly or in part) the experience’s representational content. This 
commonality between the theories underlying Goldie’s and Montague’s accounts can be 
   66 
appreciated further by considering the way in which the respective theories cash out the 
phenomenological indistinguishability between a veridical and hallucinatory experience. 
By a hallucinatory experience I mean an experience that purports to be about an object that 
in fact is not present in the subject’s surroundings. According to a theory that employs the 
notion of qualia to give an account of the phenomenal character of experience, a 
hallucinatory experience is phenomenologically indistinguishable from a veridica l 
experience insofar as the subject is in both cases presented with an intrinsic property of 
experience viz. a mental quale. The difference between the two experiences lies in the fact 
that while in the case of the hallucinatory experience there is no appropriate worldly object 
causing the quale, in the case of veridical experience the quale is caused by an appropriate 
worldly object. According to the intentionalist model, the phenomenologica l 
indistinguishability of the two sorts of experiences is explained by their sharing the same 
representational content. Since the phenomenal character is determined (wholly or in part) 
by its representational content, then in sharing the same representational content (and, for 
some, intentional attitude), they share the same phenomenal character. It is just that while 
in the case of hallucination the representational content misrepresents the way the world is 
i.e. its veridicality conditions are not satisfied, in the case of a genuine perceptual 
experience its representational content correctly represents the way the world is i.e. its 
veridicality conditions are satisfied. Just as in the case with qualia theory, the difference 
between the two experiences is a matter of their causal history. While in the case of a 
veridical experience an appropriate worldly object causes the mental representation of the 
world being a certain way, in the case of a hallucination it does not.  
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 By contrast, according to Johnston, talk of the phenomenal character of sense 
experience is not to be captured solely in terms of properties of experience. Johnston’s 
rejection of qualia as constituents of the phenomenal character of experience is explicit:  
The function of sensory awareness is not to deliver sensations, or structured 
qualia…Instead the senses are forms of openness to things in the 
environment…Start then with the notion that the senses provide neither sensations 
nor qualia, but awareness of environmental particulars –objects, stuff, states and 
events. One distinctive consequence of such awareness of an environmental 
particular is this: By turning our attention toward the particular of which we are 
aware we then have it, and not merely some quale it has produced or some mode 
of presentation of it, isolated as a topic or subject for further thought and 
judgement. (Ibid., 206-207; cf. Johnston 2006) 
Sensory experience is not a matter of being acquainted with an intrinsic property of 
experience but with a particular object and its properties out there in the world. So far, 
though, we haven’t shown exactly how Johnston differs from an intentionalist since also 
the latter can agree that the phenomenal character of experience is not constituted by 
intrinsic, non-intentional properties of experience i.e. qualia.17 So how does Johnston differ 
from the intentionalist, specifically in his understanding of the constitution of the 
phenomenal character of experience? The broader answer lies in Johnston’s rejection of 
the conception of sensory experience as providing us with a mental representation of the 
world. Rather, according to Johnston, (veridical) sensory experience is to be conceived as 
a psychological, nonrepresentational relation between the subject and the particular 
                                                 
17 I wrote “can agree” because an intentionalist can opt for a view where the phenomenal 
character of experience is constituted by qualia. 
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worldly objects out there in the world. In order to see more clearly Johnston’s disagreement 
with the intentionalist regarding the phenomenal character of experience, we need to dig 
slightly deeper into his theory of sense experience.  
 We find the necessary details in his “The Obscure Object of Hallucinat ion” 
(Johnston 2004). The crux of Johnston’s theory is that veridical sensory experience 
provides us with worldly particulars instantiating what he terms “sensible profiles”, that is, 
‘a complex, partly qualitative and partly relational property, which exhausts the way the 
particular scene before your eyes is if your present experience is veridical’ (Johnston 2004, 
134). According to Johnston, we should think of sensible profiles as pertaining to the world 
insofar as they just are the sensible way that an arrangement of particular worldly objects 
and their properties strikes us as being. In other words, sensible profiles are properties of 
the scenes we are confronted with, scenes constituted by a particular arrangement of 
worldly objects and their properties. Johnston invites us to think of sensible profiles 
through Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing as” (Johnston 2004, 137). When I see a pine tree, 
I see the tree as a pine tree. Sensory awareness provides me with the sensible profile of the 
tree as a pine tree. In having a veridical perceptual experience of a pine tree, the object of 
my experience is the particular pine tree before me that instantiates the sensible profile “as 
a pine tree”. The sensible profile just is the arrangement of the tree’s properties that allows 
me to see it as a pine tree. The characterization of sensible profiles in terms of “seeing as” 
is important because it allows Johnston to explain how our sensing can be expanded beyond 
the sensing of standard properties such as colour and shape and therefore to talk of sensing 
‘considered generally’. This is so because our ability to see things “as” is expanded by our 
conceptual abilities. I am able to see my dog as a Golden Retriever because I possess the 
   69 
concept “Golden Retriever.” In a similar vein, sensing sensuous values is a matter of seeing 
objects as exemplifying sensuous values (Johnston 2001, 209). Understanding affect as a 
disclosure of value is understanding it as the phenomenal character of an experience where 
a particular object or event appears as possessing an evaluative property. In other words, 
in the absence of an affective engagement with the object or event one is unable to 
apprehend it as instantiating an evaluative property.  
What about cases of hallucination or perceptual illusion? In cases of hallucina t ion 
or perceptual illusion, Johnston argues that we are still presented with sensible profiles, the 
“only” difference being that these are not instantiated by particular objects in the world. 
According to Johnston, if I hallucinate a pine tree, or fall under the illusion that the tree 
before me is a pine tree, I am nevertheless presented with a sensible profile- not instantiated 
in the world. Crucially, this does not mean that I am presented with a mental item. Sensible 
profiles are not properties of experience. They are complex properties instantiated by 
particular objects in the world that can be detected by sensory awareness in case of veridica l 
perceptual experience and that are not instantiated by objects in case of hallucinations or 
perceptual illusions. In both the case of hallucinatory, or illusory experience, and veridica l 
experience, the phenomenal character of experience is to be understood (in part) in terms 
of the subject’s awareness of an item that is not a property of the experience.  
Importantly, according to Johnston, although the phenomenologica l 
indistinguishability between a veridical perceptual experience and a hallucination is 
accounted for by the characterization of both sorts of experiences as an awareness of 
sensible profiles, it does not follow that these two sorts of experiences are directed towards 
the same kind of object. In the case of veridical perceptual experience, we are presented 
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with particular worldly objects that instantiate sensible profiles while in hallucination we 
are presented with sensible profiles that are not instantiated. To assume that in both cases 
we are presented with the same kind of object, namely sensible profiles, is to assume what 
Johnston calls the ‘The Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle’ according to which ‘[i]f two acts 
of awareness are qualitatively indistinguishable for their subject then objects of the very 
same type are directly presented in each act of awareness’ (Johnston 2004, 151). For our 
purposes, what is important to highlight is that by rejecting ‘The Phenomenal Bottleneck 
Principle’, Johnston rejects the assumption that we gain access to particular worldly objects 
by being presented with sensible profiles. Rather, Johnston’s thought is that we are 
presented with particular objects as having sensible profiles. As Johnston puts it, ‘the ‘as’-
structure of sensory awareness is not the loaded ‘by’-structure of the friend of indirect ion’ 
(ibid, 155). This is important because, as we shall see presently, it reveals what Johnston 
takes to be a defining feature of experience that distinguishes him from the intentionalist.  
So how does Johnston’s account of sensory experience differ from the 
intentionalist? As we have seen above, according to the intentionalist, a genuine perceptual 
experience is a veridical mental representation while a hallucinatory experience is a 
nonveridical mental representation. The phenomenological indistinguishability of a 
veridical and hallucinatory experience is due to the experience’s sharing the same 
representational content. By contrast, Johnston rejects the idea that in both veridica l 
perceptual experience and hallucination we are presented with the same sort of object 
where this is conceived as a property of experience.18 Rather, what the two experiences 
share is being an awareness of a complex property i.e. a sensible profile, where this 
                                                 
18 Here I do not in any way mean to suggest that intentionalists deny that in experience we are 
presented directly with the mind-independent object and its features.  
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property is not a property of the experience but rather, in the case of a veridical perceptual 
experience, it is a property instantiated by the particular objects out there in the world. So 
in the case of veridical perceptual experience, the phenomenal character is constituted (in 
part) by the very features of the objects we are confronted with. And in the case of 
hallucinatory experience, the phenomenal character is constituted by non-instantiated 
sensible profiles. Crucially, then, contra the intentionalist, Johnston maintains that in the 
case of veridical perceptual experience, the phenomenal character of sensory experience is 
not ultimately constituted solely by properties of the experience, properties that it shares 
with hallucinatory experience. Rather, the phenomenal character is (in part) constituted by 
the qualitative features of the particular worldly objects confronting the subject. This is 
part of what Johnston means when he writes, against a form of intentionalism which he 
labels the Fact-Directed Attitude View, that ‘it does not earn the right to the metaphor of 
the senses taking in concrete reality’ (Johnston 2006, 269).19  
Let me illustrate this difference with the case of Jackson’s Mary. According to 
Johnston, when Mary sees a red object for the first time, her acquisition of a new 
phenomenal concept of redness is due to her becoming acquainted with the colour red itself. 
The phenomenal character of her experience of redness is constituted (in part) by the very 
redness that qualifies the object of experience. By contrast, according to the intentionalist, 
                                                 
19 There is another way to contrast Johnston and the intentionalist but which does not have an 
immediate bearing on questions of phenomenology but rather of epistemology. According to the 
intentionalist, the content of experience has veridicality conditions, that is, it can be assessed as 
true or false. According to this picture, sensory experience provides us with truth-bearers. By 
contrast, according to Johnston, objects of experience are not assessable as true or false, they are 
not truth-bearers. Rather, they are the particular objects out there in the world. In and of 
themselves, the particular objects of sensory awareness do not have veridicality conditions, they 
are not assessable as true or false. The epistemological function they have is as truth-makers, that 
is, they can make the content of our judgements true or false. For more details, see Johnston 
2006. 
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when Mary sees a red object for the first time, her acquisition of a new phenomenal concept 
of redness is due to her experience representing the colour red in a new, phenomenal way. 
Within this latter framework, Mary does not gain access to redness itself but rather to a 
mode of representing redness that she might have had even in the absence of a red object 
out there in the world, as in the case of hallucination. So when Johnston writes that ‘What 
Frank Jackson’s Mary does not know is not what some mental quale is like. What she does 
not know is what redness is like’ (Johnston 2004, 146), he is not only rejecting the qualia 
theorist but also the intentionalist. We are now also in a position to understand why the 
same goes for the quote above where Johnston writes that ‘By turning our attention toward 
the particular of which we are aware we then have it, and not merely some quale it has 
produced or some mode of presentation of it, isolated as a topic or subject for further 
thought and judgement’ (Johnston 2001, 207). The phenomenal character of sensory 
awareness is constituted (in part) by the features of the particular and not by a way of 
representing the particular. 
We are now in a better position to appreciate what is at stake in Johnston’s account 
of affect as a disclosure of value. As we have seen, Johnston claims that his ‘thought about 
the sensuous values is that exemplifications of them can typically be sensed only when 
sensing is refined by affect’ (Johnston 2001, 210). First, recall that the objects of veridica l 
sensory awareness are the particular objects we are confronted with that instantiate sensible 
profiles, where the notion of sensible profiles is comparable to the phenomenon of “seeing 
as” introduced by Wittgenstein. So when Johnston speaks of affect as a refinement of 
sensing he means that in an affective experience, just like in a sensory experience, 
particular worldly objects strike us as being a certain way, in this case as exemplifying 
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certain values. Most importantly, what the above discussion of the difference between 
Johnston and the intentionalist brings out is that the way we are to think of the phenomena l 
character of affect is as constituted by the way that the particular worldly objects strike us 
as being which in this case is as instantiating evaluative properties. When we ask what 
constitutes the phenomenology of a veridical, or appropriate, affective experience 
according to Johnston, we should not answer by mentioning solely properties of experience 
but rather also by mentioning the particular objects confronting us that instantiate a sensible 
profile “as possessing a determinate, sensuous value”. Affect is the presentation of 
particular objects in the world as exemplifying evaluative properties. It is in this way that 
we should understand Johnston’s claim that affect is the disclosure of value. Here 
disclosure takes all the loaded sense of experience being (in part) the presentation of the 
properties of the object itself, of being a genuine openness to the world, of experience, as 
Johnston put it, taking in concrete reality.  
By distinguishing himself from both Montague and Goldie in the manner just 
explained, Johnston is able to avoid the trap they fall into. Montague’s account relies on a 
theory of experience that conceives its phenomenal character as constituted by intrins ic, 
non-intentional properties of experience that gain intentionality through a resemblance 
with the properties of objects. I argued that Montague’s notion of resemblance is not 
sufficient to secure an inextricable link between phenomenology and intentionality, let 
alone a defence of the notion of affect as a disclosure of value, since the intrinsic, non-
intentional phenomenal properties of experience participate in the intentionality of 
experience solely by way of a contingent association. The causal impact of the object out 
there in the world on the subject’s cognitive faculties generates the experience’s 
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phenomenal properties which are then associated with the external object. Translating this 
to the case of Mary, when Mary sees for the first time a red object, there is a causal relation 
between the object and Mary’s cognitive faculties that generates a red quale in her 
experience. Mary acquires the phenomenal concept of redness via becoming acquainted 
with an intrinsic, phenomenal property of experience. What Mary learns is something new 
about the experience of seeing red rather than about redness itself. In the case of Irene, 
Goldie’s ice-cool scientist who never felt fear before, what she learns when slipping on ice 
for the first time is something new about the experience of feeling fear rather than about 
the evaluative property of the object of experience, the danger of ice. Within this 
framework we are not able to show why without an affective engagement with the object 
of experience we are unable to access new knowledge regarding its value, that is, what a 
certain determinate value is.20 All we are able to show is why in the absence of affect we 
are unable to access new knowledge regarding the experience.  
In the case of Goldie, I argued that what the arguments he puts forward can achieve 
at best is showing an inextricable relation between the phenomenal properties of 
experience, which is how affect is conceived in the intentionalist model, and the 
experience’s representational properties, that is, the way that the object is represented as 
being by the representational content of experience. (At worst, it can be argued that 
Goldie’s arguments are compatible with a qualia theory of the sort Montague falls back 
into which is unable to secure an inextricable relation between the two sets of properties). 
I then argued that even if Goldie could convincingly show that affect plays a 
                                                 
20 One possible way to answer this problem is by adopting a dispositionalist view of the relation 
between affect and value. Dispositionalism is a position that will become an important reference 
point in the second part of the thesis. 
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representational role, he could not show that this is a case of a genuine disclosure of the 
evaluative feature of the object. As we have seen above, according to the intentionalist, 
when Mary is confronted for the first time with a red object, she acquires a new phenomena l 
concept of redness due to her experience representing the colour red in a new, phenomena l 
way. In both the case of representing redness by its physical constituents, as Mary is able 
to do before leaving the black and white room, and representing redness in the new, 
phenomenal way, redness is precisely represented by the experience to Mary. But, as I 
have argued in the previous chapter, why should we think that the representational content 
of this new, phenomenal way of representing redness, even if veridical, qualifies as a 
genuine case of disclosure when the representational content of the other, non-phenomena l 
ways of representing redness that Mary possessed before leaving the room do not qualify 
as genuine cases of disclosure? And therefore why should we think that the phenomena l 
character of this new way of representing redness is providing Mary with the knowledge 
of what redness itself is like? If the phenomenal character of Mary’s sensory experience of 
red is determined by the experience’s representational content, then the phenomena l 
character of her experience teaches her a new way of representing redness, not what redness 
is like. The item of knowledge that Mary acquires is not what redness is like but rather an 
ulterior way of representing redness. Applying this to the case of Irene, if we commit to an 
intentionalist framework, when she slips on ice for the first time and feels fear at its danger, 
then all we are able to show is that Irene is provided with a new way of representing danger 
but which, again, does not allow Goldie to claim that this representational content, even if 
veridical, is a case of a genuine disclosure of value. This is so because by “affect as a 
disclosure of value” we mean that in having an affective experience we gain knowledge 
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about value that could not be learnt before, or in the absence of, the advent of the affective 
experience. Neither in the case of Mary nor of Irene are we told what the essential role 
played by the respective phenomenal characters are in the acquisition of new knowledge 
of the object of experience. Veridical representation, then, is not sufficient for disclosure. 
Therefore, just as in the case of Montague, within this framework we are not able to show 
why without an affective engagement with the object of experience we are unable to access 
new knowledge regarding value, that is, what an evaluative feature of an object is like.  
By contrast, we have seen that Johnston’s account of affect as a disclosure of value 
relies on a theory of experience that conceives its phenomenology in such a way as to allow 
for a genuine notion of disclosure. According to Johnston, when Mary leaves the room and 
is presented with a red object, the phenomenal character of her experience is (in part) 
constituted by the very redness that qualifies the object. We are now able to say that the 
item of knowledge that Mary gains is what redness is like rather than what a mental quale 
is like or what a new, phenomenal way of representing redness is like. And therefore we 
are able to explain the essential role played by the phenomenal character of the experience 
in acquiring new knowledge of the object. Similarly, we are able to say that when Irene 
feels fear for the first time she learns what danger is like and does not merely learn 
something about the experience of feeling fear or a new way of representing danger.21 
Therefore, we are now able to show why without an affective engagement with the object 
of experience we are unable to access new knowledge regarding value, that is, what a 
certain determinate value is. That is because the evaluative property of the object 
                                                 
21 As we shall see, there are crucial disanalogies between the sort of disclosure at play in sensory 
experience and in affective experience. 
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constitutes (in part) the phenomenal character of the experience. So unless we have an 
experience with that phenomenal character, we are not being presented with the value itself.   
Now, the reason for presenting Johnston’s account and the way it avoids the trap is 
neither to endorse the details of Johnston’s account of sensory experience nor to endorse 
its relationist roots. As I argue in the second section of this chapter, not only is Johnston’s 
specific account confronted with certain issues, but committing to a conception of the 
phenomenology of experience along relationist lines when theorising the relation between 
affect and value is problematic. Rather, my aim so far has been to show the sort of criterion 
about experience that we need to satisfy if we want to defend the notion of affect as a 
disclosure of value. This is, that the phenomenal character of experience has an essential 
role to play in the acquisition of new knowledge of the object of experience. This is a 
criterion that the theories of experience underlying Montague’s and Goldie’s accounts are 
unable to satisfy and that the theory of experience underlying Johnston’s account does seem 
to satisfy - but at a cost.  
Section 2 
In what follows, I want to discuss two problems that arise from committing to the 
sort of conception of the phenomenal character of experience championed by Johnston 
when theorising the relation between affect and value. The first problem deals with the 
specific way in which Johnston cashes out the relationist conception of the phenomena l 
character of experience when applied to the case of affect and value, namely by appeal to 
the claim that sensory awareness, and therefore affect, has an “as-structure.” The question 
I want to ask is whether the notion of “seeing-as” is appropriate to capture the notion of 
disclosure that we are after. A related question is whether the notion of “seeing-as” is not 
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perhaps closer to the notion of representation than first meets the eye, a notion that I argued 
above is insufficient for disclosure. The second problem begins with the observation of a 
discrepancy between some paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness and affective 
experience. The discrepancy consists in the fact that while in the case of many paradigmatic 
cases of sensory awareness the subject is unable to focus on the features of its phenomena l 
character without focusing on the features of the object of experience, the same is not the 
case in affective experience. In the latter case, the subject is able to dissociate between 
features of the affective experience and the evaluative features of the object of experience 
and focus on the former without focusing on the latter. This discrepancy has important 
reverberations on the notion of disclosure that we are after in the case of affect, 
reverberations that Johnston not only does not consider but, I argue, that his account is 
unable to accommodate. Overall, the aim in discussing these two problems with Johnston’s 
account is to come up with further criteria that a successful notion of affect as a disclosure 
of value is meant to satisfy. 
Problem 1 
According to Johnston, the phenomenal character of veridical sensory experience 
is constituted (in part) by worldly particulars and their very features. The phenomeno logy 
of visually experiencing a red object is constituted (in part) by the very redness instantiated 
by the particular confronting us. This conception of the phenomenology of experience 
allows Johnston to use the notion of disclosure encapsulating the essential thought that 
without the relevant phenomenal character we are unable to gain a certain kind of 
knowledge regarding the object of experience, namely knowledge of what a certain 
property of the object is. Or put in another way, it encapsulates the thought that the 
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phenomenal character of experience has an essential explanatory role to play in our 
acquisition of new knowledge regarding worldly objects. In the case of redness, the 
phenomenal character of visually experiencing a red object has an explanatory role to play 
in our acquisition of the knowledge of what redness is like since the phenomenal character 
is conceived as constituted (in part) by the very redness in question. Here the phenomena l 
character of the visual experience has an explanatory role to play in the acquisition of new 
knowledge regarding the object since it consists in the disclosure of the very redness of the 
object.  
 Sensory awareness, on Johnston’s account, does not provide us only with 
properties such as colour but also with complex properties, namely sensible profiles. The 
notion that sensory awareness provides us with particulars instantiating sensible profiles is 
explained by the idea that sensory awareness has an “as-structure.” Due to its “as-
structure”, sensory awareness not only allows us to attribute properties such as colour to 
particulars but also to attribute complex properties such as being a pine tree or a Golden 
Retriever: I see a tree as a pine tree and a dog as a Golden Retriever. The ability of sensory 
awareness to detect complex properties is expanded by our conceptual sophistication. I can 
detect the property of a tree being a pine tree and of a dog being a Golden Retriever only 
if I possess the concepts “pine-ness” and “Golden Retriever” respectively. In these cases, 
the phenomenal character of sensory awareness is constituted by particulars instantia t ing 
the sensible profiles “pine-ness” and “Golden Retriever.” The phenomenal character of 
these experiences consists in the disclosure of particulars instantiating these sensible 
profiles. 
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Johnston conceives affect as a refinement of sensing. When I affectively engage 
with an object I see the object as exemplifying a determinate value. Affect is the detection 
of a determinate value instantiated by a worldly particular. In experiencing indignation at 
the latest governmental cut of public funding for higher education, I detect, say, the 
determinate injustice of the event. Insofar as affect is conceived as the disclosure of value, 
it follows that without an appropriate affective engagement with the event one is unable to 
acquire new evaluative knowledge about it. Without feeling indignation, one cannot see 
the event as unjust. The feeling of indignation is the disclosure of the event’s injustice. 
Now, the question is the following: does Johnston’s account of affect as a 
refinement of sensory awareness have the resources to argue that the affective character of 
an experience has an essential explanatory role to play in the acquisition of new evaluative 
knowledge of the object of experience? When we ask the same question for the case of 
visually experiencing a red object, the answer seems to be rather forthcoming (if we accept 
Johnston’s conception of the phenomenal character of experience, of course): yes, 
Johnston’s account does have the resources to show the essential explanatory role played 
by the experience’s phenomenal character since redness itself (in part) constitutes it. The 
phenomenal character of seeing red just is (in part) being presented with redness itself. 
According to this conception of the phenomenal character of experience, we cannot learn 
what redness itself is unless we have a visual experience with that phenomenal character. 
Can we hold on to a similar thought once we shift to affect and value?  
Let me begin by noting that in order to explain the role played by the phenomena l 
character of the visual experience of a red object in acquiring knowledge of what redness 
is like, there is no immediate need to introduce the “as-structure” of sensory experience 
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that Johnston takes it to have. Although it would not be wrong per se to do so, we do not 
need to cash out the thought that the phenomenal character of a visual experience plays an 
essential role in acquiring new knowledge regarding the colour red i.e. what redness is like, 
by saying that sensory awareness presents the object as red. We simply point out that 
redness itself (in part) constitutes the phenomenal character. Yet the same does not seem 
to be the case once we turn to affect and value. Here it seems as though there is a stronger 
need to introduce the “as-structure” of experience to make sense of the essential role played 
by the affective, phenomenal character in acquiring new evaluative knowledge of an object, 
that is, what its determinate value is like. For once we wish to cash out the claim that, say, 
the affective character of the experience of indignation provides us with new evaluative 
knowledge of an event, that is, with what its determinate value is like, in this case injust ice, 
we appeal to the claim that the phenomenal character is (in part) constituted by the 
particulars instantiating a sensible profile, one that allows us to attribute an evaluative 
property to the object. And this last claim is in turn cashed out in terms of the claim that 
we attribute injustice to the event insofar as the affective experience consists in presenting, 
or disclosing, the event as unjust. While in the case of sensing redness we do not need the 
further step of introducing the “as-structure” of sensory awareness in order to explain the 
essential explanatory role played by the phenomenal character, in the case of affect and 
value we do.  
Yet once we appeal to the “as-structure” of sensory awareness, affect’s essential 
role in acquiring new evaluative knowledge regarding value becomes less clear. What 
exactly is the essential role played by affect in seeing an event as instantiating a value? 
What reason do we have to think that in the absence of affect one cannot experience an 
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event as instantiating a value? Or, why are certain cases of seeing-as essentially affective 
while others not? To reiterate, in the case of a visual experience of a red object, since 
redness constitutes part of the phenomenal character of the visual experience, then the 
phenomenal character plays an essential role in acquiring new knowledge regarding the 
object since it just is (in part) the presentation of the object’s feature itself i.e. redness. But 
in the case of affect and value, in order to make sense of the claim that an evaluative 
property constitutes part of the affective character of the experience we need to introduce 
the claim that experience has an “as-structure.” But now the essential role played by affect 
in acquiring new evaluative knowledge regarding an object, that is, what its determinate 
value is, becomes obscure since we are not told exactly what makes certain cases of seeing-
as essentially affective.22  
The effect of rendering less clear the essential role of affect in acquiring new 
evaluative knowledge of an object by appealing to the “as-structure” of experience brings 
us to a further point. Recall the objection put forward against committing to an 
intentionalist conception of the phenomenal character of experience when arguing for the 
notion of affect as a disclosure of value: insofar as the phenomenal character is conceived 
as constitutively determined by the way an object is represented as being by the experience, 
it is not clear why in the absence of affect one is unable to gain evaluative knowledge of 
an object since value can be represented without the presence of affect, for instance in the 
content of a thought. In other words, why should we think that affect plays an essential role 
                                                 
22 Compare with Robert Roberts’ (1988) and (2003) characterisation of emotions as concern-
based construals. According to Roberts, emotions are construals of events or objects as having an 
evaluative property, where the notion of construal is explicitly taken from Wittgenstein’s notion 
of seeing-as. Crucially, though, Roberts argues that the notion of construal employed in the 
characterisation of emotions does not involve any sort of affective phenomenology. 
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in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge if it consists in the way that an object is 
evaluatively represented and objects can be evaluatively represented in feeling- less 
thoughts. Now, it seems to me that this objection contains a similar worry to the one 
expressed above regarding the introduction of the notion of the “as-structure” of 
experience. For in both cases the worry concerns the obscurity of why the presence of affect 
is essential to the acquisition of evaluative knowledge of the object, knowledge that could 
not be acquired in the absence of affect, and this obscurity is due to the terms within which 
the phenomenal character is cashed out in the respective theories, namely the 
representational structure of experience in the case of the intentionalist and the “as-
structure” of experience in the case of Johnston. In both cases we can ask why some 
evaluative representations of objects, or presentations of particulars as instantiating a 
sensible profile inducing evaluative property attributions, essentially entail an affective 
character while others do not. In virtue of this commonality, it is not clear how the “as-
structure” of experience is meant to be an improvement on its representational counterpart 
in supporting the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. 
The fact that there is a similar worry in both cases raises the suspicion that the “as-
structure” of experience advocated by Johnston entails some sort of representationa list 
notion when it comes to explaining the essential role played by affect in the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge. Just as in the case of the intentionalist, Johnston simply tells us that 
in the absence of affect we are unable to apprehend an event as, say, unjust, but we are not 
told why. So now we have grounds to question whether the claim that, say, injust ice 
constitutively determines (in part) the affective character of indignation equates the claim 
that the affective experience of indignation is the presentation of a particular event as, say, 
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unjust. Is there not perhaps some change in the way we conceive experience and the role 
played by its phenomenal character in the acquisition of new knowledge of objects once 
we switch to talk of objects being presented as something i.e. in such and such a way, in 
the experience? Whether the answer to this question is positive or negative, the fact remains 
that a relationist conception of experience is problematic once applied to the theorizat ion 
of affect and value. 
Problem 2 
It is often observed that if we are asked to describe the phenomenal character of 
sense experience, and in particular of visual experience, we naturally end up attending to, 
and therefore reporting, properties of the object of experience rather than some property of 
the experience associated with the properties of the object. For instance, if we were to 
describe our visual experience of the green leaves of a tree standing before us, we would 
end up attending to, and therefore reporting, among other things, the greenness of the leaves 
rather than some property of the experience associated with the greenness of the leaves. 
This phenomenological observation is used to argue against accounts of the 
phenomenology of experience according to which its constitutive components are intrins ic, 
non-intentional properties of experience associated to the properties we experience objects 
as having, i.e. versions of the qualia theory. If the phenomenal character is constituted by 
intrinsic, non-intentional properties, then how come we are unable to introspectively report 
them? By contrast, both the intentionalist and the relationist conception of the 
phenomenology of experience can accommodate the phenomenological observation that in 
the attempt to describe the phenomenal character of experience we end up describing the 
features of the object of experience. If one agrees that the phenomenal character of 
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experience is constitutively determined by the way in which the experience represents the 
object, as the intentionalist does, then in describing the phenomenal character one describes 
the way in which the object is represented in the experience, that is, as having such and 
such properties. And if one agrees that the phenomenal character of sense experience is 
partly constituted by the very properties of the object of experience, as a relationist like 
Johnston does, then it is only to be expected that in describing the phenomenal character 
one reports the properties of the object.  
 It also often observed that, in contrast to sense experience, and visual experience in 
particular, if we were asked to describe the phenomenal character of the affective 
dimension of an emotional experience, we would not naturally end up attending to, and 
therefore reporting, the evaluative property of the object. Rather, in the case of affect, we 
do seem to be able to attend to, and therefore report, features of the experience without 
having to attend to, and report, properties of the object of experience. For instance, if asked 
to describe our feeling of sadness after the breakup from a beloved one, we would be able 
to describe our feelings without necessarily describing its features by focusing on the 
beloved one or at the event of the breakup. To be sure, it is often the case that in describing 
our emotional experience we think or recall the event and report some of its features in 
order to justify how we feel. So we might mention the empty side of the bed where she 
used to sleep, or the unused toothbrush, or perhaps recall the enchanting character traits of 
the beloved one. But even a complete report of these features would be unable to exhaust 
our description of the affective dimension of the experience. Rather, we would have to add 
a description of the properties of the affective experience that we are able to attend to 
without attending necessarily to the evaluative feature of the event. The features of the 
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affective experience are the sort that can be captured both by metaphorical descriptions and 
by descriptions of a more concrete, bodily type. For instance, on the metaphorical side we 
might report a feeling of emptiness and heaviness. More concretely, we might report a 
constriction in our abdomen or coldness in our hands. None of these descriptions, 
metaphorical or not, necessitate reference to a description of the evaluative import of the 
event. 
 This discrepancy underlines an important disanalogy between the sort of disclosure 
we find in paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness, such as visual experience, and affect. 
In the case of affective experience, the property of the object i.e. its evaluative import, is 
disclosed in virtue of properties of the experience i.e. its affective character, that we are 
able to introspectively dissociate from the former. By contrast, in the case of paradigmatic 
cases of sense experience, such as visual experience, the property of the object e.g. its 
colour, is not disclosed in virtue of properties of the experience constituting its phenomena l 
character that we are able to introspectively dissociate from the former. Rather, its 
disclosure is precisely characterised by an impossibility of dissociating the features of the 
object from the features of the experience.23  
Johnston argues that affect is a refinement of sensing. As we have seen, what 
motivates Johnston to argue for this claim is the observation that both paradigmatic cases 
of sensory awareness, such as visual experience, and affect share an essential aspect of 
their phenomenal character: disclosure of worldly particulars and their properties. I argued 
                                                 
23 The ability of the relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience to accommodate 
this phenomenological fact, though, does not count in favour of the notion of disclosure that has 
been advocated above. For the intentionalist conception of the phenomenology of experience is 
also able to accommodate it and yet, as we have seen, the intentionalist is not allowed to make 
use of the notion of disclosure advocated by Johnston. 
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that Johnston is allowed to use the notion of disclosure in sensory experience due to his 
commitment to a relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience whereby its 
phenomenal character is conceived as constituted (in part) by the very features of the object 
of experience. Yet once we recognise the disanalogy in the notion of disclosure at play in 
visual experience and affect, due to the discrepancy underlining it, it seems as we are not 
allowed to simply copy and paste the relationist formula of the phenomenology of 
experience from the case of visual experience to the case of affect. In the case of visual 
experience, the phenomenal character is the presentation of, say, the colour of the object 
insofar as the former is partly constituted by the latter. The phenomenal character is 
conceived as performing its disclosive function in virtue of the fact that it is constituted (in 
part) by those very properties it is putatively disclosing. By contrast, in the case of affect, 
we cannot simply state that affect is the disclosure of value insofar as the evaluative feature 
of the object partly constitutes the phenomenal character of the experience. For in affective  
experience it is possible to attend to features of the experience without attending to features 
of the object. But if the very features of the object constitute the phenomenal character of 
the experience, then we should expect an inability to introspectively dissociate the two and 
report the properties of the latter without necessarily reporting the features of the former. 
The fact that this is not the case indicates the difficulty of holding on to the relationist 
formula in order to argue for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.  
It follows that if one wants to hold on to the notion of disclosure advocated so far 
in the case of affect, one has to do so by accommodating the disanalogy between disclosure 
in paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness, such as visual experience, and affect. Now, 
although Johnston does not provide us with the resources to do so, he does provide us with 
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a warning about how to do so. In his critical discussion of what he terms “projectivism”, 
that is, the view that value is reducible to our affective attitudes which are then projected 
onto a value neutral world, Johnston argues that the projectivist commits the error of 
“mentalising” affect:  
Instead of affect being a way in which the appeal and repulsiveness of other things 
and other people makes itself manifest, the affective states themselves become the 
focus of attention, as if affective engagement were an interior, private sensation 
detachable from one's being taken with or repelled by things. (Johnston 2001, 203)  
In order to illustrate his point, Johnston quotes a biographical anecdote of Martin Buber. 
As a young child, Buber spent his summers at his grandparents’ estate. There, he enjoyed 
caressing one of the horses. The act of caressing the horse was experienced by the young 
Buber as establishing a genuine relationship with the animal defined by mutual trust. One 
day, while stroking the horse, Buber shifted his attention from the horse as a friend to the 
pleasure that the feeling of caressing gave him. The anecdote ends with Buber recounting 
how the next day the horse does not respond to his caresses in the same way. The horse’s 
unresponsiveness is interpreted as a judgement to the effect that Buber’s shift of attention 
rendered the animal a mere instrument for his pleasure. In turn, Johnston interprets Buber’s 
anecdote as being illustrative of “the pornographic attitude.” Once we adopt this attitude, 
we reduce people, animals and worldly events to mere sources of pleasure or displeasure 
for us rather than apprehending them as instantiating a value that anyone with the 
appropriate feeling can detect. Once the young Buber focuses solely on the way that the 
affective character pleases him, the sort of knowledge that his feelings provide him about 
the horse is solely whether the animal is a source of pleasure or not for him rather than of 
instantiating the value of friendship. Hence the horse’s response.   
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The key thought to take from Johnston’s treatment of the pornographic attitude as 
the result of mentalising affect is that there is a potential danger that comes with conceiving 
of feelings as features of our experience that can be detached from the evaluative import 
that worldly things have. The danger is precisely that we lose sight of the sort of disclosing 
function that affect has and in doing so we end up with a conception of affect that is unable 
to capture its normative authority over our evaluative judgements and relevant actions. 
Once the young Buber apprehends his feelings by adopting the pornographic attitude, all 
that his feelings can justify is a “speculative psychological judgement” (Johnston 2001, 
200) of the sort ‘the way this horse feels when caressing it pleases me.’ It is speculative 
insofar as the judgment’s reach beyond oneself is a matter of speculation and it is 
psychological insofar as its subject matter is the psychological effect that the horse’s fur 
has on one’s cognitive faculties which gives rise to the relevant experience. These sorts of 
judgements do not capture an evaluative truth about the world that anyone with the 
appropriate feeling would be obliged to recognise, such as the judgement of ‘This horse is 
a friend’ (or, less warmly, ‘this horse instantiates the value of friendship’). Under the guise 
of the pornographic attitude, then, affect loses its authority.  
In light of Johnston’s treatment of the pornographic attitude as the result of 
mentalising affect, we should be careful not to lose sight of the authority of affect once we 
agree to accommodate the disanalogy, and underlying discrepancy, between the sort of 
disclosure at play in paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness and affect. This sort of 
warning becomes crucial when we consider one account of affect and value that seems to 
be able to hold on to the notion that affect is a disclosure of value and accommodate the 
phenomenological fact that in affective experience the evaluative import of the object is 
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disclosed in virtue of features of the experience that we are able to introspective ly 
dissociate, and attend in isolation from, the features of the object. The sort of account I 
have in mind is a version of dispositional accounts of value. According to the sort of 
dispositional account of value I have in mind, an evaluative property is a property of the 
object that normally disposes subjects to have an affective experience under certain 
conditions. A dispositional account of value of this sort is able to accommodate the claim 
that affect is the disclosure of a property of the object and not solely of the experience since 
the affective experience the subject has is caused by the dispositional property of the object. 
Therefore, the experience itself counts as a disclosure of a property of the object and not 
solely of the experience. Furthermore, the property disclosed by having the affective 
experience is an evaluative property since that is what an evaluative property is according 
to the dispositionalist viz. the disposition to cause an affective experience in the subject. 
Moreover, the dispositional account of value is able to capture the phenomenologica l 
observation that in affective experience the evaluative property of the object is disclosed 
in virtue of properties of the experience that we are introspectively able to dissociate, and 
attend to in isolation from, the property of the object. If the evaluative property of the object 
is conceived as the disposition the object has of causing an affective experience in the 
subject, then one can attend to features of the affective experience while still claiming that 
that is a case of disclosing the evaluative property of the object.    
 The problem with a dispositional account of value of this sort is precisely that it 
lacks the means to capture a crucial element regarding the notion of affect as a disclosure 
of value, an element sitting at the core of Johnston’s account, namely affect’s normative 
authority over our evaluative beliefs and desires. The subject experiences the evaluative 
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property of the object as not merely causing the affective experience but as meriting it (see 
also McDowell 1985; more on this in the next two chapters). The act of cutting public funds 
towards higher education merits our indignation. This is crucial since it’s due to the object 
being experienced as meriting the appropriate affective experience that it renders readily 
intelligible to the subject the relevant evaluative beliefs and desires. By contrast, the 
dispositional account of value conceives the evaluative property of the object as the 
disposition of the object to merely cause an affective experience in the subject. It is 
therefore unable to capture the peculiar way in which affect exerts its normative authority. 
And this is a feature of affect as a disclosure of value that we want to keep. So even though 
a dispositional account is able to accommodate the phenomenological observation that 
value is disclosed in affective experience in virtue of features of the experience that we can 
introspectively dissociate from the features of the object being disclosed, it does so in a 
way that leaves out an essential feature of the sort of disclosure at play in affective 
experience.    
Section 3 
Let us take stock. In this paper I began by showing that Johnston’s account of affect 
as a disclosure of value commits to a relationist conception of the phenomenology of 
experience according to which the phenomenal character of experience is constituted partly 
by the features of worldly particulars. According to Johnston, due to its “as-structure”, 
sensory awareness detects not only simple properties, such as colour and shape, but also 
complex properties that he terms “sensible profiles.” It is precisely in terms of the “as-
structure” of sensory awareness that Johnston explains in what sense affect is a refinement 
of sensing: if appropriate, affective experience presents an object or event as instantia t ing 
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a value. I then argued that Johnston’s relationist conception of the phenomenology of 
experience allows him to employ the sort of notion of disclosure we are after, that is, one 
that explains successfully the essential explanatory role played by the phenomena l 
character of experience in acquiring knowledge of objects. In this way, Johnston avoids the 
sort of issues confronting the accounts put forward by Montague and Goldie.  
Importantly, though, I also argued that Johnston’s relationist conception of the 
phenomenology of experience becomes problematic once applied to affect and value. First, 
the specific way in which Johnston cashes out the idea that the phenomenal character of 
veridical sensory experience is constituted by particulars instantiating sensible profiles is 
suspicious. Appeal to the “as-structure” of sensory awareness renders obscure the essential 
explanatory role played by affect since we are not told why some cases of seeing-as are 
essentially affective while others are not. In this respect, it is difficult to see an 
improvement on the representationalist picture. Second, Johnston overlooks an important 
disanalogy between the sort of disclosure at play in paradigmatic cases of sensory 
experience, such as visual experience, and affect. While in the case of affective experience 
the property of the object is disclosed by properties of the experience that the subject is 
able to introspectively dissociate from the property of the object, this is not the case in 
visual experience. Crucially, I argued that a relationist conception of the phenomeno logy 
of experience is unable to accommodate this disanalogy. I also introduced a further position 
that ought to be avoided, namely dispositional theories of value. Dispositional theories of 
value ought to be avoided since they are unable to capture the thought that affect exerts a 
normative authority over our evaluative judgements and motivational states. 
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In conclusion, I want to sum up the first part of the thesis. I argued that all three 
models of the phenomenal character of experience -the qualia model, the intentiona list 
model, and the relationist model- are saddled with problematic issues when trying to 
capture the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. Yet a positive side emerges from this 
negative work. This is because by looking at the distinct ways in which each model fails to 
capture adequately the notion of affect as a disclosure of value we have gained some criteria 
that an adequate model would have to satisfy. We have uncovered three such criteria: 
4. An account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to show that the affective 
character of experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge of the object. In other words, it needs to be able to show why 
in the absence of affect one cannot gain insight into what the evaluative property of 
an object is.  
5.  An account of affect as a disclosure of value needs to be able to accommodate the 
phenomenological fact that affect renders readily intelligible one’s evaluat ive 
beliefs and motivational states. That is, it needs to accommodate the authority of 
affect. 
6. An account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to accommodate the 
disanalogy with the sort of disclosure at play in visual experience. That is, it must 
be able to show that the sort of disclosure at play in affective experience is one 
where the evaluative import of the object of experience is disclosed in virtue of 
properties of the experience that are introspectively dissociable from the features 
of the object of experience. 
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As we have seen, the qualia model is unable to satisfy the first criterion since its 
conception of the phenomenology of experience is able to show solely that the presence of 
affect entails the acquisition of knowledge of the experience and not also knowledge of the 
object of experience. This is a criterion that the intentionalist model is also unable to satisfy 
since its conception of the phenomenology of experience is unable to explain why certain 
representations of value are essentially affective while others are not and therefore it fails 
to show the explanatory role of affect in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge that could 
not be had in the absence of affect. By contrast, the relationist conception of the 
phenomenology of experience is potentially able to satisfy this criterion. As we have seen, 
though, the latter conception of the phenomenology of experience becomes problematic 
when attempting to satisfy the third criterion. The phenomenological observation that the 
features of the phenomenal character of experience can be introspectively dissociated from 
the features of the object of experience is one that also an intentionalist model has difficulty 
in satisfying. If the phenomenal character of experience is constitutively determined by the 
way that an experience represents the object, then focusing on the affective character 
should in theory amount to focusing on the way that the object is represented, that is, as 
having such and such evaluative property (unless the evaluative component is thought to 
be located at the level of the intentional attitude rather than on the level of representationa l 
content). There is no leeway for the possibility of attending to the features of the experience 
in isolation from the features of the object. Interestingly, this criterion can be 
accommodated by the qualia model since according to it the phenomenal character of 
experience is constituted by intrinsic properties of the experience associated to the features 
the object is experienced as having. But this comes at the cost of being unable to fulfill the 
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first criterion. Therefore, an account of affect as a disclosure of value must satisfy the third 
criterion by avoiding to collapse into some form of the qualia model. That is, it must satisfy 
the third criterion by showing how the features of the affective character of an experience 
are not merely contingently associated to the evaluative features of the object but rather 
how their relation constitutes a genuine case of disclosure. Furthermore, we have seen that 
the introduction of the third criterion brings to the fore an additional position regarding the 
relation between affect and value that an account of affect as a disclosure of value must 
distinguish itself from, namely dispositionalism about value.  
 Finally, in this chapter I argued that an account of affect as a disclosure of value 
must be able to satisfy the three criteria set out above and in doing so show how it differs 
from the three models of the phenomenal character of experience discussed, namely the 
qualia theorist, intentionalist, and relationist, and how it does not collapse into a crude 
version of a dispositional understanding of the relation between affect and value. Providing 
an account that satisfies these three criteria by avoiding these four positions is the aim of 
the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 4 
Disclosure and Constitutivity  
Introduction 
In the first part of the thesis I critically assessed the viability of three accounts to 
capture the claim of affect as a disclosure of value, that is, in showing that affect plays an 
essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I argued that all three 
accounts fail due to the theoretical assumptions they inherit from the respective underlying 
theories of experience they rely on to theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in 
emotional experience. Nevertheless, out of the critical assessment I extracted three criteria 
that an account of affect as a disclosure of value ought to satisfy and clarified the theoretical 
positions that we ought to avoid. The aim of the second part of the thesis is to build on 
these lessons and provide a viable account of affect as a disclosure of value.   
The aim of this chapter is to provide the skeleton of an account of affect as a 
disclosure of value that satisfies the three criteria outlined in the first part of the thesis. I 
argue that at the heart of this account is the commitment to a response-dependent notion of 
the objectivity of value according to which the formation of rationally intelligible affective -
cum-motivational states is constitutive of the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I rely 
on John McDowell’s, and in part on David Wiggins’, writings on the subject to sketch the 
outlines of the account. I conclude by arguing that although McDowell provides us with 
the correct intuitions necessary for an account of affect as a disclosure of value, his account 
does not provide us with sufficient details as to precisely how the formation of rationally 
intelligible affective-cum-motivational states constitute the acquisition of evaluative 
knowledge (and, in all fairness, the arguments of his papers do not require him to do so). 
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It is the aim of the following chapters to provide the skeleton of the account with the 
necessary substance to ultimately defend the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.  
The chapter is divided in five sections. In Section 1 I argue that the first two criteria 
should not be satisfied independently from one another. This gives rise to the following 
constitutive thesis: the formation of our motivational states towards an object is constitut ive 
of the disclosure of value. This constitutive claim becomes the core of the account of affect 
as a disclosure of value that I defend in the remainder of the thesis. In this section I also 
introduce the distinction between theoretical knowledge of value, that is, propositiona l 
knowledge of value acquired by testimony and in the absence of affective experience, and 
knowledge of value, that is, knowledge of value that can be acquired exclusively in virtue 
of an affective experience. It is the latter sort of knowledge that is referred to in the claim 
that affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. 
The distinction is refined in detail in the final chapter of the thesis. In Section 2 I introduce 
David Wiggins’ and John McDowell’s neo-Aristotelian moral psychology. I do so in order 
to show what the key challenge is in trying to satisfy the first two criteria jointly, that is, 
what the key challenge to the constitutive thesis is. The key challenge is to theorise a notion 
of the objectivity of value that allows us both to talk of value being disclosed by affect and 
that, at the same time, cannot be specified independently of the subjective point of view, 
in this case the formation of affective-cum-motivational states. In Section 3 I rely on 
McDowell’s account of the objectivity of value, known as response-dependent objectivity, 
to show how to solve the challenge outlined in Section 2. In Section 4 I satisfy the third 
criterion. I argue that the “opaqueness” of affective experience is a constitutive feature of 
the sort of disclosure that characterises the relation of affect to value. By “opaqueness” 
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here is meant the characteristic of affective experience of having features that one is able 
to focus on without needing to focus on the features of the object of experience (in contrast 
to the “transparency” of visual experience). I argue that also the third criterion is satisfied 
jointly with the first two. Finally, in Section 5 I answer the potential objection to the effect 
that the account of affect as a disclosure of value presented to in this chapter is unable to 
accommodate the fact that affective experience is in part constituted by the awareness of 
bodily changes. 
Section 1 
In the first part of the thesis I outlined three criteria that an account of affect as a 
disclosure of value needs to satisfy. In what follows I want to focus on the first two and 
leave the third criterion aside until later in the chapter with the initial assumption that 
satisfying in the correct way the first two criteria will provide us with the way in which to 
satisfy the third one as well. The first criterion states that an account of affect as a disclosure 
of value needs to be able to show that the affective character of experience plays an 
essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge of the object. This 
first criterion captures an important analogy with the visual experience of colour where, at 
least according to some philosophers, we can show that the phenomenal character of the 
visual experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of knowledge of 
what, say, a colour like redness is. The second criterion an account of affect as a disclosure 
of value must satisfy is that it must be able to capture affect’s authority. The authority of 
affect refers to the ability of affect of rendering rationally intelligible the motivational states 
the subject forms as a response to the object or event confronting her, in addition to making 
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readily intelligible the evaluative beliefs she forms regarding the event or object.24 This 
second criterion marks an important disanalogy with the visual experience of colour since 
the phenomenal character of visual experience has authority solely over the subject’s 
perceptual beliefs regarding the object of experience. Motivational states do not normally 
figure in the range of states made intelligible by the phenomenal character of a visual 
experience of colour.  
One way in which one can go about trying to satisfy these two criteria is by 
attempting to devise an account that satisfies the first criterion independently of the second, 
and then attempt to show how the resulting account is able to accommodate the second 
criterion. I don’t think this is the way we should proceed. An account of affect as a 
disclosure of value should not attempt to capture the notion of disclosure at play here in 
isolation from capturing the ability of affect to have authority over one’s motivational states 
in addition to evaluative beliefs. Rather, the authority of affect over our motivational states 
should be conceived as an inbuilt feature of the notion of the affective disclosure of value. 
Part of Johnston’s core argument in defense of his account is precisely the idea that we 
should conceive affect as a sort of disclosure insofar as it has authority over our evaluative 
beliefs and motivational states. Affect’s disclosure is structured in such a way as to have 
authority. Therefore, theorising the sort of disclosure at play in affective experience 
independently of its authority would result in a distorted picture of affective disclosure. 
But what does this mean when theorising the role played by affect in the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge? 
                                                 
24 In the remainder of this chapter I will drop the qualifier rationally intelligible and take it for 
granted that the sort of intelligibility that qualifies the formation of motivational states is a 
rational one. 
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 When we characterise an affective experience as involving the disclosure of value, 
what we mean is that in having the affective experience we acquire knowledge of what the 
value of something is, a sort of knowledge that we would not be able to acquire in the 
absence of affect. So when we claim that an inherent feature of the affective disclosure of 
value is its authority over our motivational states, we are claiming that an inherent feature 
of the acquisition of such evaluative knowledge is making it readily intelligible to us why 
we are motivated to act in certain ways towards the object or event whose evaluative import 
we are learning about. Therefore, we should not conceive the formation of motivationa l 
states pertinent to the situation as external occurrences to the acquisition of evaluative 
knowledge. Our motivational propensities are not, say, mere consequences of learning 
what the value of something is. If this were the case, then a gap, however small, would 
open between such evaluation and the formation of motivational states and at this point 
there would be enough leeway to ask why should the acquisition of evaluative knowledge 
necessarily make our motivational states intelligible. This sort of question is the direct 
result of conceiving the acquisition of evaluative knowledge by means of affect in isolation 
from its authority. Therefore, a better way of formulating the claim we want to defend is 
that we should conceive the formation of motivational states as constitutive of the process 
of acquiring evaluative knowledge by means of affect. The very acquisition of evaluative 
knowledge by means of affective disclosure entails the formation of intelligib le 
motivational states. The disclosure of value has authority over our motivational states, then, 
precisely because part of what it means to disclose value is to form intelligible motivationa l 
states.  
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Understanding the way in which the formation of motivational states is a 
constitutive part of the disclosure of value entails rendering the distinction between gaining 
evaluative knowledge of an object and valuing or disvaluing it somewhat porous. There is  
a sense in which we cannot acquire the sort of evaluative knowledge in question without 
to a certain extent simultaneously valuing or disvaluing the object whose evaluative import 
we are learning about. Part of what it means to understand the evaluative import of 
something is to come to value or disvalue it, that is, to be taken by it in a positive or negative 
way. Since affect is the source of the formation of our motivational propensities, and the 
formation of our motivational propensities constitutes in part what it means to value or 
disvalue something, then the disclosure of value i.e. the acquisition of knowledge of what 
a value is, insofar as it entails to a certain extent valuing or disvaluing, makes our 
motivational states readily intelligible for the very reason that forming those motivationa l 
states is part of what it means to disclose the evaluative import of something.25 This is 
where the disanalogy with the experience of colour becomes pronounced. In the case of 
colour, there is no analogue of the distinction between gaining knowledge of the colour 
and valuing it or being taken with it, let alone is there an analogue of blurring this 
distinction. Disclosing the colour red in visual experience, that is, gaining knowledge of 
what redness is in visual experience, in no way entails valuing that colour. Not only is 
valuing the colour not a constitutive part of disclosing it, but it is even hard to conceive 
what that might mean. Why on earth should valuing a colour be a constitutive part of the 
process of disclosing what that colour is in visual experience? Learning what a colour is 
                                                 
25 This claim can be read along dispositional lines. One of the key the aims of this chapter is to 
show what is entailed in reading this claim in a non-dispositionalist way.  
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by phenomenal acquaintance simply does not entail forming motivational propensities 
towards it.  
This brings out a further point. The reason why the acquisition of the relevant 
evaluative knowledge entails the formation of appropriate motivational states is that, in 
part, the content of that knowledge is constituted by one’s motivational propensities.  
Metaphorically speaking, we should not think of the content of the sort of evaluative 
knowledge in question as the content of a room whose door necessitates our motivationa l 
propensities in order to be unlocked but whose content would remain the same regardless 
of whether the unlocking necessitated the formation of our motivational propensities. 
Rather, the very content of what it means to know the value of an object is constituted by 
the formation of intelligible motivational states. Part of what it means for a subject to 
possess the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by means of affective disclosure is to 
form intelligible motivational propensities towards it. The authority of affect is an inbuilt 
feature of the disclosure of value because the evaluative import disclosed is in part defined 
by the appropriate motivational propensities one forms towards it. None of this applies to 
the disclosure of colour. The content of the sort of knowledge we acquire by means of 
phenomenal acquaintance with redness is impervious to whether we form desires about it 
or not.  
We are now in a better position to characterise the sort of evaluative knowledge 
that we gain from affective experience by distinguishing it from what we might term 
“theoretical knowledge” of value. There are two ways in which we can contrast theoretical 
knowledge of value from the sort that we acquire from affective experience. The first way 
relies in part on the analogy with visual experience of colour. Before leaving her black and 
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white room, Mary has theoretical knowledge of what the colour red is. This is propositiona l 
knowledge that she acquires by testimony. Yet she has never seen the colour red. Once she 
leaves her room and is presented with a red coloured object, Mary acquires knowledge of 
red. The sort of knowledge about redness acquired by means of a visual experience is not 
reducible to theoretical knowledge of red in the sense that even if Mary were provided with 
no matter how much information about redness by testimony prior to ever seeing the colour 
red, she would not be able to acquire the sort of knowledge she gains by means of the visual 
experience of red. We find an analogous case when trying to formulate the notion of 
theoretical knowledge of value. Before slipping on ice, Irene has theoretical knowledge of 
what danger is. She acquires this knowledge by testimony. Once Irene slips on ice, she 
feels fear for the first time towards the danger of ice. She now has acquired knowledge of 
what danger is. The sort of knowledge about danger acquired by means of affective 
experience is not reducible to theoretical knowledge of danger in the sense that even if 
Irene were provided with no matter how much information about danger by testimony prior 
to feeling fear, she would not be able to acquire the sort of evaluative knowledge she gains 
by means of her affective experience.  
The second way of contrasting theoretical knowledge of value versus the sort of 
evaluative knowledge we acquire by means of affective experience relies on the disanalogy 
with the visual experience of colour. While our affective experience of value essentially 
entails the formation of appropriate motivational propensities towards the event or object 
experienced, our visual experience of colour does not entail the formation of any 
motivational state. When Mary sees for the first time a red coloured object, the knowledge 
she gains does not involve forming appropriate motivational states towards the red 
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coloured object. Her acquisition of knowledge of what redness is by means of a visual 
experience is not constituted by her being motivated to act in any sort of way. Motivation 
to act is not part of coming to know what redness is. By contrast, it is part of coming to 
know the value of something that one is motivated to act appropriately towards or away 
from the event or object experienced. The involvement of the formation of motivationa l 
states in the acquisition of knowledge is what distinguishes theoretical knowledge of value 
from the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by affective experience. While the 
formation of appropriate motivational states is an integral part of acquiring evaluative 
knowledge by means of affective experience, acquiring theoretical knowledge of value by 
means of testimony and in the absence of affective experience does not essentially involve 
the formation of appropriate motivational states. Irene is able to learn what danger is by 
means of testimony without her necessarily forming appropriate motivational states. She 
might form appropriate motivational states once she acquires knowledge by testimony 
about what danger is, but this would presumably entail further conditions. For instance, it 
would entail higher order reflective faculties in order to infer from being presented with an 
object with certain features the sort of motivational state she ought to form.26 Furthermore, 
the relation between the formation of appropriate motivational states and the acquisition of 
theoretical knowledge of value is merely an external one: the former is not essentially 
involved in the latter. It is only once Irene feels fear towards danger that she forms 
appropriate motivational states insofar as her coming to fear danger is in part constituted 
by her forming appropriate motivational states. Here, Irene’s acquisition of knowledge of 
                                                 
26 More on this in Chapter 6, Section 3. 
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what danger is is in part constituted by her forming appropriate motivational states, such 
as avoiding walking on ice. 
There are two factors, then, that characterise the notion of theoretical knowledge of 
value. First, theoretical knowledge of value is acquired by testimony and not by a 
phenomenal acquaintance with the value through an affective experience. Second, 
theoretical knowledge of value does not essentially entail the formation of appropriate 
motivational states. Mirroring the characterisation of theoretical knowledge, we have two 
factors that characterise the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by means of affec tive 
experience. First, the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by affective experience is not 
reducible to knowledge acquired by testimony and in the absence of an affective experience 
but is rather the presentation or phenomenal acquaintance of value. Second, the acquisit ion 
of the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by means of affective experience essentially 
entails the formation of appropriate motivational states. Notice that this second factor 
qualifies the first one. The sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by means of affective 
experience is not just a phenomenal acquaintance with the value, in the same way that the 
sort of knowledge acquired by visual experience is a phenomenal acquaintance with a 
determinate colour. Rather, the knowledge of what a value is essentially entails the 
formation of appropriate motivational states. We can then reformulate the notion of affect 
as a disclosure of value by saying that in having an affective experience we acquire the sort 
of knowledge of value not reducible to theoretical knowledge of it.27       
                                                 
27 This is a preliminary and admittedly a rather dry clarification of the distinction between 
theoretical knowledge of value and the sort of evaluative knowledge we gain from an affective 
experience. Part of giving substance to the distinction, especially by providing details of what is 
the content of the sort of evaluative knowledge we acquire through an affective experience, will 
be provided when developing the response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value I will 
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Section 2 
A similar idea to the one sketched above, namely that the acquisition of the sort of 
evaluative knowledge in question entails the formation of appropriate motivational states, 
is found in Wiggins’ and McDowell’s Aristotelian moral psychology, more specifically in 
McDowell’s account of the way in which the phronimos, or virtuous agent, acquires 
knowledge of what “doing well” amounts to (eu prattein, which Aristotle also associates 
with eudaimonein, often translated as “to flourish”). A (very) brief exposition of Wiggins’ 
and Dowell’s neo-Aristotelian moral psychology will prove useful in identifying the key 
challenge with our constitutive claim. Within McDowell’s Aristotelian framework, the 
ability to acquire knowledge of what “doing well” amounts to is not independent from the 
employment of practical reason. McDowell draws a distinction between orectic, or 
motivational, and doxastic, or cognitive, states. McDowell argues that knowledge of what 
“doing well” amounts to involves the activation of the virtuous agent’s (correct) 
motivational propensities, or concerns, when confronted with specific features of a 
particular situation (McDowell 1998b, 1998e, §4 and 2009; cf. Wiggins 1987c, 231ff). 
These concerns are instilled in the agent throughout her upbringing, or Bildung (McDowell 
1994, 87-88), until they become “second nature”. Hence the centrality of the notion of 
moulding the virtuous agent’s character within her upbringing through habituation. The 
virtuous agent is habituated in recognising certain actions as noble and as being worth 
pursuing in the correct situations. The ability of the virtuous agent to activate the correct 
concerns, or his sensitivity, is her knowledge of what doing well amounts to. Being virtuous 
is knowing which concerns should be activated when confronted with specific 
                                                 
argue lies at the core of an account of affect as a disclosure of value. I do so in Chapter 5. In 
Chapter 6 I refine this distinction further by discussing John Campbell’s work on “knowledge of.”  
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circumstances. As Wiggins puts it, ‘The man of highest practical wisdom is the man who 
brings to bear upon a situation the greatest number of genuinely pertinent concerns and 
genuinely relevant considerations commensurate with the importance of the deliberative 
context’ (Wiggins 1987c, 233). It is crucial to appreciate that habituation does not inculcate 
in the virtuous agent solely motivational dispositions: ‘[w]e travesty Aristotle’s picture of 
habituation into virtue of character if we suppose the products of habituation are 
motivational propensities that are independent of conceptual thought, like a trained 
animal’s behavioural dispositions’ (McDowell 1998b, 39).  Rather, it inculcates the 
conception of “doing well” which entails one’s motivational propensities to be activated in 
the right circumstances: the acquisition of the concept of the noble entails the acquisit ion 
of certain motivational propensities. And vice versa, the virtuous agent does not form the 
conception of what it is to do well by means of a purely intellectual faculty and then trains 
to bring his motivational propensities in conformity with the conception of “doing well”: 
‘Aristotle…does not picture the practical intellect as operating independently of moulded 
motivational propensities’ (McDowell 1998b, 39). What it is to possess the correct 
conception of “doing well” is, or at least essentially entails, being motivated to act when 
confronted with certain features of a particular situation. The phronimos acts virtuous ly 
because his concerns, or motivational propensities, are inextricably, and correctly, linked 
with the way he sees the situation. This thought is well expressed in McDowell’s belief 
that if we were given the task of generating the motivation of acting in the right way in an 
amoral person, we would stand a better chance to try to “convert” him through habituat ion 
rather than attempt to convince him through some piece of elaborate reasoning. That is, we 
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should attempt to change his character by moulding his motivational propensities with 
different ways of seeing things (McDowell 1998e, 99-102; cf. McDowell 1998a, §10-14).  
It is important to notice how in McDowell’s account motivational states do not play 
a role solely in the exercise of moral knowledge but also in its acquisition. That is, 
appropriate motivational propensities are not formed only once the relevant knowledge has 
been acquired: the formation of appropriate motivational propensities is part of the process 
of learning what is the right thing to do. This is linked to the second way in which we 
distinguished the sort of evaluative knowledge gained in affective experience from 
theoretical knowledge of value. The acquisition of theoretical knowledge of value does not 
entail the formation of appropriate motivational states. Therefore, we should defend a 
similar claim to McDowell’s and Wiggins’ when theorising the way in which the formation 
of motivational states plays a constitutive role in the affective disclosure of value. The 
formation of motivational states occurs not only once value has been disclosed. Rather, the 
very process by which value is disclosed entails the formation of appropriate motivationa l 
propensities. It is important to emphasise this point since in making an initial analogy with 
the visual experience of colour it is tempting to conceive the acquisition of the sort of 
evaluative knowledge in question as an exercise exclusively in our cognitive abilities. But 
that is precisely the picture we need to avoid if we want to explain how the affective 
disclosure of value entails making intelligible our motivational propensities. Acquiring the 
sort of evaluative knowledge in question makes intelligible appropriate motivationa l 
propensities because being motivated in a certain way is constitutive of knowing the value 
of something. Appropriate affect is not the result or a consequence of the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge but is constitutive of the acquisition of such knowledge.  
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There are two points that emerge from looking at Wiggins’ and McDowell’s 
treatment of the virtuous agent’s acquisition of moral knowledge. First, as McDowell (and 
Johnston) remind us, it is important not to construe the above through some crude form of 
dispositionalism about value. According to a dispositionalist construal of the above, the 
formation of motivational states is constitutive of the acquisition of evaluative knowledge 
insofar as the value of something just is its disposition to cause certain motivational states 
in the agent by way of an affective experience. This construal, though, misses the essential 
point that the affective disclosure of value is meant to have a rationalizing effect on the 
agent’s formation of motivational states, not merely a causal one. So in theorising how the 
acquisition of evaluative knowledge by means of affective disclosure entails forming 
appropriate motivational states, we have to capture the essential thought that the agent 
experiences the object evaluated as meriting the formation of her motivational states 
towards it. Furthermore, we should also not construe through dispositionalist lenses the 
claim that a constitutive part of the content of the sort of evaluative knowledge we acquire 
by means of affective disclosure is the sort of appropriate motivational states one forms 
towards the object whose evaluative import one is learning about. From a dispositiona list 
perspective, our motivational propensities constitute part of the sort of evaluative 
knowledge in question simply in virtue of the fact that for something to have value is for it 
to dispose the agent to be motivated to act in certain ways. Again, this construal misses the 
point that affect has a normative authority over our motivational states. We do not 
experience the evaluative import of the object as a mere causal pull. Rather, we experience 
it as meriting our motivational response. More on the notion of “merit” and the need to 
avoid dispositionalism in the next section. 
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As McDowell and Wiggins put it, the virtuous agent is the one that brings as many 
appropriate motivational propensities, or concerns, to bear on the situation. In doing so, the 
virtuous agent exercises his knowledge of the situation, as being one that merits such and 
such a response. The second, crucial point then is the following: although the knowledge 
acquired and exercised is objective in the sense that it is knowledge about the situation 
confronting the agent, a constitutive part of what it means to acquire and exercise this 
knowledge is to form appropriate motivational propensities. If the claim is that the moral 
knowledge exercised by the virtuous agent is constituted in part by the agent’s motivationa l 
propensities, then we are saying that subjective features, namely motivational propensities, 
are part of the knowledge about the situation. But how can this be if the knowledge in 
question is meant to be objective, that is, about the situation, not about the agent? Simila r ly, 
in our case, if we want to argue that a constitutive part of what it means for something to 
have value is that it merits the formation of appropriate motivational propensities towards 
it, then we need to show in what sense objective knowledge is constituted by subjective 
elements, that is, elements pertaining to the subject and her experience. What we need to 
avoid, in addition to a dispositionalist account, is a crude form of subjectivism about value 
according to which the value of an object is conferred on it by the subject’s affective-cum-
motivational responses. That is, the claim that the object has value because the agent feels 
motivated to act in certain ways towards it. By contrast, the thought should be that the 
situation deserves this or that sort of motivational response because the situation 
instantiates a value and my motivational response counts as knowledge of the situation’s 
evaluative import. In other words, we have to respect the objectivity of value. The 
knowledge we acquire is knowledge of a property of the object of experience. It’s 
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something about the object being evaluated that renders intelligible my motivationa l 
propensities towards it. Hence why we speak of the disclosure of value. So the question is: 
what do we mean when we say that the sort of evaluative knowledge in question is 
objective, that is, what do we mean by objectivity in the case of value, such that a subjective 
element such as the agent’s motivational propensities are necessary in order to disclose it? 
In the next section I rely again on McDowell to show what sort of notion of objectivity we 
need in order to answer this question and therefore to lend support to the notion of affect 
as a disclosure of value. 
Section 3 
In his “Values and Secondary Qualities” (1998g), McDowell argues in support of 
the notion that values are real features of our surroundings. In typical McDowellian 
fashion, the adopted strategy is one that uncovers the assumptions made by his opponent 
and then proceeds to show how these assumptions portray a false picture of what one is 
committing to when defending the thesis in question. In so doing, the thesis defended 
surfaces to a level of plausibility at the very least equalling the opponent’s position. What 
are the assumptions made by someone opposing the possibility that values might be part 
of the world beyond one’s body? At the root of the opposition stands the difficulty of 
understanding the compatibility of the putative objectivity of value, the thought that values 
are genuine properties of objects out there in the world, with a further feature of what it 
means for something to be valuable, namely its intrinsic connection to a subject’s 
motivational states. This is precisely the difficulty we saw needs to be answered in 
defending the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.  
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McDowell’s argumentative move involves two steps. In the first step (sec. 2-3 of 
his 1998g paper), McDowell equips himself with a notion of objectivity that shows how a 
property deemed to be genuinely possessed by an object of experience can neverthe less 
have a conceptual connection to the subject’s experience of the property. McDowell does 
so by arguing for a response-dependent conception of secondary qualities and then draws 
an initial analogy between secondary qualities, such as colour, and value. In this first step 
the assumption made by the opponent that McDowell uncovers and rejects consists in the 
thought that if a property is characterised as objective then it must be modelled on the 
notion of primary qualities since secondary qualities are mere projected figments of the 
subject’s mind and therefore do not count as objective. McDowell’s second step (sec. 4-5 
of his 1998g paper) consists in arguing that a certain test for the reality of a property is 
unfit in the case of value. The test in question is one where the reality of a property is 
thought to depend on whether the property in question has a clear causal role to play in the 
explanation of the experience the subject has of that property. Since, according to 
McDowell’s opponent, evaluative properties cannot be shown to have such a causal role, 
they cannot be said to be part of reality. McDowell shows that in making this claim his 
opponent is assuming a notion of causality that we are not obliged to accept, namely one 
where properties can have causal powers solely if they are endowed with the sort of 
objectivity that is specifiable independently of the subject’s responses. Indeed, McDowell 
shows that applying this notion of mere causality to the case of value misses a crucial 
component of our experience of value, namely that it is essentially characterised by a sort 
of intelligibility, the sort that cannot be captured by a mere casual explanation. Rather, the 
explanation of an object having value is one that essentially entails the subject’s affective 
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and motivational states as appropriate responses to the object, or of the object meriting the 
subject’s response. This is precisely what is involved with the phenomenon we have been 
referring to as the normative authority of affect. This second step draws on the disanalogy 
between our experience of secondary qualities, such as colour, and value. Ultima te ly 
McDowell argues that once we reject this notion of causality and accept that we can still 
speak of causality regarding properties whose concepts are response-dependent, then we 
are able to capture what is truly distinctive of the experience of value.  
The two steps ultimately paint a picture showing not only that value is objective 
and that experience of it is intrinsically motivating, but that the very objectivity of value 
must be conceptualized as being essentially constituted by the subject’s formation of 
intelligible affective and motivational states. That is, McDowell connects the sort of 
response-dependent conception of objectivity defended in the first step to the specific 
feature of the experience of value as being intrinsically and rationally motivating. And, as 
argued at the end of Section 2 of this chapter, this is the sort of notion of objectivity that 
we need to defend the thesis that affect is a disclosure of value. Understanding McDowell’s 
arguments and the notion of objectivity of value he favours, then, is an essential step in 
reconstructing the contours of the sort of notion of the objectivity of value we need to 
defend the thesis that affect is the disclosure of value. 
 In the first step of his argument, McDowell argues that the conception of a property 
the understanding of which is conceptually connected to the subject’s experience of that 
property, or of how that property looks to a subject, does not detract from our being allowed 
to speak of that property as objective. McDowell’s argument consists in showing that his 
opponent’s conception of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, in this 
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specific case Mackie’s Lockeanism (McDowell 1998g, sec.2), is incoherent and that we 
should adopt a different understanding of what this distinction entails, one precisely that 
shows how secondary qualities are objective properties and not mere figments of the mind 
projected onto objects out there in the world. I don’t want to enter the details of 
McDowell’s argument against Mackie’s Lockeanism. Rather, I want to present 
McDowell’s characterisation of the objectivity of secondary qualities for it contains an 
essential characteristic of the sort of objectivity that McDowell argues characterises value 
as well. I think that the plausibility of this characterisation of objectivity is gained just as 
much from whether it works in characterising the sort of evaluation human beings engage 
in as it does from McDowell’s arguments against Mackie’s Lockeanism.  
McDowell’s characterisation of the objectivity of secondary qualities relies on a 
dispositionalist understanding of secondary qualities. Consider a dispositiona list 
characterisation of the secondary quality of colour: for an object to be, say, red is for the 
object to be disposed to look red to the subject under normal conditions. This entails that 
understanding what it is for an object to be red, and thus attributing redness to an object, is 
conceptually dependent on the subject understanding what it is for an object to look red. 
Yet this does not detract from the object having the property of being red. Even though 
there is no one at a particular time to whom the object looks red, we are still allowed to 
characterise the object as being red. To clarify his claim, McDowell draws a distinct ion 
between two ways of framing the distinction between a property being objective or 
subjective (McDowell 1998g, 136). According to one way of framing the distinction, a 
property is objective insofar as the understanding of what it is for an object to have that 
property does not depend on the subject understanding the way that property looks in 
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experience. For instance, our understanding of primary qualities, such as the microphys ica l 
structure of an object, does not conceptually depend on our understanding how the property 
looks in experience. Our understanding of what it is for an object to have a microphys ica l 
structure is conceptually independent from whether the object looks to a subject as having 
a microphysical structure. Indeed, the microphysical structure of an object is a property 
that normally eludes our experience. By contrast, the understanding of what it is for an 
object to be red depends conceptually on the subject understanding how the property looks 
in experience, in this case of an object looking red to a subject. In this sense, redness can 
be said to be a subjective property. According to the other way of framing the distinct ion, 
the objectivity of a property can be understood as the fact that the property is really there 
to be experienced and is not merely a figment of our mind projected onto the object. Here, 
for a property to be subjective it means that it is a mere figment of our mind projected onto 
the object of experience. McDowell’s point of making this distinction is to point out that if 
a property is subjective in the first sense distinguished above, it does not follow that it is 
subjective in the second sense. Just because the understanding of what it is for an object to 
be red depends conceptually on the subject understanding the way the property looks in 
experience, it does not mean that redness is a mere figment of our mind projected onto the 
object. 
Crucially, the dispositionalist characterisation of the objectivity of secondary 
qualities is a response-dependent notion of objectivity. Insofar as the object being red is its 
disposition to look red to a subject under normal conditions, the understanding of the 
property “red” is conceptually dependent on the experiential response of the subject. Yet 
the dependence of our understanding of what a property is on our experiential response to 
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the property does not make the property subjective in the second sense distinguished above, 
that is, a mere figment of the mind. Indeed, a dispositionalist construal of the response-
dependent character of the property shows how the property can be deemed objective, as a 
feature of the object ready to be experienced. It is the response-dependent sort of objectivity 
that McDowell equips himself with in the first step in order to argue that values are 
objective: values are objective in an analogous sense in which secondary qualities such as 
colour can be said to be objective. They are objective in the response-dependent sense: that 
is, our understanding of a value is conceptually dependent on the experiential and 
motivational response a subject has to an object deemed valuable.  
Although McDowell’s first step consists in arguing that the sort of objectivity 
pertinent to value is analogous to the sort of objectivity pertinent to secondary qualit ies, 
that is, in the response-dependent sense, McDowell’s second step consists in arguing that 
in order to fully capture what it means for a value to be an objective property we need to 
recognise a fundamental disanalogy with secondary qualities such as colour. Here is where 
McDowell abandons the dispositionalist take on response-dependence and offers an 
alternative take on response-dependence, or rather the seeds for an alternative. McDowell’s 
opponent argues that we earn the right to call a property real only if it can be shown to have 
a causal role in the generation of the subject’s experience of that property. For instance, we 
are allowed to call a primary quality real since we can mention it in the causal explanation 
of the subject’s experience. A subject experiences a ball as round because of the ball’s 
shape. The shape of the ball has a causal role to play in the explanation of why the subject 
has an experience as of a round shaped object. If so, the opponent continues, then value 
cannot be real since value is not the sort of property that can be specified independently of 
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the subject’s point of view as in the case of primary qualities. McDowell’s characterisat ion 
of a response-dependent notion of objectivity in the first step of his argument has already 
provided us with a conception of objectivity, or what it is for a property to be real, that 
provides us with an answer to the objector. What the objector is assuming is that the only 
valid notion of causality is one that presupposes the primary quality model of objectivity, 
namely where a property is deemed real, or objective, only if it can be specified 
independently of a subject’s point of view. It follows, according to the objector, that a 
property can have causal power only if it can be specified independently of the subject’s 
perspective. Since our experience of value is intrinsically characterised by our affective -
cum-motivational responses towards the object evaluated, then, according to the objector, 
values cannot be objective, or real. But once we show that there is another notion of 
objectivity, precisely a response-dependent one, then it is not clear anymore why we cannot 
give value a causal role to play in the explanations of our experience of an object as 
valuable.  Now, when asked why am I feeling fear, I can answer ‘Because the dog is 
dangerous!’ where danger plays a causal-explanatory role.  
Crucially, and this is where the disanalogy with secondary qualities comes into play 
together with abandoning the dispositionalist take on response-dependence, McDowell 
points out that there is further reason why applying a primary quality model of causality to 
value would be a mistake. This is where McDowell’s advice on paying close attention to 
the “lived character” of evaluative experience comes in (McDowell g, 131) and where the 
notion of “merit” mentioned already in the previous two sections of this chapter plays a 
central role. If we pay close attention to our experience of an object as valuable, we notice 
that our experiential response to the object deemed valuable is characterised by a certain 
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form of appropriateness in the having of it that mere causal explanations are unable to 
capture. Or to put it in McDowell’s terms, the object deemed valuable is experienced as 
meriting the sort of response characteristic of evaluative experience (McDowell 1998g, 
143; cf. McDowell 1998c). The experiential responses in question are affective and 
motivational. For instance, our experience of an event as unjust is essentially characterised 
by our feeling of indignation and the motivation to, say, protest against its occurrence 
where these experiential and motivational responses are experienced as the appropriate 
manner of responding to the object. The event is experienced as meriting these responses. 
The evaluative property of being unjust is response-dependent insofar as our understanding 
of what it is for an event to be unjust depends on the sort of affective and motivationa l 
responses that we deem appropriate to have. There is therefore a notion of rational 
intelligibility inbuilt in the notion of merit. From the subject’s perspective, her affective 
and motivational responses are rationally intelligible when evaluating the object of 
experience for those are the sort of responses that the object deserves in virtue of having 
that evaluative import.  
McDowell’s point, then, is that the sort of response-dependence that characterises 
the objectivity of value is one that cannot be captured by causal explanations if these are 
conceived as in the primary quality model, that is, as conceived by a model assuming that 
only properties specifiable independently from a subject’s response can have causal 
powers. This is so because causal explanations of this sort are unable to capture the notion 
of merit distinctive of evaluative experience, the sort of experience on which our 
understanding of an object as valuable depends. The sort of intelligibility that we would 
gain from a causal explanation of this sort of our responses is not one that would allow for 
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the rationalization of our affective-cum-motivational responses. And this brings out what 
is wrong with the dispositionalist. For an object to be valuable is not for it to merely cause 
certain affective-cum-motivational responses in the subject. Rather, for an object to be 
valuable it is to merit the subject’s affective-cum-motivational responses. Hence the 
disanalogy with secondary qualities such as colour. Our experience of redness does not 
involve any notion of merit.  
So far McDowell has provided us with argumentative material to diffuse the 
opponent’s objections against the thought that values are indeed features of objects in the 
world. First, we are not obliged to think of the objectivity of a property along the sort of 
objectivity that characterises primary qualities, that is, one the understanding of which is 
conceptually independent from the subject’s understanding the way in which the property 
looks in experience. We can equip ourselves with a response-dependent notion of 
objectivity instead. Second, the fact that values are not the sort of property that play a mere 
causal role in the explanation of the sort of experience the subject has in evaluating an 
object not only does not count against their objectivity due to the analogy drawn with the 
objectivity of secondary qualities, but in fact it is a welcome observation since the sort of 
explanation one should look for in explaining the affective-cum-motivational response 
characteristic of evaluative experience is precisely one that does not assume that sort of 
mere causal explanation. Rather, rendering intelligible the sort of affective-cum-
motivational response characteristic of evaluative experience necessitates a sort of 
explanation that is essentially given in terms of the object meriting those responses, and 
not merely causing them.  
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From these diffusing moves we gain a positive insight: the sort of response-
dependent objectivity pertaining to value is one that essentially entails the subject’s 
affective-cum-motivational responses being readily and rationally intelligible to her. Since 
the subject’s understanding of what a value is is conceptually dependent on her intelligib le 
experiential responses, then the activity of explicating the intelligibility of a subject’s 
experiential responses is simultaneously an attempt at understanding the evaluative import 
of the object. And vice versa, understanding the evaluative import of an object essentially 
entails the attempt at understanding one’s affective and motivational responses. This is 
what McDowell means when he writes that ‘a technique for giving satisfying explanations 
of cases of fear…must allow for the possibility of criticism; we make sense of fear by 
seeing it as a response to objects that merit such a response…For an object to merit fear 
just is for it to be fearful’ (McDowell 1998g, 144).28 Here is where we find a further 
important dimension to McDowell’s argument in support of the claim that values are part 
of reality: the distinctive conception of response-dependence that we find in evaluative 
discourse, namely that it essentially involves a ‘critical dimension’ (McDowell 1998g, 
145), is itself indicative of the objectivity of value for the very fact that we are able to have 
readily and rationally intelligible affective and motivational responses tells in favour of 
envisaging objects in the world as having value. ‘[E]xplanations of fear that manifest our 
capacity to understand ourselves in this region of our lives will simply not cohere with the 
claim that reality contains nothing in the way of fearfulness. Any such claim would 
undermine the intelligibility that the explanations confer on our responses’ (McDowell 
1998g, 144). As I understand it, McDowell’s claim is that the sort of explanation of one’s 
                                                 
28 In fact, McDowell does not take danger to be a value though he uses it as an analogous case to 
value.  
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experiential responses peculiar to evaluative discourse, namely the subject’s rationally 
intelligible affective-cum-motivational responses, presupposes, or even necessitates, 
reference to how objects in the world strike us as being, namely as having value. If we tried 
to explicate the rational intelligibility of our affective-cum-motivational responses without 
referring to how objects in the world strike us as being, we would find it at the very least 
challenging to understand our responses. The objectivity of value is, once again, what 
allows us to make sense of our responses.  
How does the above allow us to make progress in the argument in support of the 
notion of affect as a disclosure of value? Arguing for the notion of affect as a disclosure of 
value entails showing that affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge. A clue to what this role might be is provided by the fact that affect 
has a normative authority not only over our evaluative beliefs but also over our 
motivational states, that is, affect renders readily and rationally intelligible to us the way 
in which we want to behave towards the object evaluated. Normative authority over our 
motivational states is an inbuilt structural feature of the affective disclosure of value. We 
saw that we can make sense of affect’s authority over our motivational states if we conceive 
the formation of our motivational propensities as constitutive of the acquisition of the sort 
of evaluative knowledge we gain by means of affective experience. This is manifested in 
part by the fact that what it means to acquire evaluative knowledge by means of affective 
experience is to be taken by the object evaluated in a positive or negative way, that is, to 
come to value or disvalue it. Furthermore, this means that the very content of the sort of 
evaluative knowledge we gain by means of affective experience is constituted by our 
motivational states. If so, then we need to make sense of the idea that our knowledge of 
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evaluative properties of objects i.e. objective knowledge, is constituted by our motivationa l 
states i.e. subjective states. This led us to ask the following question: what do we mean 
when we say that the sort of evaluative knowledge in question is objective, that is, what do 
we mean by objectivity in the case of value, such that a subjective element such as the 
agent’s motivational propensities are necessary in order to disclose it? According to the 
response-dependent notion of objectivity introduced above, the subject’s attribution of a 
property to an object is conceptually dependent on the subject’s experiential responses to 
the object. In the particular case of value, what it is for an object to be valuable is for it to 
merit the appropriate affective-cum-motivational response of the subject. And here we 
arrive at the crucial juncture: affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition 
of evaluative knowledge because what it means for an object to have value is for it to merit 
an appropriate affective-cum-motivational response.29   
Section 4 
We are now in the position to show how a commitment to a response-dependent 
notion of the objectivity of value allows us to satisfy the third criterion. The third criterion 
arises as a response to a possible objection to the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. 
The objection goes as follows. In the case of the visual experience of colour, we are allowed 
to speak of its phenomenal character as an instance of the disclosure of a property of the 
object of experience in part because the experience is “transparent.”30 The transparency of 
                                                 
29 Recall that the aim of this chapter is to provide the skeleton of an account of affect as 
disclosure of value. It is the aim of the next two chapters to provide substance to this skeleton. 
Therefore, also the claim that affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of 
evaluative knowledge because what it means for an object to have value is for it to merit an 
appropriate affective-cum-motivational response needs further qualifications and development 
which will be provided in the next two chapters.  
30 The notion of “transparency” within the context of debating the nature of the phenomenal 
character of experience is far from univocal. For useful expositions of the notion of 
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visual experience refers to the phenomenological observation that we are not able to attend 
to and report features of the phenomenal character of experience without attending to and 
reporting features of the object of experience. The visual experience is characterised as 
transparent since trying to attend to and report features of the phenomenal character of 
experience inevitably leads us to “fall through” the experience and attend to and report 
features that we experience as pertaining to the object of experience. For instance, attending 
to and reporting the phenomenal character of the visual experience of a red ball inevitab ly 
leads us to attend to and report features experienced as pertaining to the ball, for instance 
its redness. By contrast, in the case of affective experience, we are able to attend to and 
report features of the phenomenal character of experience that are not experienced as 
properties of the object evaluated. In this sense, affective experience is not transparent.31 
Therefore, the objection continues, if we are able to attend to features of the phenomena l 
character of affective experience that do not strike us as properties of the object of 
experience, then how can we speak of the phenomenal character of an affective experience 
being a case of the disclosure of a property of the object of experience rather than just of 
the experience itself? The challenge is to show how the “opaqueness” of affective 
experience is at the very least compatible with the notion that affect entails the disclosure 
of properties of the object of experience, namely its evaluative import.  
Crucially, in satisfying this criterion, we have to once again avoid two pitfalls. The 
first one is answering this challenge without construing the phenomenal character of 
                                                 
“transparency,” see Crane (2000b) and Martin (2002). For a brief historical overview of the 
notion and a useful disambiguation, see  
Kind (2003). The locus classicus of the notion of “transparency” is Moore (1903). 
31 For views that remark on the non-transparency, or “opaqueness,” of emotional experience, see 
de Sousa (2004), Salmela (2011), and Deonna and Teroni (2012), 68-69. 
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experience as the qualia theorist does. Recall that the qualia theorist conceives affect as an 
intrinsic, non-intentional property of the experience that gains intentionality once it is 
associated with the feature of the object causing the subject to have the experience. 
Although the qualia theorist is able to capture the phenomenological fact that we are able 
to attend to and report features of the affective experience that are not experienced as 
properties of the object evaluated, her ability to do so comes at a high cost, namely it results 
in construing the relation between affect and the evaluative feature of the object as one of 
mere contingent association. In so doing, we lose the right to speak of affect as a disclosure 
of value since within the framework of the qualia theorist what we learn about in having 
an experience with affective character is properties of the experience rather than of the 
object of experience. The second pitfall is set once again by the dispositionalist. The 
dispositionalist conceives of affect as a mere causal effect of a dispositional property the 
object possesses, namely its value. The dispositionalist then seems at first to be able to 
answer the challenge by claiming that since the value of an object just is its disposition to 
cause an affective experience in the subject, then attending to properties of experience, 
namely its affective character, is a case of the disclosure of value since, again, value just is 
the disposition to cause an affective experience in the subject. But we have repeatedly seen 
that this answer comes at a great cost: it leaves out the authority of affect. That is, the 
dispositionalist is not able to capture the fact that affect renders rationally intelligible our 
motivational states rather than merely causally intelligible.   
So how does the above provide us with a clue to satisfying the third criterion 
without falling into the pitfalls set by the qualia theorist and the dispositionalist? According 
to the above, a constitutive part of the disclosure of value is forming intelligible affective-
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cum-motivational responses. In having an affective experience, then, we are able to attend 
to and report features of the experience that are not experienced as properties of the object 
of experience, namely the features that constitute or affective-cum-motivationa l 
propensities. These features are properties that pertain to the experience of the subject and 
not to the objects of experience. Yet, since the formation of intelligible motivational states 
is constitutive of what it means to affectively disclose value, then attending to and reporting 
the intelligibility of the affective and motivational character of our experience is 
constitutive of the disclosure of the evaluative import of the object of experience. For 
instance, in experiencing indignation at the latest governmental cuts, I can attend to and 
report what it feels like to feel indignation and form intelligible motivational states. For 
instance, the feeling of indignation motivates me to organize a protest or write an op-ed 
article denouncing the government. In feeling indignation, I am able to attend to features 
of my experience, features that are not experienced as properties of the object of 
experience. Yet, within the framework above, the description of the way it feels like to fee l 
indignation, for instance wanting to organize protests and write harsh criticisms of the latest 
governmental cuts, entails describing the responses’ intelligibility which, in turn, 
necessitates referring to the injustice of the government. Insofar as the formation of 
appropriate affective-cum-motivational responses is a constitutive part of what it means to 
disclose value, accurately describing the phenomenology of these responses i.e. as 
intelligible to the agent, entails describing the sort of disclosure of value at stake. This 
means that within the framework of the account above we have a ready explanation as to 
why describing the experiential aspect of our affective-cum-motivational responses, that 
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is, features of the experience that are not experienced as properties of the object 
experienced, already amounts to describing part of the disclosure of value.  
This way of satisfying the third criterion avoids the pitfall set by the qualia theorist 
because within the framework above we are able to capture the “opaqueness” of affective 
experience in full respect of the inextricability and necessity of the relation between affect 
and the disclosure of value. Insofar as describing the intelligibility of our affective-cum-
motivational responses towards the object is a constitutive part of learning about the 
evaluative import of an object, and insofar as describing the intelligibility of one’s 
affective-cum-motivational responses entails the act of attending to and reporting the 
responses’ subjective features, then attending to and reporting the intelligibility of the 
phenomenal character of an affective experience is necessarily related, and not merely 
contingently associated, with the disclosure of the evaluative import of the object. 
Furthermore, we avoid the pitfall set by the dispositionalist since our claim is that on the 
one hand we are able to attend to and report features of our experience without necessarily 
attending to and reporting features of the object of experience yet on the other hand our 
description of the intelligibility of our responses necessarily entails attending to and 
reporting features of the object of experience, namely its evaluative import. The subject 
learns the value of an object by forming her intelligible affective-cum-motivationa l 
response. This is in stark contrast to the dispositionalist according to whom the value of an 
object just is its disposition to merely cause an affective-cum-motivational response thus 
leaving out the intelligibility of the responses.  
Crucially, notice that the above account not only satisfies the first two criteria in a 
way that shows them to be interdependent, but it does so also with the third criterion. That 
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is, the phenomenological fact that affective experience is “opaque” rather than 
“transparent” is not only accommodated by the account resulting from the simultaneous 
satisfaction of the first two criteria. Rather, the account above provides us with a picture 
that shows “opaqueness” to be an essential feature of the sort of disclosure of value 
characteristic of affective experience due to the response-dependent nature of the 
objectivity of value.  
Section 5 
 I want to end this chapter by discussing the way that my account takes in 
consideration the bodily component of affective experience. William James writes that ‘If 
we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the 
feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind’ (James 
1884, 193) since ‘[a] purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity… for us, emotion 
dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable’ (ibid., 194). There are different 
intuitions one might extract from James’ words. The prevalent reading has been that James 
argues for a reductive account of emotions in terms of the awareness of bodily changes 
(but see, e.g., Ratcliffe 2005). I do not endorse this view. I also do not want to argue for 
the claim that the awareness of physiological changes is essential to emotional experience. 
Yet I am sceptical of the notion of purely “psychic” feelings that some authors have put 
forward in their accounts (see, e.g., Scheler 1973; Stocker 1983; Goldie 2000). All I want 
to do in this section, then, is to show that the account of affect and value provided above is 
not incompatible with descriptions of emotional affect in terms of the awareness of bodily 
changes.  
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I do so by considering the following worry. In the previous section I argued that 
even though in the case of affect we are able to attend to and report features of the 
experience that are not experienced as properties of the object of experience, the 
description of the intelligibility of our affective experiences cannot be given independently 
from the description of the evaluative property of the object confronting us. Yet it seems 
as we can describe the experience of bodily changes independently of the evaluative 
property of an object. For instance, I can describe the experience of accelerated breathing, 
of sweat dripping down my back, of my muscles tensing, and of my throat drying up, 
without having to mention the fearsomeness of the object confronting me. If so, then are 
we to conclude that the experience of bodily changes is not part of the sort of affective 
experiences in question? This conclusion goes against the intuition that there is an 
undeniable physiological component in affective experience. So how do we reconcile the 
thought that there is an undeniable physiological component in affective experience that 
can be described independently of the evaluative features of the object we confront and the 
thought that we cannot describe the intelligibility of our affective experiences 
independently of those same evaluative features?  
The answer lies in recognising that the apparent tension is fruit of two distinct levels 
of description of the same phenomenon. In order to illustrate this, I want to rely on an 
argument put forward by Lambie and Marcel (2002) to the effect that different descriptions 
of the phenomenology of emotional experience need not be thought to be incompatible. In 
their paper “Consciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience,” Lambie and Marcel 
argue that one of the main reasons why we find in the literature a diversity of, and at first 
appearance conflicting, theoretical descriptions of the phenomenology of emotiona l 
   130 
experience is that theorists tend to give unitary characterisations of the phenomenon when 
in fact there is a variety (ibid., 220). This variety depends on which aspects of the 
phenomenology one directs one’s attention towards. For our purposes, the key point that 
Lambie and Marcel make is that the different theoretical descriptions need not be 
incompatible, they just mirror the attentional focus of the theorist.  
Lambie and Marcel’s argument relies on drawing a series of distinctions and then 
showing how what at first appeared to be conflicting descriptions of the phenomeno logy 
of experience in fact are descriptions of the same phenomenon. In what follows I present 
the key distinctions drawn by Lambie and Marcel and then I show how these can be used 
to dissolve the apparent tension at the heart of the worry above. The first distinction that 
Lambie and Marcel draw is between first-order phenomenal experience and second-order 
awareness, or reflexive consciousness (ibid., 228). First-order phenomenal experience is a 
phenomenally conscious experience. Second-order awareness is the result of an act of focal 
attention on first-order phenomenal experience. Importantly, Lambie and Marcel point out 
that the act of focal attention on phenomenal experience not only produces second-order 
awareness but, due to its focal nature, it also entails a selection of an aspect of phenomena l 
experience. Now, there are two aspects to the sort of focal attention that we can take on 
first-order phenomenal experience. First, there is general directedness. One can focus on 
that aspect of emotional experience that is directed towards the self or one can focus on 
that aspect of the emotional experience that is directed towards the world. Lambie and 
Marcel describe the relation between self-focus and world-focus as one between figure and 
ground. Focusing on the world-directed aspect of emotional experience does not entail that 
there isn’t a self-directed aspect to the experience. Rather, it means that in focusing our 
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attention on the world-directed aspect we allow it to stand out against its background, the 
self-directed aspect. And vice versa. Lambie and Marcel use tactile experience in order to 
illustrate the figure-ground relation between the self and world-directed aspects of 
emotional experience generated by a change in focal attention. When one slides one’s 
finger on the edge of a table, one can shift one’s focal attention between, on the one hand, 
the sensation at the tip of one’s finger and, on the other hand, the features of the edge of 
the table, for instance, its shape, texture, and so on. Here, focusing one’s attention on one 
aspect of the tactile experience does not entail that the other aspect disappears entirely. It 
just means that it recedes in the background of one’s attention.32 Similarly, focusing on, 
say, the world-directed aspect of emotional experience does not entail that the self-directed 
aspect disappears or is non-existent. Rather, it recedes in the background and is not the 
object of our focal attention.  
The second aspect of focal attention is its mode. The mode of focal attention is 
characterised in two ways. First, the mode of focal attention can either be synthetic or 
analytic. It is synthetic if the focus is on the emotional experience as a whole and it is 
analytic if the focus is on a component of emotional experience. Second, the mode of 
attentional focus can either be immersed in the object of experience or detached. Extreme 
cases of immersion with the object of emotional experience usually result in the absence 
of second-order awareness. Typical cases of extreme immersion with the object of 
experience are so-called experiences of “flow,” that is, experiences where the subject is 
deeply involved in a task that is challenging yet where the subject performs successfully. 
                                                 
32 For similar illustrative uses of the phenomenon of tactile experience in the description of the 
bodily component of emotional experience, see also Ratcliffe (2008), Slaby (2008), and 
Colombetti (2014). 
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By contrast, detachment from the object of emotional experience facilitates second-order 
awareness insofar as the focal attention is directed towards one’s doing or experience rather 
than on the object of experiences. An example of detachment with the object are cases 
where the subject is asked to report aloud the protocol of a task.   
Armed with these distinctions, Lambie and Marcel argue that depending on the sort 
of focal attention that a theorist adopts, a different description of the phenomenology of 
emotional experience will be generated. Yet this does not entail that the theorist is 
describing a different phenomenon. Consider the case of fear. Suppose that we focus our 
attention towards the world-directed aspect of the experience, in an immersed and synthet ic 
mode of attention. The content of the resulting description most probably will concern the 
way that the object of experience appears to us, that is, in its fearsomeness. Now suppose 
that we switch our focal attention to the self and adopt a detached and analytic mode of 
attention. What would the content of the resulting description include? I surmise that the 
description would include factors such as one’s accelerated breathing, the sensation of 
sweating, and so on. Lambie and Marcel’s point is that although the content of the two 
resulting descriptions is indeed different, it doesn’t seem as we are describing two different 
experiences. After all, we are still describing the experience of fear. What we have done is 
that we selected certain aspects of the experience of fear and consequently momentar i ly 
excluded others. Here, in switching from a world-directed to a self-directed, and from a 
synthetic to analytic focus, we momentarily exclude the situational components of the 
experience of fear, namely its object and its experienced evaluative properties. Mere 
switching though does not necessarily entail that the aspect of the emotional experience 
that has receded in the background, in this case its world-directedness, has disappeared in 
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the overall experience. Rather, by switching our focal attention, it has receded in the 
background.  
How does this help us with the worry above? Recall that the answer to the worry 
needs to show how we can reconcile the thought that there is an undeniable physiologica l 
component in affective experience that can be described independently of the evaluative 
features of the object we confront and the thought that we cannot describe the intelligibi lity 
of our affective experiences independently of those same evaluative features. What Lambie 
and Marcel’s argument asks us to appreciate is that descriptions of emotional experience 
change in virtue of changes in our focal attention but that the different aspects of emotiona l 
experience we focus on, and therefore the different descriptions that are generated, need 
not be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they provide a richer description of the 
emotional experience. The worry above results from not appreciating that one level of 
description need not exclude another. Indeed, the worry seems to be generated precisely 
by adopting one level of description, the content of which are physiological changes, and 
excluding the other level, the content of which is the evaluative, world-directed aspect. 
Once this happens, the affective component of the emotional experience is conceived as 
being solely a matter of physiological changes. But now we have distorted the phenomenon 
under description since we have permanently excluded its evaluative, world-directed 
aspect, precisely the aspect that needs description in capturing the intelligibility of our 
affective experiences. Nico Frijda provides us with a useful analogy: ‘[a]ction awareness 
by necessity is situated; otherwise it becomes mere awareness of muscle tension. Take the 
experience of pointing one’s finger: It feels different from stretching one’s finger, because 
the action is guided by orientation towards a point in space’ (Frijda 2005, 480). 
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Analogously, excluding the evaluative aspect of emotional experience and keeping solely 
the description of physiological changes gives the description of a different phenomenon 
altogether. 
I believe that the mistake that one makes when endorsing one description of affect 
at the exclusion of another in part constitutes the erroneous conception of affect that 
Johnston imputes to the projectivist. Recall that Johnston accuses the projectivist of 
“mentalising” affect. One “mentalises” affect when one focuses on affect and in doing so 
construes it as a private sensation. Once affect is “mentalised”, then one loses the grip on 
the sort of disclosing function that affect has. In turn, we end up with a conception of affect 
that is unable to capture its normative authority over our evaluative judgements and 
motivational states. The level of description which is needed in characterising affect as a 
disclosure of value is one that allows for the description of its intelligibility which itself 
entails an outward looking stance, that is, a stance towards the world. The puzzlement over 
how the experience of physiological changes can constitute the disclosure of the value of 
objects derives from focusing on one sort of description of affect at the exclusion of the 
other. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Disclosure and Response-Dependent Objectivity of Value 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I began with Johnston’s insight that in order to understand 
in what sense affective experience is a disclosure of value we need to make sense of the 
phenomenological observation that affect renders readily and rationally intelligible not 
only the formation of our evaluative judgements but also of our motivational states. I then 
argued that to make sense of this phenomenological observation we should commit to the 
following constitutive thesis: the formation of our motivational states towards an object is 
constitutive of the disclosure of value. The key challenge in defending this constitut ive 
thesis is the apparent tension between the idea that the sort of evaluative knowledge that 
we acquire in having an affective experience is objective, that is, it is knowledge of objects 
–hence the notion of affect as a disclosure of value- and the idea that the formation of 
motivational states of the subject is a constitutive part of such evaluative knowledge. How 
can the formation of motivational states of the subject be a constitutive part of knowledge 
of objects? I then argued that in order to dissolve this apparent tension we need to commit 
to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value. According to a response-
dependent notion of the objectivity of value, the value of an object is inextricably tied to 
the affective-cum-motivational responses of the subject since for an object to have value is 
for it to merit an affective-cum-motivational response. Although committing to a response-
dependent notion of the objectivity of value allowed us to show in a preliminary fashion 
that we can solve the challenge, we have yet to provide the details of this notion of 
objectivity that show how the challenge is solved, that is, that shows in what way the 
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formation of our affective-cum-motivational responses is a constitutive part of what it 
means for the object to have value.  
 The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of a response-dependent notion of 
the objectivity of value that defends the constitutive thesis by dissolving the apparent 
tension that lies within it. My strategy is the following. In the next section (Section 1) I 
consider four possible ways of conceiving the relation between value and our affective -
cum-motivational responses that range from an extreme form of subjectivism to an extreme 
form of objectivism. I then show why each of these options is not viable for our purposes. 
The purpose of considering why these are not viable options is to provide us with two 
reference points needed to calibrate the sort of relation between value and our affective -
cum-motivational responses, that is, of a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of 
value, that fits our account of affect as a disclosure of value. In Section 2 I rely on David 
Wiggins’ work on the objectivity of value to flesh out the sort of notion of objectivity we 
are seeking. I argue that David Wiggins’s account of value embodies the sort of response-
dependent notion of the objectivity of value that is calibrated by the two reference points 
extracted in Section 1. In Section 3 I show how the account of the objectivity of value 
formulated in Section 2 dissolves the apparent tension that lies within the constitutive thesis 
and therefore provides a defence of the idea that affect is the disclosure of value. Finally, 
in Section 4 I look at Bennet Helm’s account of the objectivity of value. I do so because 
his account is also inspired by McDowell and Wiggins and it therefore serves as a useful 
account against which to clarify our own position. I argue that his account encounters a 
problem that symptomises an incorrect calibration between subjectivity and objectivity. 
Considering this problem will allow us to clarify our own position. 
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Section 1 
 In this section I distinguish four accounts of the relation between value and our 
affective-cum-motivational responses. I do so with an eye to providing two reference points 
for the account of the objectivity of value to be developed in the remainder of the chapter. 
I term the four accounts in the following way: “robust objectivism”, “colour-ana logy 
objectivism”, “dispositionalist objectivism”, “traditional subjectivism.” These four 
position are meant to be conceived as on a spectrum going from an extreme conception of 
objectivism to an extreme form of subjectivism.  
1. Robust Objectivism 
 According to the robust objectivist, our conception of value is specifiab le 
independently of the subject’s responses. Objects would have value even if creatures 
equipped with the ability to respond affectively and motivationally, or more broadly, with 
an evaluative interest, did not exist.  The only relation there is between a subject’s affective -
cum-motivational responses towards an object and the object’s value is, we might say, 
contingent, that is, the relation obtains when the subject has a veridical experience of the 
object as having the relevant value but no such relation need obtain for the object to have 
value. Insofar as on this view value is specifiable independently of a subjective point of 
view, it becomes utterly mysterious why our experiences of value should have an 
intrinsically affective-cum-motivational character. This is because, to put it in somewhat 
unfashionable terms, according to a robust objectivist view, there is no special link between 
value and the will. This is the sort of conception of objectivity that lead Mackie to argue 
that the notion of the objectivity of value is committed to a “queer” notion of properties 
(Mackie 1977, 38). For how can a property that is specifiable independently of our 
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subjective responses have nevertheless a special link to our will i.e. affective-cum-
motivational responses? As we saw in the previous chapter, McDowell argues, contra 
Mackie, that we need not commit to this sort of objectivity in arguing that value is 
objective. For our purposes, we need to be clear that if value is specifiable independently 
of our affective-cum-motivational responses, that is, if there is no necessary relation 
between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses, then we 
are unable to explain why affect renders readily, let alone rationally, intelligible the 
formation of our motivational states.  
2. Colour-Analogy Objectivism 
 Recall that in the previous chapter we repeatedly looked at an analogy and a 
disanalogy between our conceptions of colour and value. The analogy is that just as our 
conception of what colour is is dependent on our sensory experiences of colour, our 
conception of what value is is dependent on our experiences of value. The disanalogy is 
that while our experiences of value have an affective-cum-motivational character, or in 
other words, entail the formation of motivational states, our experiences of colour don’t. 
That is why, we argued, sensory experiences render readily and rationally intelligib le 
perceptual judgements but not the formation of motivational states, while experiences of 
value render readily and rationally intelligible both evaluative judgements and the 
formation of motivational states. We can think of the colour-analogy objectivist as 
committing solely to the analogy and not to the disanalogy. Perhaps the colour-analogy 
objectivist thinks that our experience of value is characterised by the sort of phenomena l 
acquaintance that characterises our experience of colour where phenomenal acquaintance 
in no way entails any affective or motivational component. Perhaps this sort of 
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acquaintance can be thought of as some sort of intuition. Insofar as the colour-analogy 
objectivist commits to the analogy with colour, she differentiates herself from the robust 
objectivist by maintaining a necessary link between our conception of value and our 
experience, where the relevant sort of experience is not characterised as an affective-cum-
motivational response. After all, in committing to the analogy, the colour-analogy 
objectivist is a response-dependent objectivist since she takes value to be a property of the 
object while maintaining that it is not possible to specify value independently of our 
experiential responses. For our purposes, the problem with the colour-analogy objectivist 
is that if our experience of value is conceived as a mere phenomenal acquaintance bereft 
of any affective-cum-motivational character, then although we might be able to explain 
why, just as our experience of colour is able to make readily and rationally intelligible our 
perceptual judgements, our experience of value is able to render readily and rationally 
intelligible our evaluative judgements, we are unable to explain why our experience of 
value is able to render readily, let alone rationally, intelligible the formation of our 
motivational states (in the same way that our experience of colour is unable to do so).  
3. Dispositionalist Objectivism 
 As we have already noted, according to the dispositionalist, value is a dispositiona l 
property in the object to cause an affective-cum-motivational response in the subject. 
Insofar as value is conceived as a property of the object, the dispositionalist is an 
objectivist. The dispositionalist differentiates herself from the robust objectivist insofar as 
according to the former value cannot be specified independently of the subject’s point of 
view since for an object to have value just is for it to cause the subject to have the relevant 
response. Although the dispositionalist agrees with the colour-analogy objectivist in 
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maintaining an internal link between our conception of value and our experiences of value, 
the dispositionalist differentiates herself from the colour-analogy objectivist by 
characterising the sort of experience that the dispositional property in the object i.e. value, 
causes the subject to have as an affective-cum-motivational response. The dispositionalist, 
then, is a response-dependent theorist of the objectivity of value that seems at first sight to 
be able to make sense of affect as disclosure of value. Our affective-cum-motivationa l 
experiences are a disclosure of value since our having these experiences is caused by the 
dispositional property of the object i.e. its value. The problem with the dispositionalist, as 
we have repeatedly observed in previous chapters, is that all that her conception of the 
objectivity of value can show is that there is a causal link between value and our affective-
cum-motivational responses. This is a problem since if our notion of the objectivity of 
value merely tells us that value causes our affective-cum-motivational response, then we 
are not able to make sense of the phenomenological observation that the disclosure of value 
renders rationally intelligible the formation of our motivational states. This is the problem 
with dispositionalist theories that we saw McDowell pointing out. By contrast, as we have 
seen McDowell arguing, the object is experienced as having value when it is experienced 
as meriting the relevant affective-cum-motivational response, or to put it in slightly 
different terminology, the object has value when it makes our affective-cum-motivationa l 
responses appropriate. A mere causal explanation cannot capture this aspect of our 
affective experience and this aspect is precisely what we need in order to argue that affect 
is a disclosure of value. So the notion of disclosure that results from a dispositiona list 
conception of the objectivity of value is unsuitable for our purposes. 
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4. Traditional Subjectivism  
 According to the traditional subjectivist, value is reducible to our affective-cum-
motivational responses. This conception of value is then married to a form of projectivism 
according to which we project onto a value-neutral world our affective-cum-motivationa l 
states and in so doing judge objects to have value. The traditional subjectivist is against 
any notion that value might be an objective property, that is, a property of objects in the 
world. Therefore, according to the traditional subjectivist, although it might seem to the 
subject of experience as if value is a property of the object, that is not the case (see, e.g., 
Blackburn 1985). If so, then there is no sense in which our affective-cum-motivationa l 
experiences are disclosures of value. Although traditional subjectivism denies any notion 
of disclosure to our affective experience, it nevertheless commits to a claim that our notion 
of objectivity also wants to commit to, namely that there is an inextricable link between 
our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses. The inclusion of 
the traditional subjectivist position, then, is important because it puts in perspective what 
claim we do want to commit to, namely that there is an inextricable link between our 
conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses, yet it stands as a 
warning for us not to fall into some form of reductionism and consequent projectivism. In 
other words, it provides us with the limit that we ought not to surpass in removing ourselves 
from the sorts of objectivism to be avoided when calibrating the sort of objectivism that 
we need.  
* 
 Having surveyed these four possible ways of conceiving the relation between value 
and our affective-cum-motivational responses and the way each one is unable to capture 
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the notion of affect as a disclosure of value, we can now formulate four lessons required to 
calibrate the notion of objectivity we are after:  
1. Against the robust objectivist, the sort of objectivity needed is one that mainta ins 
that our conception of value has a necessary link to our experiential responses. 
2. Against the colour-analogy objectivist, the sort of objectivity needed is one that 
characterises the sort of experience that is necessarily linked to our conception of 
value as an affective-cum-motivational response. 
3. Against the dispositionalist objectivist, the sort of objectivity needed is one that is 
able to capture the phenomenological observation that our affective experiences 
render rationally intelligible the formation of our motivational states.  That is, the 
sort of objectivity needed is one that provides both a causal and justificatory 
explanation of our responses. 
4. Against the traditional subjectivist, we need a conception of the relation between 
value and our affective-cum-motivational responses that maintains that there is an 
inextricable link between them does not reduce the former to the latter.  
Notice that the dispositionalist objectivist position avoids the problems with (1) and (2). It 
then avoids falling into (4) but by means of an unsuitable notion of objectivity, one that 
allows her to capture solely a causal link between value and our affective-cum-motivationa l 
responses. The dispositionalist objectivist, then, should be seen as someone who wants to 
commit to the traditional subjectivist’s claim of there being an inextricable link between 
value and our affective-cum-motivational responses but nevertheless also wants some sort 
of objectivity for value and therefore at the very least shows us that the traditiona l 
subjectivist’s claim is not in principle incompatible with some sort of objectivity of value. 
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In brief, then, the position we are after is between the dispositionalist objectivist and the 
traditional subjectivist. They are our two key reference points in theorising the notion of 
the objectivity of value that we are after. To clarify: we want to keep the traditiona l 
subjectivist’s claim that there is an internal, indeed constitutive, link between value and 
our affective-cum-motivational responses yet interpret this link in such a way as to allow 
value to be objective in a way that renders the formation of our motivational states 
rationally intelligible. What we need to do, then, is to emancipate from the traditiona l 
subjectivist towards a notion of objectivity that avoids the dispositionalist error. This will 
then allow us to maintain the constitutive thesis together with the objectivity of value 
suitable for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. 
Section 2 
 David Wiggins’ response-dependent account of the objectivity of value should be 
seen precisely as a position that is born from a marriage between the traditiona l 
subjectivist’s claim that there is an internal link between our conception of value and our 
affective-cum-motivational responses and a desire to allow value to be objective and not 
merely the projection of our affective-cum-motivational states. I believe that a fruitful way 
of extracting the notion of the objectivity of value we are after from Wiggins’ re-
interpretation of the traditional subjectivist’s claim is to concentrate on, and then clarify, 
two central commitments of his view. The first one is a certain circularity in his conception 
of value. Wiggins provides an original, circular interpretation of the traditiona l 
subjectivist’s claim that there is an internal link between our conception of value and our 
affective-cum-motivational responses. As we shall see, this circular interpretation is what 
allows Wiggins to slip in his peculiar notion of objectivity. The second commitment is to 
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a certain form of relativism in his conception of value. This is where Wiggins refines the 
circular conception of value and therefore of its objectivity. In so doing, he emancipates 
himself from the traditional subjectivist towards a notion of objectivity that maintains the 
claim that there is an internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-
motivational responses and avoids the dispositionalist’s trap. 
 Wiggins interprets the traditional subjectivist’s claim that there is an internal link 
between our conception of value and our responses as the biconditional that ‘x is 
good/right/beautiful if and only if x is such as to make a certain sentiment of approbation 
appropriate’ (Wiggins 1987, 187). Paraphrasing the biconditional using our terminology: 
an object is valuable, or has value, if and only if the object is such as to make a certain 
affective-cum-motivational response appropriate, or in slightly different words, if the 
object is such as to merit a certain affective-cum-motivational response. The circular ity 
consists in that once we try to cash out the notion of merit, or of what it means for an 
affective-cum-motivational response to be appropriate, we revert to making reference to 
the object having value. For instance, an object is fearful if and only if the object is such 
as to make a fearful response appropriate yet in explicating the appropriateness of a fearful 
response we make reference to the object being fearful. Is this circularity problematic? 
There are two reasons why one might think so. The first worry is that the resultant account 
of value is, precisely, circular and circular definitions are problematic since they use the 
terms to be defined as part of the definition. The source of this worry, though, is a 
misunderstanding of the commitments to such circularity. The circularity is not meant to 
be an attempt at defining value in terms of the normativity of our responses. In other words, 
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committing to this circular conception of value is not a commitment to an account of value 
that reduces it to the normativity of our responses.33 Here is how Wiggins puts it: 
Whether such circularities constitute a difficulty for the subjectivist depends 
entirely on what the subjectivist takes himself to be attempting. If we treat it as 
already known and given that ‘x is good’ (or ‘right’ or ‘beautiful’) is fully 
analysable, and if ‘x is such as to arouse the sentiment of approbation’ (or ‘x is 
such as to make that sentiment appropriate’) is the subjectivist’s best effort in the 
analytical direction, and if this equivalent fails to deliver any proper analysis, then 
subjectivism is some sort of failure. Certainly. But even if classical subjectivists 
have given this impression to those who want to conceive of all philosophy as 
analysis, analysis as such never needed to be their real concern. What traditional 
subjectivists have really wanted to convey is not so much definition as 
commentary. Chiefly they have wanted to persuade us that, when we consider 
whether or not x is good or right or beautiful, there is no appeal to anything that is 
more fundamental than actually possible human sentiments[.] (Wiggins, 1987b, 
188-9). 
The circularity would be vicious solely if we attempted to give a reductive definition of 
value in terms of the normativity of our affective-cum-motivational responses and then 
found ourselves defining the latter in terms of the former. Since normative reduction is no 
part of the agenda of this circular conception of value, the circularity is not vicious.  
The second worry is the following. Someone might argue that even if the circular ity 
is not vicious insofar as it is not committed to a normative reductive account of value, it is 
                                                 
33 For a characterisation of Wiggins’ position as committed to a reductive analysis of value in 
normative terms see, e.g., Jacobson 2011. For an interpretation of Wiggins that denies this, see 
Tappolet (2011). Others remain worryingly ambiguous on this matter. For instance, see D’Arms 
and Jacobson (2000) and Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (2004).  
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nevertheless uninformative since the terms within which value is characterised, namely an 
appropriate affective-cum-motivational response, is in turn characterised in terms of the 
object’s value. But, as Wiggins points out, this worry is unfounded since the circular 
interpretation of the conception of value is informative insofar as it informs us regarding 
the way in which the subject learns about the evaluative import of the object. Again, the 
project is not one of providing us with a definition of value but rather with a clue to the 
milieu within which we generate our conception of value, a milieu that essentially involves 
our affective-cum-motivational responses. As Wiggins writes:  
But what use (I shall be asked) is such a circular formulation? My answer is that, 
by tracing out such a circle, the subjectivist hopes to elucidate the concept of value 
by displaying it in its actual involvement with the sentiments. One would not, 
according to him, have sufficiently elucidated what value is without that detour. 
(ibid., 189) 
This goes hand in hand with Wiggins’ claim in the previous quote that the message that the 
traditional subjectivist wants to convey in their conception of value is not a definition of 
value but rather a ‘commentary.’ Since the circularity is neither vicious nor uninformative, 
it is ultimately ‘benign’ (ibid., 188).  
 The key point that should be appreciated from Wiggins’ response to both worries 
about circularity is that what a circular interpretation of the internal link between our 
conception of value and our responses delivers is precisely a denial of the need to conceive 
the internal link in terms of analysability. In other words, simply because our conception 
of a property makes necessary reference to our experiential responses it does not mean that 
therefore the property is reducible to our experiential response (cf. our discussion in the 
previous chapter of McDowell 1998g, 136). This is what allows Wiggins to take a first step 
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away from the traditional subjectivist since he effectively provides us with an interpretat ion 
of the internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivationa l 
responses that does away with the reduction of the former to the latter. In so doing, Wiggins 
shows that the internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-
motivational responses, when interpreted as entailing a circularity, can very well admit of 
an objectivist take on value.  
The claim that the circular interpretation of the internal link between our conception 
of value and our responses admits of objectivity finds expression in Wiggins’ “speculat ive” 
account of the formation of our evaluative concepts (Wiggins 1987c, 194-199; see also 
Wiggins 1987a, sec.5 and Wiggins 2013, sec. 6; cf. Pettit 1991, 600-602). Looking at this 
account is important then to see how the circular interpretation of the internal link between 
our conception of value and our responses admits of objectivity.  
 The speculative account of the formation of our evaluative concepts can be 
reconstructed as involving two stages. The first stage begins with the recognition that we 
respond in various ways to objects and persons we confront. The sort of responses that 
indicate that an object or person matters to us often consist in experiences with an affective 
and motivational character. For instance, we are repulsed at a person who doesn’t repay 
kindness with kindness, or we feel ashamed at ourselves when we lie, or we feel respect at 
someone who sacrificed something of his own for someone else. We then group the objects 
and persons that seem to elicit similar responses and label them with names: the repulsive, 
the shameful, the respectful. This leads us to seek to find the features that allow the objects 
to fit in the categories we have devised. This entails arguing as to why and whether our 
actual responses are appropriate, or to put it the other way round, whether the object or 
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person merit that sort of response. In so doing, we specify the relation of the relevant 
“evaluative concept-affective response” pair. For instance, the specification of the content 
of the concept of the respectful is achieved by arguing whether that object or class of 
objects merits our respectful responses by agreeing or disagreeing as to what the features 
are of the object that count in favour or against that kind of response. Simultaneously, we 
refine our understanding of the sort of response that a respectful object renders appropriate. 
The process is one of mutual adjustment between the evaluative concept and the affective 
response (cf. Johnston 2001, 212). That is, we argue as to how an evaluative concept and 
a response are made for one another, what the ‘marks’ (Wiggins 1987, 196) of the concept 
are that pair it with the appropriate affective-cum-motivational response. Wiggins 
characterises this activity as a ‘process of interpersonal education, instruction and mutual 
enlightenment’ (Wiggins 1987, 196). The second stage begins once a sufficient “lock” has 
been achieved between the pairs “evaluative concept-affective response.” At this point, we 
can move from arguing about what the features of a particular class of objects are such that 
they make a certain response appropriate, to focusing on a response, say indignation, and 
argue about what are the features of the related property, say injustice, such that it merits 
that response or makes that response appropriate. It then becomes essentially contestable 
without a detrimental loss of univocity in the use of the evaluative predicate what an object 
has to be like in order to fall under the relevant evaluative concept, that is, what the object 
has to be like in order to instantiate that value.  
 What the speculative account renders explicit is the interdependence between our 
conception of evaluative properties and our affective-cum-motivational responses. Neither 
can be specified independently of the other. This was the point of characterising the interna l 
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link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses as 
circular. We should not, then, make the mistake of conceiving either side as potentially 
specifiable independently of the other. This is especially illuminating in the case of 
evaluative properties. Here is how Wiggins puts it in a more recent text:  
The presence of such properties, that is of value properties, is ascertained by all 
the multifarious means that are called for by the exercise of our grasp of this or 
that ethical concept. [Evaluative] properties are to be conceived in the light of what 
it takes to exercise that grasp- and not vice versa. A particular ethical property, we 
might say, is to be identified or singled out as the property which the reasonable 
exercise of the grasp of such and such a concept, as regulated by criticism, hunts 
down…The objectivity of the reasonable exercise of the grasp of an ethical concept 
is not established by reference to the product of some independent understanding 
of the property. (Why should it need to be?) It is established by those who exercise 
it and engage fairly first-order criticism. (Wiggins 2006, 334-335) 
Although in this passage Wiggins’ focus of discussion is the objectivity of ethical 
judgements in first-order ethical discourse, we gain the useful insight that the specifica t ion 
of what a certain evaluative property is, is to be conceived in terms of what is involved in 
our ability to apply an evaluative concept. Since our affective-cum-motivational responses 
play an essential role in the formation of our evaluative concepts, then the ability to apply 
an evaluative predicate entails an understanding, if not an experiential undergoing of, the 
sort of affective-cum-motivational response that the relevant evaluative property renders 
appropriate. If so, then an evaluative property should not and cannot be conceived 
independently of our affective-cum-motivational responses.  
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The same goes for our responses. Our conception of what sort of response an object 
ought to evoke is dependent on our conception of the evaluative property that the object is 
taken to instantiate. Hence why Wiggins writes, when commenting on our conception of 
amusement, that ‘[t[here is no object-independent and property-independent, ‘purely 
phenomenological’ or ‘purely introspective’ account of amusement’ (Wiggins 1987, 195). 
For us to specify our conception of amusement, we need to make reference to the property 
that makes an object funny. Indeed, thinking that we can give an object-independent 
account of our responses is one of the mistakes that the traditional subjectivist makes. 
Recall Johnston’s charge of “mentalising” affect discussed in Chapter 3 and at the end of 
Chapter 4. If we sever the specification of our responses from our conception of value, then 
we end up distorting the nature of our original target, namely, our affective-cum-
motivational responses, to such an extent that we risk ending up describing a completely 
different phenomenon from the original target, such as one’s awareness of physiologica l 
changes. That is why Wiggins seems to intimate that there is something fishy in thinking, 
as the traditional subjectivist does, that it is possible for a subject to tell in what experient ia l 
state she is in without ‘looking outward’ (ibid., 208).  
 The circularity between our conception of value and our affective-cum-
motivational responses introduces a commitment to a certain form of relativism. If an 
object has value if and only if it renders appropriate our affective and motivationa l 
responses, then value is, in a sense to be specified, relative to our responses. But if value is 
relative to our responses, how can we claim objectivity? Wiggins’ strategy in answering 
this worry is to refine the notion of relativity he is committed to. Wiggins begins by 
pointing out that he is not claiming that the value of an object is constituted by the 
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agreement between participants in the critical process (ibid., 204-205). If there is 
agreement among the participants as to what the appropriate response is to an object, that 
is because the object has the evaluative import that makes it such as to make it appropriate 
to have the relevant response. More subtly, Wiggins points out that his account is not 
committed to the idea that one can simply substitute “‘x is good’” with “‘x is such as to 
arouse or make appropriate [a certain] sentiment of approbation’ (ibid., 206). Rather, the 
claim is that ‘x is good if and only if x is the sort of thing that calls forth or makes 
appropriate a certain sentiment of approbation given the range of propensities that we 
actually have to respond in this or that way’ (ibid., original emphasis). The thought here is 
that value is not relative to our actual responses, period. Rather, value is relative to our 
actual tendencies of which our actual responses are part. Or putting it the other way round, 
value is relative to our actual responses conceived as part of a collection of tendencies that 
we actually have to respond in certain ways. Let me illustrate this point. Take the case of a 
community where the vast majority believes that repulsion is the appropriate response to 
homosexuality and therefore believes that homosexuality is repulsive. In this case, 
according to Wiggins, if value were relative to the actual responses of the community, 
period, then we should conclude that, for that community, homosexuality is repulsive. But 
this sort of relativity, of course, would take away any claim to objectivity since it would 
make value local to the community. Rather, the thought is that value is relative to the actual 
tendencies of the members of the community to feel in one way or another, of which 
repulsion is one sort. This opens up a gap allowing for progress insofar as now there is 
room to argue which response we should have, that is, to argue which response is 
appropriate given the range of tendencies to respond we actually have. Hence the element 
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of essential contestability in the application of evaluative concepts. By contrast, if value 
were relative to the actual responses of the community, period, then there wouldn’t be any 
room to argue whether homosexuality is or is not repulsive, that is, whether repulsion is or 
is not an appropriate response to homosexuality, since the application of the evaluative 
concept “repulsive” would be “fixed” by the actual responses.  
We are now in a position to see the way in which Wiggins’ circular, or 
interdependent, interpretation of the internal link between our conception of value and our 
affective-cum-motivational responses has introduced a notion of objectivity within the 
traditional subjectivist framework- and hence the way in which Wiggins has emancipated 
us from it- without falling into the dispositionalist trap. Insofar as the specification of 
evaluative properties needs to make reference to subjective responses, the internal link 
between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses is 
preserved. Yet, what the circular interpretation allows Wiggins to do is to avoid the mistake 
of the traditional subjectivist of reducing value to our responses since we are shown that 
the specification of our responses needs to in turn make reference to evaluative properties. 
At the same time, Wiggins avoids falling into the dispositionalist trap because, as we have 
seen, the claim is not that value is relative to our actual responses, period. Rather, value is 
relative to the appropriateness of the relevant response given the range of the actual 
collective responses we have. The value of an object is what ‘calls forth’ (ibid., 210) a 
response that potentially fits the features of the object that make it valuable. That is, there 
is reason for the object to call forth the relevant response. Importantly, the value of an 
object is not reducible to the fact that there is reason to respond in a certain way; 34 rather, 
                                                 
34 I take this to be Scanlon’s view. See Scanlon 1998, ch.1 and 2. 
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the values are what provide us with potential reasons to respond in the relevant way. If so, 
then the value of an object does not merely cause an affective-cum-motivational response 
but also provides the subject with the marks for potential justification. If so, then the sort 
of explanation that we give in having an affective-cum-motivational response is one that 
lends itself both to causation and justification. The dispositionalist is unable to provide this 
sort of explanation because it does not make room for justification. This is what presumably 
Wiggins has in mind when he writes that ‘the subjectivism we have envisaged [i.e. the 
response-dependent objectivism of the sort we are after] does not treat the response as a 
criterion, or even as an indicator…[Rather] it is a judgement indispensably sustained by 
the perceptions and feelings and thoughts that are open to criticism that is based on norms 
that are open to criticism. It is not that by which we tell. It is part of the telling itself’ (ibid., 
208). The objectivity of value as envisaged by Wiggins, then, is one that essentially allows 
for the possibility of justifying one’s responses. Again, this is why the application of an 
evaluative predicate essentially involves contestability: that is because value is the sort of 
property that essentially entails the possibility of arguing whether its application is correct 
or incorrect which is established by arguing whether a certain response is appropriate or 
not. 
Section 3 
 We are now in a position to dissolve the apparent tension within the constitut ive 
thesis. The constitutive thesis states that the formation of our motivational states towards 
an object is constitutive of the disclosure of value. The key difficulty in defending the 
constitutive thesis is the apparent tension between the idea that the sort of evaluative 
knowledge that we acquire in having an affective experience is objective, that is, it is 
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knowledge of features of objects, and the idea that the formation of motivational states of 
the subject is constitutive of such knowledge. The tension dissolves once we admit of the 
possibility of the formation of motivational states as constituting evaluative knowledge of 
objects and this is precisely what the response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value 
formulated in the previous section allows us to do. According to this conception of value, 
the value of an object is that property of an object that renders the formation of our 
motivational states appropriate. The formation of our motivational states is a response to 
the evaluative property of the object. As we have seen, evaluative properties are not 
specifiable independently of our responses since the specification of the former is in terms 
of what renders appropriate the latter. Yet evaluative properties maintain their objectivity 
precisely because they are those properties of the object that justify our responses. The 
knowledge we gain from having an affective-cum-motivational response, that is, a response 
entailing the formation of motivational states, is objective since its content consists in the 
features of the object that render our responses appropriate. At the same time, our responses 
are constitutive of this sort of knowledge because they are the terms within which we 
specify those features, that is, as those that render our responses appropriate. I believe that 
here is where the importance, and subtlety, of Wiggins’ quote above comes out: 
‘[Evaluative] properties are to be conceived in the light of what it takes to exercise that 
grasp’ where the grasp is of the relevant evaluative concept the formation of which 
essentially entails the potential justification of our responses (Wiggins 2006, 334).  
We can now make sense of the idea that affect renders readily and rationally 
intelligible the formation of our motivational states insofar as it is a disclosure of value. 
Our affective responses are responses to evaluative properties of objects and persons 
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confronting us. The link between our affective responses and the object’s evaluative 
properties is inextricable since evaluative properties are specified in terms of those features 
of the object that render our affective responses appropriate. In turn our responses are 
specified in terms of those experiences that respond to an evaluative property- hence 
Wiggins’ scepticism of the possibility of a purely “introspective”, object-independent 
account of our affective experiences. Insofar as the formation of our motivational states is 
part of having an affective experience -hence the term “affective-cum-motivationa l 
response” I have employed throughout this chapter and the previous one - affective 
experience has authority over the formation of our motivational states because the 
formation of our motivational states is itself a response to the evaluative properties of the 
object of experience. This lands us on the conclusion that affect renders readily and 
rationally intelligible the formation of our motivational states because it is a disclosure of 
value.  
  The notion of the objectivity of value with which we have dissolved the apparent 
tension explains the phenomenon mentioned in the previous chapter that there is a sense in 
which we cannot acquire the sort of evaluative knowledge in question without to a certain 
extent simultaneously valuing or disvaluing the object whose evaluative import we are 
learning about.   The idea that part of what it means to understand the evaluative import of 
something is to come to value or disvalue it, that is, to be taken by it in a positive or negative 
way, is made salient by contrasting it with the case of colour. The acquisition of the sort of 
knowledge that grounds our concepts of colour does not entail being taken with the object 
in the relevant sense. Yet the acquisition of the sort of knowledge grounding our evaluative 
concepts does. At this point, this phenomenon should not be mysterious since this is due to 
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the different sort of responses essential to the acquisition of the respective sort of 
knowledge. In the case of value these are affective and motivational, while in the case of 
colour they are sensorial. Sense experience of colour does not involve the formation of 
motivational states while affect does. This difference is encapsulated within the grasp and 
use of the respective concepts. Evaluative concepts retain within their very meaning the 
fact that they have been formed within a process involving our affective and motivationa l 
states, that is, responses that characteristically manifest a concerned interest in the object 
or person. This is what Wiggins calls, following Stevenson, ‘the ‘magnetism’ of value 
terms’ (ibid., 198). Evaluative concepts are “magnetic” because their very meaning points 
to being taken with the object, either negatively or positively. None of this holds for our 
concepts of colour. It is no surprise then that the application of an evaluative concept to an 
object or person normally entails the adoption of a certain valenced attitude towards it. 
That is because the genesis of evaluative concepts essentially involves our affective and 
motivational responses. 
Section 4 
  In this final section I want to look at Bennet Helm’s account of the relation between 
affective experience and value. I do so for the following reason. Helm’s account is inspired 
by the response-dependent account of the objectivity of value of McDowell and Wiggins 
that I have been relying on to argue for affect as a disclosure of value. Therefore, it affords 
us with an account against which we can refine our own. As we shall see presently, Helm 
aims to situate his account also in between an extreme form of objectivism and an extreme 
form of subjectivism. Yet his account encounters a problem that symptomises an incorrect 
calibration. Considering this problem will allow us to clarify our own position.      
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 Helm employs the term “import” to refer to value as he understands it.35 Helm 
situates his response-dependent notion of the objectivity of import between what we have 
termed “robust objectivism”- objectivity conceived as specifiable independently of the 
subjective point of view- and what we have termed “traditional subjectivism”- value is 
reduced to our affective responses and is conceived as projected onto a value-neutral world-
. Helm’s account characterises import as ‘perspectivally subjective in the sense that their 
[i.e. values’] existence is intelligible only in terms of being the objects of a certain sort of 
awareness, a certain perspective on the world’ (Helm 2001a, 56). This is the sort of 
ontological status that, according to Helm, is characteristic of secondary qualities such as 
colour. Helm does not distinguish between a dispositionalist notion of objectivity, which 
is the sort that we have bestowed on secondary qualities such as colour, and the sort that 
we have argued pertains to value. Rather, Helm writes that ‘we can accommodate what is 
right about the idea that things have import because we evaluate them as good or bad by 
understanding import to be perspectivally subjective: something’s having import is 
intelligible only in light of a subject’s evaluative perspective. Of course, in contrast to 
secondary qualities, import can be relative to the individual, and is in this way more 
subjective than secondary qualities’ (ibid., 57). The notion of “perspectival subjectivity” is 
then meant to capture both the idea that import is more subjective than the status of 
secondary qualities such as colour and yet is, in some sense to be specified, objective.  
                                                 
35 In what follows, I focus on Helm’s account of the objectivity of value and its relation to 
affective experience. I therefore skip other interesting aspects of Helm’s overall theory, such as 
his notion of “felt evaluations” and their hedonic nature; and the relation between invention and 
discovery in deliberation about value. For more details on the former, see Helm (1994), Helm 
(2002) and Helm (2009); while for more details on the latter, see Helm (1996) and Helm (2000).  
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The notion of an individual’s “evaluative perspective,” then, seems to play a crucial 
role in calibrating subjectivity and objectivity in Helm’s account of import. What kind of 
perspective is this? And how does it calibrate subjectivity and objectivity of import? Helm 
provides us with the following account of perspective. The first thing to note is that ‘[s]uch 
a perspective is constituted not by particular evaluations…but rather by a broader pattern 
in our evaluative attitudes’ (ibid.). The broader pattern of our evaluative attitudes is 
conceived as being constituted by rational interconnections between the emotiona l 
responses in the subject’s perspective. Helm distinguishes between two sorts of rational 
interconnections between emotions: transitional and tonal commitments. Transitiona l 
commitments are the rational interconnections between forward- and backward-looking 
emotions. Forward-looking emotions are emotions characterised by evaluations of present 
or future states of affairs. Examples of future-looking emotions are hope and fear. 
Backward-looking emotions are emotions characterised by evaluations of past states of 
affairs. Examples of backward-looking emotions are regret and relief. The thought is that 
‘forward-looking emotions rationally ought to become the corresponding backward-
looking emotions’ (Helm 2001b, 193). For instance, it is rationally appropriate that if one 
fears about one’s vase being destroyed, one then feels relief when the vase has escaped the 
danger of being destroyed. Or to put it the other way round, it would be rationally 
inappropriate if one feared that one’s vase will be destroyed yet does not feel relief when 
the vase escapes the danger. The second sort of rational interconnection between emotions 
is characterised in terms of tonal commitments. Tonal commitments are the rational 
interconnections between positive and negative emotions. Positive emotions are emotions 
characterised by evaluations of something as good while negative emotions are emotions 
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characterised by evaluations of something as bad. ‘To say that emotions involve tonal 
commitments is to say that if one experiences a positive emotion in response to something 
good that has happened or might happen, then, other things being equal, one rationally 
ought to have experienced the corresponding negative emotion if instead what happened 
(or conspicuously might happen) were something bad; not to experience this emotion 
would be rationally inappropriate’ (ibid., 193-194). For instance, if I feel happy that my 
vase has not been destroyed (positive emotion), then it would be rationally inappropriate if 
I were not to feel distress in the case that my vase would be destroyed (negative emotion). 
Helm then states that the source of the rational commitment of an emotion to other 
emotions is the emotion’s focus, that is, the background object of concern of that emotion. 
For instance, what commits one’s fear that the vase will be destroyed to feel relief in case 
the vase escapes the danger is the background concern for one’s vase. The thought is that 
when emotions have the same focus then they impose on each other certain rational 
commitments. The pattern of commitments between a subject’s emotions is rational 
because it spells out the appropriateness of one’s emotion. A subject’s evaluative 
perspective, then, is constituted by a rational pattern of emotions within which one’s 
particular emotional response can be assessed as appropriate or not.36 
How does import fit in this story? Helm begins with the thought that ‘at least part 
of what it is to have import is to be a worthy object of attention and action: insofar as 
something has import for one, one ought to pay attention to what happens to it and so be 
                                                 
36 The evaluative perspective of a subject is not only constituted by the pattern of one’s emotions 
but also by one’s evaluative judgments. For our purposes, we do not need to go into Helm’s 
account of the relation between our emotional responses and evaluative judgments or indeed in 
how Helm conceives evaluative judgments in the first place. For more details, see Helm 2001b, 
199-205. 
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prepared to act on its behalf when otherwise appropriate’ (ibid., 195). To characterise the 
sort of attention to an object that has import, Helm distinguishes between two sorts of 
vigilance. Active vigilance entails deliberately directing one’s attention to an object. By 
contrast, in passive vigilance one’s attention is ‘naturally drawn’ to an object. According 
to Helm, it is the latter sort of vigilance that characterises the sort of attention towards 
objects having import. Helm then argues that there is ‘a two-way conceptual connection 
between import and the pattern of emotions defined by their mutual commitments to a 
common focus’ (ibid., 195). First, the sort of passive vigilance characterising the attention 
towards something of import is made possible by the commitments in the pattern of our 
emotions. It is partly due to those commitments that we are ‘naturally drawn’ to certain 
objects, that is, to objects with the relevant import. Furthermore, we make sense of an 
object naturally drawing our attention, and therefore having import, in part because our 
patterns are rational: failing to be drawn to an object with import would be inappropriate. 
Hence why we are drawn to it. Import is perspectivally subjective, then, in the sense that 
we make sense of an object having import by means of the rational interconnections and 
commitments in the pattern of the emotions constituting an evaluative perspective. When 
viewed in this way, the pattern of emotions is conceptually prior to import. Yet import is 
also objective. This is the second direction in the conceptual connection between import 
and the pattern of emotions. Import is objective insofar as it is conceived as the standard in 
terms of which we assess the appropriateness of a particular emotional response in the 
overall pattern. An emotion is appropriate when it rationally fits in the overall pattern and 
the pattern is rational because the emotions share a common focus of import. Without a 
common focus of import, we would not be able to make sense of the rationality of the 
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pattern and therefore we would not be able to assess a particular emotional response. Now, 
import is conceived as conceptually prior to the pattern of emotions. The result is that 
neither import nor the pattern of emotions is ultimately prior to the other. Rather, the two 
are constitutively interdependent. Although we have discussed only attention in explaining 
the sense in which import and the pattern of emotions are constitutively interdependent, 
the same applies to action. Part of what it means for an object to have import is that it is 
worthy of being the source of motivation of a subject. We make sense of an object having 
import in terms of a subject’s pattern of motivation towards that object. At the same time 
the appropriateness of a subject’s motivational state is assessed against the import of the 
focus. Again, we have a two-way conceptual connection between import and the pattern of 
one’s motivational states insofar as neither is conceptually prior to the other.  
Notice that Helm’s account of the response-dependent sort of objectivity of value, 
or import, is characterised by the two key features that we have seen characterise Wiggins’ 
conception of value: circularity and relativity. First, it is circular since neither the 
appropriateness of our emotions nor import are conceived as conceptually prior to each 
other. Rather, each is conceived in part as constitutive of the other. Just like in Wiggins’ 
account, Helm’s circular account is neither vicious nor uninformative since it does not 
analyse value in terms of our emotional responses, or in Helm’s terminology, it does not 
bestow conceptual priority on either side of the circle. Second, import is conceived as 
relative insofar as an object having import is relative to a subject’s evaluative perspective, 
that is, the pattern of emotional responses she has towards the object. Yet in the case of 
relativity I believe there is an important difference with Wiggins. In what follows, I want 
to point out where the difference lies and ultimately argue that not only is this a difference 
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that fundamentally distinguishes Helm’s account from the account we committed to above 
but also that it renders Helm’s account problematic in a way that ours is not. 
 Recall the way in which value is relative to our responses in Wiggins’ account. 
Value is relative to our actual tendencies or propensities to respond in certain ways. 
Characterising value as relative to our propensities to respond in certain ways rather than 
to our responses, period, allows for a sufficient leeway to argue for the appropriateness of 
a particular response. Value is not relative to how we respond but rather to how we ought 
to respond. In turn, the source of normativity of our responses is the value of an object. The 
objectivity of value is such as to essentially allow for argumentation as to the 
appropriateness of a particular emotional response. So far, Helm’s account seems to be in 
line with Wiggins’. Yet, in Helm’s account the normativity of our responses is conceived 
as arising from the commitments between our emotional responses. This means that the 
import of an object is relative to the rational pattern of our emotional responses. I believe 
that it is not too farfetched to assume that Helm’s notion of a rational pattern of emotiona l 
responses is meant to do the work of the notion of “propensities” in Wiggins’. Yet the key 
difference is that Helm construes the rationality of the pattern, and therefore the standard 
of the appropriateness of a particular emotional response, as defined by the commitments 
of a single evaluative perspective. That is, the rationality of the pattern is particular to a 
subject and therefore import is relative to a particular pattern of emotional responses. By 
contrast, in Wiggins, value is not relative to the evaluative perspective of a single subject. 
Rather, value is relative to the appropriateness of an emotional response which is assessed 
against the propensities to respond that anyone in a community ought to have. 
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According to Helm, the rationality arising from the commitments between a 
subject’s emotional responses is sufficient to secure a notion of objectivity. But is it? 
Consider the example used by Helm, namely being afraid for one’s precious vase. What it 
means for the vase to have import for me, is for me to be committed to respond emotiona lly 
in certain ways towards it. I feel fear when I have reason to believe that the vase is in danger 
of being destroyed and I feel relief when I have reason to believe that the vase escaped the 
danger. I feel happiness at the thought of my friends appreciating my vase and 
disappointment when my friends do not appreciate it. But if the import of the vase is in part 
constituted by the rationality of the pattern of my emotional responses, then why think that 
the vase itself has import. That is, if the appropriateness of my emotional response towards 
the vase is assessed by the rationality of the pattern, which in part constitutes import, who 
is to say that the pattern is actually rational? We can conceive of a situation in which the 
commitments between our emotional responses are respected yet when seen from someone 
else’s perspective the pattern as a whole is not rational at all. For instance, if one feels joy 
at torturing insects, then one might be committed to feeling sadness at not being able to 
torture insects. Here, the transitional commitment is respected yet we wouldn’t characterise 
the emotional response as rational or appropriate. The incoherence in Helm’s account is 
that it ends up characterising emotional responses that are not rational or appropriate as 
rational or appropriate. 
Of course, Helm might reply that the emotional response is rational for the subject 
whose evaluative perspective we are considering. Yet this brings out the fundamenta l 
problem with Helm’s account. If the value of something is relative to the evaluative 
perspective of an individual, where her evaluative perspective is characterised by the 
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commitments of her pattern, then it seems like we have calibrated wrongly the sort of 
relativity characterising objectivity in a response-dependent account of value. That is, we 
have allowed too much subjectivity in our account to be able to hold on to a genuine notion 
of objectivity. For if the objectivity of import boils down to the commitments between the 
emotional responses constituting an individual’s evaluative perspective, then we have no 
way of adjudicating whether the object of import really does have that import. Recall that 
according to Helm it is the focus of a pattern, that is, its background object of concern, that 
bestows rationality on the pattern. In the example above of my valuing the vase, what 
renders intelligible the commitments characterising my emotional pattern is the 
background object of concern of my valuing the vase. As Helm puts it, ‘emotiona l 
commitments constitute an attunement of one’s sensibilities to the focus of that pattern’ 
(ibid., 195, Helm’s italics). Yet in what sense is the value of the focus objective? What has 
established that? And therefore what sort of “attunement” is at play here? If the objectivity 
is, again, a matter of respecting the commitments between our emotional responses, it 
seems like the value of the vase is entirely up to me to decide. Now, it is not clear that 
Helm’s account of value is distinguishable from the projectivist commitment of what we 
have termed “traditional subjectivism.” I believe this is betrayed when Helm characterises 
the objectivity of value as being more subjective than the objectivity of secondary qualit ies. 
Part of the point of McDowell and Wiggins in drawing the analogy between secondary 
qualities and value is precisely to argue that value is not less objective, or more subjective, 
than secondary qualities. By contrast, in Wiggins’ account we do not fall in the same 
problem because the relativity that characterises value is not to a single evaluative 
perspective and its constitutive pattern but rather to the propensities that anyone in a 
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community ought to have. In arguing whether an emotional response is appropriate or not 
we do not consider solely the evaluative perspective of a single individual but rather we 
argue for the evaluative perspective that anyone should have.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Affect as a Disclosure of Value 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters I formulated the notion that affect is the disclosure of value 
in terms of affect playing an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative 
knowledge. The aim of this final chapter is to specify this role and in so doing clarify the 
commitments of the account of affect given in the previous chapters. This entails specifying 
further the distinction I drew in chapter 4 between knowledge of value and theoretical 
knowledge of value, where theoretical knowledge of value stands for propositiona l 
knowledge of value acquired by testimony in the absence of affective experience. In order 
to do so, I rely on the work of John Campbell, from whom I borrowed the terminology of 
“the explanatory role of experience” and “knowledge of.” Campbell argues for an 
analogous thesis for sensory awareness, that is, he argues that sensory awareness plays an 
essential explanatory role in the acquisition of knowledge of our surroundings. More 
specifically, Campbell’s aim is to argue that sensory awareness plays an essential role in 
grounding both our concepts of mind-independent objects and their qualities and our 
propositional knowledge of objects. My strategy is to reconstruct Campbell’s account in 
defence of the explanatory role of sensory awareness in order to then rely on it when 
specifying the role of affect in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. In so doing I 
specify the notion of “knowledge of value” and its role in grounding evaluative concepts 
and its relation to propositional knowledge.  
Two caveats. First, although Campbell’s aim is to show the role of experience in 
grounding not only the concepts of the qualities of objects but also the concept of objects 
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as mind-independent, I am interested only in the role of experience in grounding concepts 
of the qualities of objects and not in the concept of objects as mind-independent. This is 
important as I will focus on Campbell’s arguments that are designed to show the role of 
experience in grounding concepts of features of objects, such as their shape and, especially, 
colour, while leaving aside Campbell’s arguments specifically designed for the concept of 
objects as mind-independent. Second, Campbell’s overall aim in his set up of the issue of 
the role of experience in grounding our concepts of objects and their features is to argue 
for his relational, or naïve realist, view of experience. As the first part of my thesis shows, 
I am neutral at best and sceptical at worst on whether any of the current dominant theories 
of the phenomenal character of experience are suitable on their own to argue for affect as 
a disclosure of value. Therefore, although I reconstruct Campbell’s argument for naïve 
realism in order to extract his take on the role of experience in grounding our concepts, I 
do not in any way want to support a relational view of experience and indeed I show that I 
can rely on his formulations of the problem of the role of experience in grounding 
knowledge without committing to his overall aim. 
The chapter is divided in three sections. In the first section I discuss Campbell’s 
argument in defence of his Relational View of Experience. In so doing, I extract 
Campbell’s insight into the specific role of sensory experience in the acquisition of 
knowledge. The insight is that phenomenally conscious experience provides the subject 
with the source of justification and rational intelligibility in her deployment of the relevant 
concept. I argue that this insight, embodied in the notion of “knowledge of”, is not tied to 
any of the dominant theories of the phenomenal character of experience. Combined with 
the arguments in the first three chapters of the thesis, this allows me to defend the notion 
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of affect as a disclosure of value without endorsing any of the three dominant theories of 
the phenomenology of experience. In Section 2 I apply the findings from Section 1 on the 
case of affect and value. I argue that in the absence of affective experience, we are unable 
to form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states when deploying evaluative 
concepts. Finally, in Section 3 I draw out the implications of the findings from Section 2 
by considering a variety of thought experiments similar to the case of Goldie’s Irene we 
have looked at in the previous chapters. I argue that the implications indicate that affect 
plays an essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm.  
Section 1 
Campbell’s argument in defence of the naïve realist conception of experience relies 
on the claim that only the naïve realist can account for the principle of ‘the explanatory 
role of experience’ which states that ‘concepts of individual physical objects, and concepts 
of the observable characteristics of such objects, are made available by our experience of 
the world. It is experience of the world that explains our grasp of these concepts’ (Campbell 
2002, 128). The first step of Campbell’s argument, then, is to argue that experience does 
indeed play such a role. Campbell’s argument in defence of the principle of the explanatory 
role of experience begins with a distinction between two ways in which we can conceive 
the property of an object: a dispositional conception and a categorical conception. Here is 
how Campbell formulates the distinction: 
There is a difference between the family of dispositions an object has in virtue of 
having some categorical property, and the underlying categorical property itself.  
On the one hand, there is the collection of dispositions a round object has in virtue 
of being round: a tendency to roll when pushed, if it is made of sufficiently rigid 
material, to leave gaps when stacked together with other things of the same shape, 
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and so on. On the other hand, there is the characteristic of roundness itself, in virtue 
of which the object has all these dispositions. We ordinarily take ourselves to have 
the conception of categorical objects and properties; we do not think only in 
dispositional terms. (Campbell 2005, 103-104) 
Campbell illustrates this distinction and the fact that we are able to have both conceptions 
of a property by asking us to consider what happens when the property of an object is 
changed. For instance, consider what happens when we change the shape of a chair by 
bending its leg. In changing the shape of a chair, we simultaneously alter the object’s 
dispositions. Now, the chair cannot support a person sitting down, or it cannot be stacked 
on top of another chair. According to Campbell, when we think of a case like this one, we 
intuitively, and correctly, tend to think that what we have changed is not primarily a set of 
dispositions of the chair, or even just one disposition, but rather we have changed the 
underlying categorical property of the object, that is, its shape. The change in dispositions 
of the chair is a consequence of our changing its categorical property. Campbell’s point is 
that in our everyday lives we naturally take it as evident that we are confronted with 
categorical objects37 and categorical properties in virtue of which there are a set of 
possibilities of various things happening to these objects and properties when set in 
different conditions. 
Once Campbell has secured the intuition that we are able to, and indeed normally 
do, think of categorical properties as such, he claims that ‘[i]t is experience itself that makes 
                                                 
37 The notion of a “categorical object” is important for Campbell in his argument to the effect that 
sensory awareness plays an essential role in our grasp of objects as mind-independent. 
Campbell’s the thought is that in sensory experience we do not encounter objects as bundles of 
properties but as the bases instantiating properties. Since I am focusing on Campbell’s treatment 
of our experience of properties and the way in which experience grounds our conception of these 
properties, I leave aside any further discussion on the plausibility of the notion of “categorical 
objects.”   
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it compelling that we encounter the categorical; and only an appeal to experience will 
explain how it is that we can think in terms of the categorical at all’ (ibid., 107). There are 
two points Campbell is making here. First, and explicitly, it is only in virtue of experiencing 
a property that we encounter it categorically and are therefore able to think of it 
categorically. Secondly, and implicitly, what Campbell is also saying here is that no 
amount of knowledge of the dispositions that a property has can provide us with the 
categorical conception of the property. Only an experience of the property can do so. For 
instance, recall Goldie’s example of the colour-blind person that relies on a trustworthy 
companion to select red objects. In this case, one of the dispositions of red objects is to 
dispose the trustworthy companion to signal the colour-blind person to select red objects. 
Now suppose that the colour-blind person learns many more dispositions of red objects 
that allow her to select red objects in ever subtler ways. Campbell’s intuitive point here is 
that no matter how vast the set of known dispositions of the colour red the colour-blind 
person is in possession of, she cannot have a categorical conception of the colour red 
because she has never experienced it. It is only experience that can provide the colour blind 
person with the categorical conception of what the colour red is. 
At this stage, according to Campbell, we have a stable enough foundation to argue 
for naïve realism. For once we agree that we are able to acquire a conception of a 
categorical property as such, and that only experience can provide us with such a 
conception of a property insofar as it is in experience that we encounter the actual property 
itself rather than merely its dispositions, then the question turns to what conception of 
experience we need in order to be able to make sense of this. According to Campbell, only 
a naïve realist conception of experience can do so. Recall that according to a naïve realist 
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conception of experience, the phenomenal character of conscious experience is partly 
constituted by the object of experience itself and its qualities. Campbell’s argument is that 
the naïve realist can capture the idea that the phenomenal character of experience plays an 
essential role in providing us with the categorical conception of properties precisely 
because it conceives the phenomenal character as being in part constituted by objects and 
their categorical properties. By contrast, according to Campbell, alternative accounts of 
experience, namely qualia theories and representationalism, are unable to do so. We have 
encountered the arguments as to why qualia theory and representationalism are unable to 
do so in Chapters 1 and 2, respectively. Recall that according to the qualia theorist the 
phenomenal character of conscious experience is constituted by intrinsic, non-intentiona l 
properties of experience that are caused by the object of experience. If so, then the only 
conception of the property of the object of experience that we can acquire through 
experience is a dispositional one, that is, the property’s disposition of causing a particular 
kind of intrinsic, non-intentional property of experience. According to representationalism, 
the phenomenal character of experience is determined by the representational properties of 
the experience. The representational properties of the experience are the properties the 
experience has in virtue of its representational content and the intentional attitude taken 
towards it. The reason why, according to Campbell, representationalism is unable to 
account for the fact that the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in 
the acquisition of the categorical conception of a property is that the notion of 
representational content is insufficient to capture the phenomenal character of experience. 
That is, it is unclear why the possession of a representational content should suffice to make 
a mental state phenomenally conscious. If, then, our access to properties is by means of 
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representational content, then the phenomenal character of experience does not play a 
necessary role in the epistemic access to the properties in question. And if so, then, 
analogously to the qualia theorist, all that experience can provide us with is a non-
categorical, dispositional conception of the property. Campbell concludes that neither the 
qualia theorist nor the representationalist is able to account for the fact that experience 
acquaints us with the actual property itself and therefore neither is able to account for the 
fact that through experience we acquire the categorical conception of a property.    
For our purposes, we do not need to agree with Campbell’s’ argument to the effect 
that the naïve realist conception of sensory experience is able to capture the thought that 
the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in our epistemic access to 
the categorical base of properties, and therefore in providing us with the concept of 
properties as categorical bases. Neither do we have to agree with the claim that it is the 
only conception of experience that is able to do so. What is important here is to appreciate 
the claim, to which Campbell commits, that sensory experience provides us with a 
distinctive epistemic access to properties. It is here that we encounter the notion of 
“knowledge of.” Campbell introduces the notion of knowledge of by distinguishing it from 
propositional knowledge. It is worth quoting Campbell at length:  
[First] There is your knowledge of how things are around you: knowing that the 
book is on the table, that the tree is full of birds’ nests, and so on. Second, and 
more basically, there is knowledge of which things and properties are to be found 
in your surroundings. For example, consider knowledge of colour. I don’t just 
mean that there is such a phenomenon as colour, but knowledge of which property 
scarlet is, for example. We usually find it compelling that this knowledge can be 
provided by experience of the colours. A capacity for correct, blind-sight guessing 
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as to the colours of things would not be enough for knowledge of what the colours 
are; you wouldn’t know what scarlet is, in the absence of experience of it. Or again, 
we take it that to know which particular thing someone is trying to draw your 
attention to, you have to experience the thing; a mere capacity for blindsight-style 
guessing, a mere hunch that someone is there, isn’t enough. This kind of 
knowledge is, on the face of it, not a matter of knowing that things are thus and so. 
It seems a precondition of knowing that things are thus and so. To know that the 
apple is red, for example, you have to know what an apple is, and you have to 
know what redness is. (Campbell 2014, 77).    
The first sort of knowledge distinguished by Campbell is propositional knowledge that can 
be acquired by testimony in the absence of experience. The second sort of knowledge is 
what I have called “knowledge of.” There are two distinct claims that we should extract 
from the above regarding the distinction between knowledge of and propositiona l 
knowledge. First, knowledge of a property, say of the colour scarlet, can only be acquired 
in virtue of having an experience of scarlet. This claim goes hand in hand with the claim 
that it is only in virtue of experience, and therefore acquiring knowledge of scarlet, that we 
acquire the categorical conception of scarlet. Experience is what grants us the epistemic 
access to i.e. knowledge of, the categorical property of scarlet and is therefore what grounds 
our categorical concept of scarlet. By contrast, propositional knowledge acquired by 
testimony in the absence of experience is not the sort of knowledge that grants us epistemic 
access to what a colour like scarlet is. Second, Campbell claims that knowledge of is ‘more 
basic’ than propositional knowledge. This second claim is then explicated in terms of 
knowledge of being a ‘precondition’ of propositional knowledge: in order to know that the 
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apple is red you need to know what an apple is, that is, you need to have knowledge of an 
apple, and you need to know what red is, that is, you need to have knowledge of red.  
 Two points need elaboration in order to clarify the notion of knowledge of and the 
role it plays in relation to concepts. First, I said above that for our purposes we do not need 
to commit to any of the dominant theories of the phenomenal character of experience. Yet 
I want to commit to the idea that there is a distinctive sort of knowledge of properties, 
namely knowledge of, that can be had solely by subjects that can enjoy a phenomena lly 
conscious experience. This sort of knowledge grounds concepts of those properties that can 
be acquired only in virtue of having a phenomenally conscious experience of the property. 
Call such concepts phenomenal concepts of properties. What needs to be appreciated is 
that a commitment to the notion that the phenomenal character of experience plays an 
essential role in the acquisition of phenomenal concepts of properties, or in other words, a 
commitment to the notion of knowledge of, does not entail a commitment to any particular 
theory of the phenomenal character of experience. Although so far we have looked at the 
notion of knowledge of as embedded in Campbell’s naïve realism, it seems as the naïve 
realist is not alone in being able to capture the thought that in the absence of a 
phenomenally conscious experience of a property we are not able to acquire a distinct ive 
way of thinking about that property, that is, a phenomenal concept of the relevant 
property.38 Consider the qualia theorist. According to a qualia theorist, in having a 
phenomenally conscious experience of an object as red, we are phenomenally acquainted 
with an intrinsic feature of experience that we associate with the colour red. We gain the 
phenomenal concept of redness in virtue of becoming acquainted with the sort of quale that 
                                                 
38 In this paragraph I rely on Soteriou 2016, 105-106. 
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we associate with redness. Since, according to the qualia theorist, it is only in having a 
phenomenally conscious experience that we are able to gain epistemic access to the quale 
that we associate with redness, it follows that the phenomenal character of experience plays 
an essential role in the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of redness. So the qualia 
theorist and the naïve realist agree that Mary lacks something epistemically. The point of 
their disagreement lies in what the naïve realist and the qualia theorist take to be the item 
that the phenomenal character of experience acquaints us with. In the case of the former, it 
is a property of the object of experience while in the case of the latter it is a property of the 
experience. Again, the crucial point to be extracted here is not whether the qualia theorist’s 
argument is a threat to naïve realism, or whether it is even a viable option. Rather, the point 
is that the qualia theorist just as much as the naïve realist, can employ the notion of 
knowledge of, that is, of a distinctive sort of knowledge provided exclusively by the 
phenomenal character of experience that puts us in a presentational relation with a property. 
Knowledge of, then, is neither a notion peculiar to the naïve realist nor to the qualia theorist, 
nor to any theorist of the phenomenal character of experience. Knowledge of denotes the 
distinctive epistemic access to a property that is provided exclusively by a phenomena lly 
conscious experience that grounds a distinctive conception of the relevant property.39  
 Second, and most importantly, we need to clarify the sense in which knowledge of 
is a precondition of propositional knowledge. For consider the following worry. Someone 
might say that we can understand perfectly well the proposition that the apple is red, and 
have propositional knowledge that the apple is red, without ever having encountered an 
                                                 
39 The claim that knowledge of is not a notion peculiar to any theory of the phenomenal character 
of experience does not entail the claim that therefore any theory of phenomenal character is able 
to accommodate it. All I argued for here is that I need not commit to a particular theory of 
phenomenal character in order to employ the notion of knowledge of. 
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apple or the colour red. For instance, Goldie’s colour-blind person can know that the apple 
is red simply by testimony and in the absence of the experience of the colour red. And 
Jackson’s Mary can know that certain objects are red in virtue of their physical properties 
without ever having encountered a red object. That is, the colour-blind person and Mary 
can know that the apple, or any other object, is red without acquiring knowledge of red or 
knowledge of the relevant object. So in what sense is knowledge of a precondition of 
propositional knowledge? 
 The answer to this worry takes us to the heart of the matter regarding the role played 
by phenomenally conscious experience and knowledge of in the deployment of concepts. 
So far we have agreed with Campbell that the experiential encounter with the observable 
properties of objects, such as colour and shape, provides us with a distinctive sort of 
epistemic access to the relevant properties. We have termed this distinctive sort of 
epistemic access “knowledge of.” Let us elaborate further on what knowledge of affords us 
with. In acquiring knowledge of a property, we acquire knowledge of the semantic value 
of the concept of the relevant property. That is, we acquire knowledge of the thing to which 
the concept refers. For instance, in having an experience of a red object, we learn what the 
concept “red” refers to. Crucially, knowing the semantic value of the concept “red” is the 
source of justification for our deployment of the concept “red.” It is our knowledge of what 
the concept “red” refers to that affords us with the justification of our deploying the concept 
“red.” When we encounter a red object and we apply the concept “red” to the object, we 
are justified in doing so because we have knowledge of what the concept “red” refers to. 
Since it is in virtue of having a phenomenally conscious experience that we acquire the 
knowledge of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant property, experience plays 
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an essential role in acquiring the source of justification at play in the deployment of the 
relevant concept.  
Notice that the sort of justification at stake here is not the sort at play in the 
justification of our beliefs. When we try to justify our beliefs, we employ higher order 
reflective faculties. For instance, in trying to justify the belief that there is a pig in the 
surroundings, I might reflect on various bits of evidence that lead me to conclude that there 
is a pig in the surroundings. By contrast, the sort of justification at play when I deploy the 
concept “red” in seeing a red object does not involve the sort of higher order reflective 
faculties needed in justifying my beliefs. Rather, what is involved is the knowledge of what 
the concept refers to. In this sense, the sort of justification with which we are dealing in the 
deployment of concepts is more basic than the sort of justification we deal with in the 
formation of our beliefs. From now on, then, it is important to keep in mind that the sort of 
justification we are dealing with is of the more basic sort. Notice also that the knowledge 
of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant property not only justifies but also 
causes the deployment of the concept. In seeing a red object, I deploy the concept “red” 
because I know what the concept “red” refers to. Here, the “because” entails both causation 
and justification.  
What knowledge of provides us with, then, is a fundamental sort of competence in 
our deployment of the relevant concept. This fundamental sort of competence is 
characterised by a rational intelligibility in the deployment of the relevant concept. In 
seeing a red object, it is readily and rationally intelligible to us why we deploy the concept 
“red.” The source of the rational intelligibility in the deployment of the concept “red” 
derives from our knowing what the semantic value of the concept red is, that is, from 
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knowing what the concept refers to. That is, it is the sort of justification mentioned above 
that renders rationally intelligible our deployment of the concept. This sort of justificat ion, 
we said, is not one that involves higher order reflective faculties. It is therefore from the 
theorist’s perspective that we can trace the source of the rational intelligibility in the 
deployment of the concept to that of justification. In other words, in order for the 
deployment of the concept to be rationally intelligible from the subject’s perspective, there 
is no need to involve higher order reflective faculties. Now, since it is in virtue of acquiring 
knowledge of a property that we learn what the concept of the property refers to, and 
therefore we acquire the source of justification for the concept’s deployment, it is in virtue 
of having acquired knowledge of the relevant property that the deployment of the relevant 
concept is rationally intelligible to us. In turn, since we acquire knowledge of in virtue of 
having a phenomenally conscious experience of the relevant property, experience plays an 
essential role in rendering our deployment of the relevant concept rationally intelligible. 
Now take the case of Jackson’s Mary. Mary is able to acquire propositiona l 
knowledge regarding the colour red without having ever had an experience of a red object. 
This means that Mary is able to employ the concept “red” without having knowledge of 
the relevant property. The key point here is not whether or not Mary is able to employ the 
concept “red” since we have assumed that she is. Rather, the point is that Mary’s 
understanding of the concept of the colour red is deferential. That is, the concept Mary uses 
to refer to redness has the content it has for someone else. In Mary’s case, it might be of 
whoever is providing her with the propositional knowledge of the colour red. What this 
means is that Mary’s justification for her deployment of the concept “red” depends on the 
person to whom she defers her understanding. Assuming that the person to whom Mary 
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defers her understanding of the concept “red” has knowledge of the relevant property, and 
therefore has knowledge of the semantic value of the concept “red,” Mary’s justifica t ion 
for her deployment of the concept “red” depends on that person’s knowledge of the relevant 
property. This means also that the rational intelligibility of Mary’s deployment of the 
concept “red” depends on the subject who has knowledge of the relevant property. In other 
words, although Mary is able to employ the concept “red” and acquire propositiona l 
knowledge by testimony about the colour red, she does not possess an independent source 
of justification for the deployment of the concept since she lacks knowledge of the relevant 
property. Since we acquire knowledge of by having an experiential encounter with the 
relevant property, it is only by having an experience of the relevant property that we acquire 
an independent source of justification and intelligibility for the deployment of the relevant 
concept. 
The answer to the worry above, then, is the following. The worry gets it right that 
Mary is able to employ the concept “red” and acquire propositional knowledge of the 
property of redness by testimony and in the absence of an experiential encounter with the 
relevant property. Yet this in no way undermines the claim that knowledge of is a 
precondition of propositional knowledge. This is because Mary’s ability in using, and 
justification for her use of, the concept “red” depends ultimately on the justification that is 
acquired by knowledge of redness that is possessed by the person that provides her with 
the propositional knowledge regarding redness. Knowledge of is a precondition of 
propositional knowledge in the sense of being the ultimate source of justification in the 
deployment of the relevant concept. Since we acquire knowledge of the relevant property 
solely by means of having an experience of the property insofar as it is in virtue of 
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experience that we acquire knowledge of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant 
property, experience plays an essential and fundamental justificatory role in the 
deployment of our concepts.  
Section 2 
 I now want to employ the discussion of Campbell’s notion of the role of experience 
in grounding our concepts of features of objects to specify the claim that affect plays an 
essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge, that is, that affect is 
a disclosure of value.   
In chapter 4 I provided a preliminary contrast between knowledge of value and 
theoretical knowledge of value, where theoretical knowledge of value is propositiona l 
knowledge of value acquired by testimony in the absence of affective experience. There I 
pointed out two points of contrast. The first and most obvious is that theoretical knowledge 
of value is acquired in the absence of any affective experience while knowledge of value 
can be acquired solely by means of an affective response to an object. The thought here is 
that no matter the amount of theoretical knowledge of value, one cannot acquire knowledge 
of value in the absence of affective experience. This point draws on the analogy between 
sensory and affective experience. Just as in the case of affect and value, we gain knowledge 
of a sensory property such as colour solely in virtue of a sensory encounter with the relevant 
property and no amount of theoretical knowledge can provide us with knowledge of the 
relevant property. By contrast, the second point draws on the disanalogy between sensory 
and affective experience. That is, the affective encounter with value entails the formation 
of motivational states while the sensory encounter with a sensory property such as colour 
does not. Insofar as the acquisition of theoretical knowledge of value does not entail an 
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affective experience, it does not involve the formation of motivational states while insofar 
as the acquisition of knowledge of value does entail an affective experience, it entails the 
formation of motivational states. 
In what follows I want to show the importance of acquiring knowledge of value by 
means of affective experience by replying to a potential objection against the idea that 
affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. This objection has 
been lurking in the background throughout the previous and present chapters and it is 
similar to the objection we considered in the previous section to the effect that knowledge 
of is a precondition of propositional knowledge. The objection is the following. The 
objector begins by conceding, for the sake of argument, that knowledge of value is not 
reducible to theoretical knowledge of value and that therefore we cannot acquire the former 
from the latter. Yet, the objector might ask, why should we think that someone who, 
hypothetically, would be unable to have affective experiential responses to her 
surroundings is therefore unable to grasp or understand the value of an object? If the fact, 
if it is a fact, that we cannot acquire knowledge of value from theoretical knowledge of 
value does not entail that we cannot acquire propositional knowledge of value by testimony 
and in the absence of affective experience, then why shouldn’t we be able to apply 
evaluative predicates, even correctly at times, without necessarily undergoing experiences 
of an affective kind, indeed, without being able to undergo such experiences at all? If this 
is the case, that is, if we can after all acquire theoretical knowledge of value without 
knowledge of value and therefore acquire the ability to apply evaluative concepts without 
the need to be able to have affective experiences, then why should we think that affective 
experience is so important, indeed essential, in the navigation of the evaluative realm?  
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The answer to this objection combines the findings from our discussion in the 
previous section with the analogy and disanalogy between sensory and affective 
experience. Let’s begin with what is analogous between the two sorts of experiences. As 
we have seen, just as in the case of sensory experience, in the case of affective experience 
the acquisition of knowledge of the relevant property can occur solely through an 
experiential encounter with the property. In the previous section we argued that by 
acquiring knowledge of the relevant property we acquire epistemic access to the semantic 
value of the concept of the relevant property, that is, we acquire knowledge of what the 
concept refers to. In turn, knowledge of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant 
property is the source of justification (and causation) in our deployment of the relevant 
concept. Knowing what the concept refers to makes it readily and rationally intelligible to 
us why we deploy the relevant concept. Since knowledge of is acquired solely in virtue of 
having an experiential encounter with the relevant property, experience plays an essential 
role in the acquisition of the source of justification of the deployment of concepts of 
features of objects. As we have also seen, this does not entail that a subject who acquires 
propositional knowledge by testimony and in the absence of an experiential encounter with 
the relevant property, and who is therefore not in possession of knowledge of the relevant 
property, is not able to understand and employ the concept of the property, that is, is not 
able to apply the predicate in a correct way. Rather, what this entails is that this subject has 
a deferential understanding of the concept, that is, his understanding of the concept depends 
on the understanding of whoever provides the subject with the propositional knowledge. 
In turn, this means that the subject’s justification for her deployment of the concept depends 
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on the justification of the person to whom she defers. It is in this sense, we said, that 
knowledge of is a precondition of propositional knowledge.  
This is brought over to the case of affective experience. In having an affective 
experience, we acquire knowledge of the semantic value of the relevant evaluative concept, 
that is, we acquire knowledge of what the evaluative concept refers to. In acquiring such 
knowledge, we acquire an independent source of justification for the deployment of the 
relevant evaluative concept. In having had the relevant affective experience, it becomes 
readily and rationally intelligible to us why we deploy an evaluative concept. Again, this 
does not entail that someone who acquires propositional knowledge of value by testimony 
and in the absence of affective experience cannot deploy the relevant evaluative concept. 
Rather, it means that her justification for doing so depends on the justification of the person 
to whom she defers her understanding of the relevant evaluative concept. And the same is 
the case for her intelligibility in deploying the relevant evaluative concept. Her 
intelligibility depends on the justification of the person to whom she defers. To illustrate. 
When Goldie’s Irene learns everything there is to know about danger by testimony and in 
the absence of having felt fear, she is able to apply the concept of danger to objects and 
situations in her environment. Yet the justification for her deployment of the concept of 
danger depends on the person from whom she acquired propositional knowledge of danger. 
Once Irene slips on ice and feels fear for the first time, she acquires knowledge of danger, 
that is, she acquires knowledge of what the concept of danger refers to. Now, Irene’s 
justification for, and intelligibility in, deploying the concept of danger is not dependent on 
anyone. That is because she now knows what danger is. 
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 So far, the objector can agree with us and yet still be sceptical of the importance of 
affective experience in our evaluative relation with the world. After all, before having ever 
felt fear, Irene was nevertheless able to apply the evaluative predicate “dangerous” 
correctly to objects and situations in her environment. This is where the disanalogy with 
sensory experience becomes crucial. The disanalogy consists in the fact that having an 
affective experience entails the formation of motivational states while having a sensory 
experience does not. This means that, in contrast to the case of sensory experience, 
acquiring knowledge of the semantic value of an evaluative concept, or in other words, 
acquiring knowledge of what the evaluative concept refers to, or in still other words, 
acquiring knowledge of an evaluative property, entails the formation of motivational states. 
So in contrast to the case of sensory experience, when a subject learns how to apply an 
evaluative predicate without having experienced the relevant affect, and therefore by 
means of a deferential understanding of the relevant evaluative concept, her competence in 
the deployment of the evaluative concept does not entail the formation of the relevant 
motivational state. The subject might very well be able to apply the relevant evaluative 
predicate but she does so without being motivated in the same way as the subject who 
learns how to apply the evaluative predicate by means of an affective experience. So while 
in the case of sensory experience the lack of an experiential encounter with the relevant 
sensory property might not seem to be a pressing issue once it comes to the ability to apply 
the relevant concept, in the case of affective experience it becomes a pressing issue in the 
sense that acquiring propositional knowledge of value by testimony and in the absence of 
affect does not entail the formation of the relevant motivational state. In other words, the 
subject who acquires evaluative knowledge solely by means of testimony and in the 
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absence of motivational states is missing a crucial component of our evaluative relation 
with the world: its practical dimension. The reason why affective experience plays an 
essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm, then, is that acquiring knowledge 
of value by means of an affective experience involves forming the relevant motivationa l 
states, that is, it means gaining access to the practical domain of the evaluative realm. An 
inability to have affective experiences entails a motivational blindness when navigating the 
evaluative realm. 
Let us be more specific about what exactly the subject who acquires knowledge of 
value in the absence of affect is missing and how this is relevant to our evaluative relation 
with the world. Since knowledge of the relevant property is the source of justification (and 
causation) in the deployment of the relevant concept, and since affect entails the formation 
of the relevant motivational state, in having an affective experience one gains the source 
of justification (and causation) not only for the deployment of the relevant evaluative 
concept but also for the formation of the relevant motivational state. That is why, together 
with Johnston, we have repeatedly claimed that affective experience renders readily and 
rationally intelligible the formation of our motivational states in addition to the formation 
of our evaluative judgements. Now, acquiring propositional knowledge of value by 
testimony and in the absence of an affective experience does not entail the formation of 
motivational states. In acquiring evaluative knowledge in the absence of affect, then, one 
does not acquire what renders readily and rationally intelligible the formation of the 
relevant motivational state. This means that one’s competence in deploying the relevant 
evaluative concept does not involve forming readily and rationally intelligible motivationa l 
states.  
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Let me illustrate. When Mary learns all there is to know about the physical 
properties of the colour red by testimony and in the absence of an experiential encounter 
with the relevant property, she is able to apply the concept of redness. The fact that she is 
missing knowledge of the relevant property does not seem to be a pressing issue insofar as 
she is nevertheless able to discriminate red objects. When it comes to Irene, though, her 
lacking knowledge of danger doesn’t simply mean that her understanding of the concept of 
danger is deferential and is therefore anyways able to discriminate dangerous objects. What 
it means is that in applying the concept of danger, that is, when Irene is confronted with 
what she deems to be a dangerous situation, she does not automatically form readily and 
rationally intelligible motivational states. It is therefore essential to Irene that she feels fear 
towards an object if she wants to be able to automatically form readily and rationally 
intelligible motivational states when deploying the concept of danger.   
Let us consider two possible ways in which the objector can reply and in doing so 
clarify further still our claim. First, the objector might reply that we have proved too much. 
For now, it seems as if we are committing to a picture of our dealings within the evaluative 
realm where the deployment of an evaluative concept necessarily entails the formation of 
the relevant motivational state. But surely forming a motivational state is not a necessary 
condition in deploying an evaluative concept even in the case that we have knowledge of 
the relevant value. In response, we agree with the objector that we do not need to form the 
relevant motivational state every time we deploy the relevant evaluative concept. That is, 
we do not need to undergo the relevant affective experience every time we deploy the 
relevant evaluative concept. For instance, after having felt fear for the first time towards 
the danger of ice, Irene need not feel fear each time she deploys the concept of danger. But 
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this is not a commitment of ours. Our claim is that if Irene is to be able to form readily and 
rationally intelligible motivational states in her deployment of the evaluative concept of 
danger, then she must have felt fear before. In no way does this entail that therefore it is 
necessary that she feel fear every time she deploys the evaluative concept of danger. 
Compare with deploying the phenomenal concept of the colour red. Mary’s deployment of 
the phenomenal concept of “redness” is readily and rationally intelligible to her insofar as 
she visually experienced the colour red. In no way does this this entail that she needs to 
visually experience the colour red every time she deploys the concept of “redness.” 
Second, the objector can point out that we have committed to a picture where unless 
we have acquired knowledge of value by means of an affective experience, then we are 
unable to form the relevant motivational states. But surely in learning what a value is by 
testimony and in the absence of affective experience, we also learn the sort of motivationa l 
states that are characteristically associated with the deployment of the relevant evaluative 
concept. For instance, suppose that in learning what danger is before having ever felt fear, 
Irene also learns that when one is confronted with a dangerous object, one ought to flee. It 
might then be thought that even though Irene never felt fear before, when she encounters 
an object she deems dangerous, she knows that she ought to flee and consequently forms 
the relevant motivational state. This might be thought to be in part what is involved in the 
deferential use of an evaluative concept. Therefore, the objector continues, in deploying an 
evaluative concept we can form the relevant motivational state without necessarily having 
acquired evaluative knowledge by means of affective experience. Furthermore, the 
objector might add, the formation of the relevant motivational state is rationally intelligib le 
to the subject since she knows that one ought to flee when deploying the concept of danger. 
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The fact that her source of justification is dependent on the person to whom she defers her 
use of the concept of danger does not mean that the formation of the relevant motivationa l 
state cannot be rationally intelligible to her.  
 It is certainly possible to conceive Irene learning by testimony and in the absence 
of affect the sort of motivational states that normally characterise one’s deployment of the 
concept of danger in feeling fear and then forming these motivational states on the basis of 
her propositional knowledge. Yet it is not clear that the formation of the relevant 
motivational state would be readily and rationally intelligible to her. In acquiring 
knowledge about danger by testimony and in the absence of affect, Irene’s intelligibility in 
the deployment of the concept of danger and in the formation of the relevant motivationa l 
state is dependent on the justification of the person to whom she defers her use of the 
concept of danger. While her deployment of the concept of danger might be rationally 
intelligible to her even though her use of the concept is deferential, it seems that the 
consequent formation of the relevant motivational state would need the employment of 
higher order, inferential faculties to become intelligible. The crucial point is that in this 
case Irene’s deployment of the concept of danger would not be constituted by the formation 
of a readily and rationally intelligible motivational state. In confronting a dangerous object, 
Irene might be able to deploy the concept of danger and then form the relevant motivationa l 
state yet the latter would not be constitutive of the former. So our claim above is not that if 
one acquires evaluative knowledge in the absence of affective experience then it is 
inconceivable that in deploying the relevant evaluative concept one also forms the relevant 
motivational state. Rather, our claim is that in the absence of acquiring evaluative 
knowledge by means of affective experience, the deployment of the relevant evaluative 
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concept cannot be in part constituted by the formation of a readily and rationally intelligib le 
motivational state. 
We have now clarified our claim: if one is to be able to form readily and rationally 
intelligible motivational states in the deployment of an evaluative concept, then one has to 
acquire evaluative knowledge by means of affective experience. Put the other way round, 
in the absence of affective experience, one is unable to automatically form readily and 
rationally intelligible motivational states when deploying an evaluative concept. Yet our 
persistent objector can still wonder why affect is essential in the navigation of the 
evaluative realm. After all, again, although a subject who acquires evaluative knowledge 
by testimony and in the absence of affective experience might not be able to form 
automatically rationally intelligible motivational states, she might be able to form them in 
a different way, for instance by relying on her propositional knowledge of the relevant 
value and inferring from her evaluative judgement the sort of motivational state she ought 
to form. According to the objector, this would suffice to ensure that a subject who does not 
possess the ability to feel emotions is able to judge evaluatively an object and potentially 
act accordingly towards it. In order to answer conclusively the objector, we need to look at 
what is missing in a subject who lacks the ability not only to feel one particular sort of 
emotion, say, fear, but who is unable to undergo any sort of emotional affect. In other 
words, in order to draw out the full implications of the findings of this section, we need to 
ask what would happen if a subject, or indeed all the subjects of a community, would be 
unable to form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states when deploying any 
evaluative concept. The aim of the next section is to answer conclusively the objector by 
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answering this question and in so doing show that, and how, affect plays an essential role 
in the navigation of the evaluative realm. 
Section 3 
 Let us begin with the hypothetical case of an individual subject who lacks the ability 
to feel any sort of emotion. Call her Jane. Jane differs from Irene in that while Irene never 
felt fear before but, supposedly, has felt other emotions such as joy, sadness, indignation, 
and so on, Jane never felt any sort of emotion. Nevertheless, Jane lives in a community 
where the other members are able to feel emotions. Jane learns all there is to know about 
value by testimony and in the absence of affective experience. This includes what sorts of 
motivational states one ought to have when deploying the relevant evaluative concept. For 
instance, Jane is able to discriminate dangerous objects from innocuous ones, unjust deeds 
from just ones, sad events from joyful ones, and so on. Jane also knows that, normally, one 
ought to flee a dangerous object, be repelled by unjust deeds, and wish to avoid sad events. 
Moreover, Jane is able by means of inference to form the relevant motivational state when 
deploying an evaluative concept. Jane’s justification for deploying an evaluative concept 
and forming the relevant motivational state depends on the members of her community to 
whom she defers her understanding of value. This means that when Jane forms the relevant 
motivational state, her rational intelligibility in doing so derives from her deferential use 
of the relevant evaluative concept. What Jane is unable to do is to automatically form 
rationally intelligible motivational states when judging an object or situation to have value. 
Her deployment of the relevant evaluative concept is not in part constituted by the 
formation of the relevant motivational state.  
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Now, it is conceivable, for the sake of argument, that Jane would be able to coexist 
more or less in an undisrupted way with the other members of the community. She can 
judge with others what is dangerous or innocuous, unjust or just, sad or joyful, and she can 
form similar motivational states to her peers. The difference lies in the fact that Jane has to 
rely exclusively on her peers’ testimony to know what sort of motivational states she ought 
to have. Her learning about value does not entail the formation of readily and rationally 
intelligible motivational states and therefore Jane’s deployment of an evaluative concept 
does not entail the formation of such states. So although Jane is able to coexist with her 
peers within the community, it seems as she lacks a fundamental aspect of our evaluative 
relation with the world and others, an aspect her peers possess, namely an independent 
source of justification for the formation of motivational states. This means that unless one 
of her peers informs her that, normally, one ought to flee when judging an object as 
dangerous, then Jane will not flee when confronted with an object deemed dangerous. And 
unless one of Jane’s peers informs her that she ought to be repelled by unjust deeds and 
attracted to just ones, Jane will not be repelled by injustice and attracted to justice. And 
unless one of Jane’s peers informs her that, normally, one ought to be attracted to, and wish 
for, joyful events, Jane will not be attracted to and wish for joyful events. Without the help 
of her peers, Jane is motivationally blind. It now appears as if Jane’s inability to feel 
emotions -and therefore form rationally intelligible motivational states in the deployment 
of the relevant evaluative concept- is not a mere deficiency that can be replaced by some 
sort of associative learning technique between value and the relevant motivational state. 
No matter how good Jane becomes in her associative technique, she will not become 
motivationally sighted when it comes to the motivational aspect of the values that she has 
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not learnt about with the help of others. It is only by becoming able to feel emotions that 
Jane would become motivationally sighted independently of others. Therefore, although 
Jane might be able to form the same evaluative judgements and (consequent) motivationa l 
states as her peers, ultimately without the help of the other members of the community Jane 
would not be able to form the relevant motivational states. Jane lacks knowledge of value. 
So what would happen if all other members of the community were unable to feel 
emotions? Let us distinguish between two case scenarios. In the first case scenario, the 
members of a community have been struck by a tragic curse. Although they were able to 
feel all the sort of emotions that humans normally feel within a lifespan, they have now 
suddenly lost this ability for all emotions. Suppose also that the curse struck all the future 
offspring of the members of the community. At the time the curse strikes, the members of 
this community, then, possess knowledge of what value is, knowledge that they have, in 
one way or another, acquired by means of a mix of affective experience and theoretical 
knowledge, as in any normal human development. The present members of the community 
are then able to recall what it felt like to be afraid, joyful, sad, and so on, and know which 
motivational states they ought to form in response to the deployment of the relevant 
evaluative concept. They then are able to pass this knowledge onto the next generations. 
Would the community’s navigation within the evaluative realm remain the same as before 
the curse? Due to the absence of the motivational aspect of our experience of value, it is 
not farfetched to suppose that the present members of this community, let alone the future 
generations, would, bit by bit, start losing sight of why things matter. That is, they would 
lose sight of why it matters to flee a dangerous object, why it matters to be repelled by 
unjust deeds, why it matters to wish for joyful times. Since the members of this community, 
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in contrast to Jane, have no one to rely on to remind them why one ought to form a certain 
motivational state when deploying the relevant evaluative concept, then although they 
would still be able to apply evaluative predicates, they would stop caring in the relevant 
way about the objects they judge. Bit by bit, the practical dimension of the evaluative realm 
would start disappearing. Ultimately, by losing the ability to form rationally intelligib le 
motivational states in the deployment of evaluative concepts, the community loses contact 
with the evaluative realm as we humans know it. 
 In the second case scenario, the members of the community never felt emotions and 
are unable to do so. Based on what we have argued so far, no one in this community would 
be able to form the motivational state relevant to the evaluative concept being deployed. 
But, in contrast to the first case scenario, this would not leave us with a community where, 
at least at first, its members would be able to deploy evaluative concepts but would lack 
the interest in doing so. Rather, here, the members of the community would not only not 
possess the ability to deploy evaluative concepts but, more importantly, would be unable 
to generate them in the first place. That is because a subject who is unable to feel emotions 
is unable to form rational motivational states independently from the help of others 
providing her with a deferential use of evaluative concepts. And since the members of this 
community cannot rely on anyone else providing them with the deferential use of 
evaluative concepts, insofar as no one can feel emotions, then it seems as the members of 
this community would not form evaluative concepts of the relevant sort at all. In lacking 
the ability to form rational motivational states in response to objects in their environment, 
and in being surrounded exclusively by people with the same deficiency, the members of 
the community would have no resources from which to generate evaluative concepts. This 
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ties in with Wiggins’ speculative account of evaluative concept formation we have 
discussed in the previous chapter. Our conception of value is generated by an 
intersubjective effort in arguing the appropriateness of our affective-cum-motivationa l 
responses. If no member of a community is capable of having affective-cum-motivationa l 
responses, that is, forming readily and rationally intelligible motivational states, then the 
community as a whole is unable to enter the evaluative realm.  
In either case scenario, and in the case of Jane, what becomes apparent is that 
without the ability to undergo an affective experience, and therefore form rationally 
intelligible motivational states, our relation to the evaluative realm is severed. In the most 
extreme case, embodied by the second case scenario community, the members of the 
community are not only unable to deploy evaluative concepts but are unable to generate 
them. In Jane’s case, she is able to get a hold of the evaluative realm solely because her 
peers, who are able to feel emotions, provide her with a bridge into it. Without them, she 
would be unable to judge evaluatively. And in the first case scenario, the community slowly 
loses the practical dimension of the evaluative realm which, to all effects, means losing the 
evaluative realm as we humans know it. In the absence of affect, we have simply no access 
to the evaluative realm. That is, we are unable to disclose value.  
In conclusion, I want to consider a reverse hypothetical case from the ones we have 
considered so far. I believe that doing so will not only seal the claim that affect plays an 
essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm but it will also illustrate the 
symmetrical dependence between our ability to feel emotions and the coming into 
existence of the evaluative realm as we humans know it. Take the case of Claire. Claire is 
a member of the second case scenario community. She has never felt an emotion before 
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and no one in her community has either. This means that, in contrast to Jane, Claire not 
only is unable to form rationally intelligible motivational states in deploying evaluative 
concepts, but she has never acquired any sort of evaluative knowledge. In turn, this means 
that Claire does not possess evaluative concepts at all and therefore does not possess the 
ability to deploy them. Now suppose that one day a miracle strikes the community and one 
of their members, namely Claire, is suddenly able to feel a glimmer of joy while witnessing 
the birth of a baby. Setting aside complex issues such as whether Claire would be able to 
recognise her feeling as an emotion as such or whether she would be able to express it to 
others, I want to ask whether it is plausible to think that Claire would, in developing her 
feeling of joy, also develop other sorts of feelings, such as feelings of sadness. For suppose 
that Claire, after having witnessed the birth of the baby, cannot stop thinking of the joyful 
event of the mother giving birth. The more Claire thinks about the event she witnessed, the 
more intense the feeling becomes. She forms wishes that the state of affairs continues and 
her wish is rationally intelligible to her due to the joyfulness she experienced in the event. 
Now suppose that the following morning Claire is told that the baby did not survive the 
night. Is it plausible, within the confines of the plausibility of this case scenario, that Claire 
does not feel anything at the tragic news? That is, is it plausible that Claire feels an intense 
and clear joy at the event of the baby’s birth but feels nothing at the news of the baby’s 
death?  
Although it is not impossible to conceive Claire feeling joy at the birth of the baby 
and yet nothing at the baby’s death, I believe that there is a strong intuition behind the 
thought that Claire’s ability to feel joy is somewhat inextricably connected to her ability to 
feel sadness. If so, once Claire is able to feel sadness at the baby’s tragic death, it seems 
   196 
plausible to suggest that then Claire would develop the ability to feel, say, hope for a 
healthy new born. In turn, this might lead Claire to develop the ability to feel 
disappointment if the new born is ill and relief when the new born survives the night and 
is declared out of danger. And so on and so forth. Due to the interdependent relation 
between the ability to feel emotions and the ability to disclose value, the case of Claire 
signals at the same time the implausibility of thinking that she could experience the 
joyfulness of a mother giving birth yet not be able to experience the tragedy of a mother 
losing her child. This thought ties in with Helm’s claim, discussed in the previous chapter, 
that there seem to be rational interconnections between our emotions which in turn means 
that there are rational interconnections between our evaluations. Now, I want to suggest 
that the strength of this intuition derives from the motivational aspect of the affective 
disclosure of value. The implausibility of Claire feeling joy at the baby’s birth yet not 
feeling sadness at the baby’s tragic death derives from the fact that it would mean that 
Claire wants the baby to be healthy but is neutral as to the baby’s death. That is, it derives 
from the implausibility of Claire forming positive rationally intelligible motivational states 
towards the baby’s birth without forming any towards the baby’s death. It’s the 
motivational aspect of our evaluative relation with the world that ties our emotions together 
and therefore our ability to disclose value. Indeed, if the miracle striking Claire would 
consist in her acquiring out of nowhere a bit of propositional knowledge regarding 
joyfulness, including what sort of motivational state one ought to form in the case of 
experiencing joyfulness, but without feeling joy, we would not be surprised at all if Claire 
would not be able to generate and deploy the evaluative concept of sadness, and form the 
relevant motivational state, in the case of the baby’s death. 
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 The message that the case of Claire is meant to convey is that emotiona l 
experiences are part of a single ability to feel emotions. Although some emotions are more 
strongly connected than others to one another, it is implausible to think that an individua l 
could feel a single emotion, say joy, without feeling any other related emotion. Again, the 
implausibility derives from the motivational aspect of emotional experience. The miracle 
that strikes Claire, then, is not simply the bestowal of a compartmentalised ability, that is, 
the ability to feel solely joy in experiencing the joyfulness of the mother giving birth. 
Rather, the miracle consists in the bestowal of the ability to feel emotions. And this means 
that the miracle does not simply consist in gaining access to what joyfulness is, but rather 
it consists in gaining access, little by little, to the evaluative realm as a whole. In becoming 
able to feel emotions and therefore forming rationally intelligible motivational states, 
Claire is now able to disclose value.  
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CONCLUSION 
 To sum up. In this thesis I argued in defence of the claim that affect plays an 
essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. The sort of knowledge at stake is 
the sort that grounds our evaluative concepts. The core of the argument consists in the 
constitutive thesis that the formation of rationally intelligible motivational states towards 
an object or state of affairs is constitutive of the disclosure of the value of the object or 
state of affairs. Since it is in virtue of the affective, or feeling, component of an emotiona l 
experience that we are able to form rationally intelligible motivational states towards an 
object or state of affairs, affect plays an essential role in disclosing the value of the object 
or state of affairs. In other words, affect provides us with a distinctive sort of epistemic 
access to the evaluative features of an object or state of affairs. It is in virtue of this 
distinctive sort of epistemic access to the evaluative features of objects and state of affairs 
that we are able to generate evaluative concepts. 
 One of the main virtues of this account of affect as a disclosure of value is that it 
shows that we need not commit to any of the dominant and controversial theories of the 
phenomenal character of experience in order to theorise and defend the claim that affect 
plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. Another virtue of this 
account is that while it steers clear of the popular debate as to whether emotional experience 
is a sort of perceptual experience of value, it captures one of the key motivations behind 
many of the accounts that want to argue for a positive answer. Indeed, it does so by paying 
close attention at what the analogies and disanalogies between the two sorts of experiences 
are. At the same time, it shows that if we are to argue for the claim that affect is the 
disclosure of value, then we have to commit to a response-dependent notion of the 
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objectivity of value as defended by philosophers such as David Wiggins and John 
McDowell. Needless to say, this position is controversial. The hope is that in having 
clarified in detail the commitments of this positon, and the beneficial consequences of 
committing to it, it begins to look more plausible.  
 More generally, I believe that the arguments in this thesis show the crucial 
importance of the role of emotions in our evaluative relation with the world. As is evident 
from the examples I have relied on throughout the thesis, it is within the ethical domain in 
particular that I believe the arguments in this thesis have most impact. Indeed, I believe 
that the upshot of this thesis is a defence of neo-Aristotelian approaches to moral 
psychology which conceive the relation between emotions and reason as two 
interdependent developmental aspects of our moral upbringing. Thus, they drive a wedge 
in the traditional debate between the Kantian emphasis on moral reasoning as the source of 
moral judgement and motivation and the Humean denigration of reason as the slave of the 
passions. In particular, I believe I have filled in a gap in neo-Aristotelian accounts by 
identifying the meeting point of reason and emotion in the acquisition of evaluative 
knowledge at the level of our motivational states. The arguments of this thesis, then, are 
also a rejection of the assumption common to both Kantian rationalists and Humean 
emotivists that conceives emotions as mere causal, rather than also rational, determinants 
in the formation of moral agency. 
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